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ABSTRACT 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of domestic social actors mobilized for 
peace in several African countries. They did so under unfavorable political conditions. Some of 
them went further and pursued their objective for peace at the level of formal negotiations. This 
particularizing inquiry sought to understand the process leading to their engagement with formal 
negotiations. To achieve this, inquiry focused on two questions: what about the conditions and 
contexts prevailing in the 1990s to early 2000s accounted for social actor’s engagement with 
formal negotiation processes and how civic groups went about doing so. The main argument was 
that certain opportunities within the unfavorable political conditions and social actors’ 
understanding of war accounted for the pursuit of peace objectives at the level of formal 
negotiations. A combination of specific and configurational history strategies were employed to 
reconstruct the process of engagement and the conditions under which it unfolded. This 
reconstruction relied on intrinsic and extrinsic analyses of ten peace campaigns led by religious 
leaders and women organizations that occurred between 1990 and 2005 in Angola, Burundi, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia. Data on these campaigns was collected 
through archival research and face to face interviews.  The resulting account suggests that the 
failure of social actor’s humanitarian activities to mitigate the social and economic suffering 
caused by the war and the failure of formal negotiations to secure a lasting peace led to social 
actors’ pursuit for an end to war. However, to engage with political actors with political, military 
and economic leverage, social actors had to deploy their social resources creatively to pursue 
their demands for peace.  
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, the Council of Churches of Mozambique created a Commission on Peace and 
Reconciliation. At the time, the government of Mozambique was at war with the Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), a group that emerged in the 1970s in opposition to the 
government’s Leninist-Marxist policies. By the early 1980s, the war had reached a destructive 
and brutal phase. Vital social infrastructure was destroyed. The economy was devastated. Large 
numbers of civilians died or were forcefully displaced and enduring harsh conditions. The 
objective of the Commission on Peace and Reconciliation was to persuade the government and 
the RENAMO to end the war through peaceful means—internal dialogue. The Mozambican 
government had started negotiations in 1983 with South Africa a regional ally of the RENAMO, 
resulting in the Nkomati Accord (1984). South Africa provided military support to the 
RENAMO as part of its policy of destabilizing neighboring states that were allied with the 
African National Congress and its struggle against apartheid. Under pressure from the United 
States, the Mozambican government began talks with the RENAMO. However, these broke 
down and the RENAMO launched new attacks in the country that were more brutal and 
predatory.  
The Mozambican church leaders’ objective of persuading the government to end the war 
through dialogue was at odds with a government determined to pursue a military solution and not 
negotiations with a group it did not recognize as a political party. Yet, this did not seem to deter 
church leaders. Their main concern was the destructive nature of the war, particularly the great 
suffering it caused for the people (McVeigh 1999, 183, 189). From 1984 until 1992, the year that 
the government and RENAMO signed an agreement ending war, the Council of Churches of 
Mozambique and the Catholic Church leaders who had joined them persisted in calling for an 
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end to war and its peaceful resolution. The clergy also formed the Contact Group that sought to 
facilitate communication between the government and RENAMO. In addition, a member of the 
Contact Group, Catholic Bishop Gonçalves, became a member of the mediation team that 
brokered the Mozambican peace talks. From the late 1980s onwards, similar initiatives by social 
actors are evident in a number of African countries affected by war, for example, Angola, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Examples of civic groups that sought an end to war 
through peaceful means include the New Sudan Council of Churches, Inter-Faith Mediation 
Committee in Liberia, Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI), Inter-Religious Council of Sierra 
Leone, Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola, and Save Somali Women and 
Children. In addition to calling for an end to violent political conflict, some of these social actors 
went further in pursuing this objective at the level of the formal negotiations processes. This 
study focuses on this aspect of civic groups’ peace activism—the engagement with formal 
negotiations to end internal wars.  
Background to Social Actors’ Engagement with Formal Negotiations 
The conditions under which social actors sought to engage in formal negotiations are 
crucial to understanding this engagement. It was a domestic response to the nature of internal 
conflicts that escalated from the late 1980s and continued into the early 2000s when political 
transitions in a number of sub-Saharan countries turned violent. Whereas internal conflicts such 
as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone were outcomes of violent political transitions of the 1990s, 
those in Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan were a continuation of armed struggles for political 
power that dated back to the early years of independence and were influenced by Cold War 
politics. However, the political competition that accompanied political reforms of the 1990s did 
not resolve these longstanding conflicts. Instead, this triggered new cycles of conflict in a 
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changed domestic context. With the end of the Cold War and shift in donor aid policy, 
governments were under international donor pressure to institute political reforms and adopt 
market-based economies. Whether older or newer, the large scale conflicts in Angola, Burundi, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Somalia form the context in which civic groups 
organized to end war.  
Intractable conflicts are persistent, destructive, and resistant to resolution (Coleman 2006, 
534). Understanding these features of intractable conflicts and how social actors experience them 
is important in understanding, as well, social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. The 
military policies that armed groups and government forces pursued destabilized economic and 
social life. Acts of economic sabotage by armed groups included the destruction of public 
infrastructure—water and electricity supply, roads, bridges, and schools and hospitals. Armed 
groups also destabilized civilians’ livelihoods by looting villagers’ crops and livestock, burning 
farms and mining areas frequented by civilians. Thousands of civilians fled their homes for safer 
areas within or outside the country. Government counterinsurgent policies such as forceful 
evacuation of civilians, their resettlement in villages surrounded by government forces, and 
burning forests considered rebel bases, disrupted civilian life considerably. These war strategies 
denied civilians access to basic services, forcing them to abandon their livelihoods. Large-scale 
displacement, for instance, disrupted agricultural production or led to its demise. The economic 
destabilization and its disruption of agricultural activities impoverished populations that were 
economically self-sufficient. It led to mass starvation and famine. The protracted nature of the 
violent conflicts and their recurring cycles of violence overwhelmed coping mechanisms 
civilians resorted to in times of distress, such as drought periods. Populations became dependent 
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on humanitarian relief provided by churches, women’s organizations, and international 
humanitarian relief organizations.  
The fragmentation of armed groups into rival factions, as well as the proliferation of 
weapons and their unregulated use, created cultures of violence. The traumatic and socially 
destabilizing consequences of these cultures of violence are visible in the deliberate targeting of 
civilians and the level of brutality. War repertoire included brutal and violent attacks, massacres, 
mutilation, and sexual abuse of women. Forceful recruitment of combatants and workers was 
done through abduction of children and youth. These brutal encounters with armed groups and 
government forces caused a lot of confusion, fear, hostility, suspicion, and bitter resentment 
among the affected population. An example is the 1991 “Bor massacre” of Dinka civilians by a 
faction of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (Amnesty International 
[AI] Report 1992, 17).  
Similar to economic destabilizing policies, the brutal repertoire of war sparked large-
scale displacement of populations, disrupting family and social relations. An example is the Siad 
Barre government’s brutal repression of the Isaaq Somali suspected of supporting the Somali 
National Movement (SNM). Over 300,000 Isaaq Somali fled from the north to neighboring 
Ethiopia due to the intense artillery and aerial bombardment of cities and towns by government 
forces and attacks by government-sponsored militia (Bradbury 2008, 53–75; Omar 1993). The 
brutal attacks also provoked armed resistance by civilians who organized militia to protect 
themselves. In Mozambique, for example, the Naprama religious warriors mobilized to counter 
the RENAMO (Chingono 1996, 53–54). Similar attempts by civilians have been documented in 
Sierra Leone and South Sudan. These armed responses from below added to the cycles of 
violence. They contributed to a militarization of society. Civilians found it difficult to pursue 
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their livelihoods with the breakdown of social order and increasing conditions of insecurity and 
uncertainty. 
These internal conflicts also altered social relations, including gender and generation 
relations. Women became heads of households as men either joined the military, were killed, or 
abandoned the family. Women took on the tasks of providing for the family under very difficult 
conditions and often without the protection of husbands or male relatives. They were vulnerable 
to attacks by armed groups and undisciplined government forces. Large numbers of children and 
youths were orphaned or separated from families. With no adult protection many joined the 
military for survival (Peters 2004, 30–31). With the breakdown of social order, elders could not 
discipline the large number of youth with weapons. Few armed groups could discipline their 
troops or control their activities. The government lacked the capacity to protect civilians from the 
armed groups and roaming bands of armed youth.  
Intractable Conflict and Intervention. 
The intractable conflicts posed a number of challenges to humanitarian interventions 
aimed at alleviating the suffering of civilians and to the diplomatic efforts aimed at ending them. 
These challenges are also crucial to understanding social actors’ engagement with formal 
negotiations. First, there is the humanitarian challenge. The economic and social destabilization 
caused by the processes of war resulted in complex humanitarian crises—profound social crises 
induced by war or natural disaster (Binder 2009, 332). People’s strategies for surviving proved 
very difficult under the conditions of war. Thus complex humanitarian crises attracted 
international attention as large sections of the population urgently needed assistance. However, 
international humanitarian actors were confronted with difficult conditions of providing 
assistance to populations in need.  
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Briefly, the humanitarian challenge had to do with access to populations in need of 
assistance, especially those outside urban areas. The destruction of public infrastructure made 
access very difficult. Also and most importantly, the armed groups’ attacks on, threats toward, 
and intimidation of international humanitarian relief agencies and looting of relief aid raised the 
problem of safety and security of humanitarian relief staff. International humanitarian agencies 
withdrew, as they did in Somalia, or were reluctant to intervene under conditions of insecurity, as 
in the first Liberian Civil War.  
The task of providing humanitarian relief in such situations fell to domestic social actors 
since governments and armed groups lacked the capacity or will. The churches were one such 
domestic social actor with a long history of charity and with a national reach that in some cases 
rivaled that of government social service provision. Women’s self-help groups feature in 
accounts of domestic social actors’ attempts to address the war at the local level. These two 
groups of actors relied on social resources acquired through international networks of religious 
organizations and partnerships with international humanitarian agencies such as the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) to address the humanitarian needs created by the war. Some 
of the actors, especially women, mobilized resources locally. Yet, even domestic social actors 
met similar challenges in providing relief as the international humanitarian organizations. They 
faced intimidation and had to negotiate access or find ways of bypassing rebel control of 
communication lines.  
With this kind of challenge, humanitarian relief providers could not make the difference 
actors expected. For actors like the churches, the humanitarian crises created by the violent 
political conflict needed urgent attention. During one of their early visits to President Samora 
Machel, the Protestant and Catholic bishops called attention to the immense suffering the war 
 
 
 
7 
caused for the people and proposed the pursuit of a peaceful resolution through dialogue. In a 
public statement to the government and the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA), Angola’s Roman Catholic bishops called the civil war “a twice-deadly 
organization—it kills with weapons and kills with hunger” (Human Rights Watch 1999). Peace 
activists in other countries expressed similar views. Liberian women, represented by the Liberian 
Women’s Initiative, said that they were tired of the war and suffering they endured. Peace 
activists in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia organized protests, demonstrations, and marches 
against continued fighting. Addressing the humanitarian crisis—the people’s suffering—
effectively required addressing its cause: the violent political conflict and socioeconomically 
destabilizing conditions it created. Only in this way would humanitarian assistance make a 
difference. Instead, as Catholic Bishop Parade Taban of the Diocese of Torit (South Sudan) put 
it, providing humanitarian assistance under such difficult conditions of war was like “fattening a 
cow for slaughter.”  
However, those able to make a difference, the conflicting parties, seemed reluctant or 
disinterested in the humanitarian impact of war, the suffering of the people. This raised a second 
political challenge: continuation of war despite several attempts to end it through dialogue, in 
particular formal negotiations convened by the international community. The formal negotiations 
seemed unable to end war and resolve the political crises. Mediating agents were not the only 
ones concerned by this. The proliferation of armed groups in the course of negotiations, each 
seeking political representation; frequent postponement of talks; frequent violations of cease-fire 
agreements; and breaches of negotiated agreements frustrated war-weary populations. They also 
cast doubt on the integrity of negotiation as a tool for ending war despite peace activists calling 
for its use as a peaceful means. The conflicting parties’ delaying tactics and apparent disregard 
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for formal negotiations seemed to signal a lack of commitment on their part to negotiate for 
peace. The long, drawn-out processes stretched the patience of the affected population and the 
international community. Conflicting parties’ spoiler strategies alienated them from the people 
they claimed to represent—their political constituency. Thus, for some of the peace activists, it 
was not enough to demand an end to war. They sought to engage directly in formal negotiations, 
a form of the dialogue they promoted. Social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations 
varied. The Liberian Women’s Initiative lobbied to be allowed into the Accra (1994) and Abuja 
(1995–96) talks. Burundi women peace activists from the Collectif des Assocations Féminines et 
ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) also lobbied to be included in the Arusha negotiations (1998–2000). 
Other social actors, such as church leaders in Mozambique and Sierra Leone, were invited into 
the negotiations. In some instances, provisions were made for the participation of civil society 
actors. The Somali negotiations beginning with the Djibouti talks (2000) is an example.  
Statement of the Problem 
Social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations took place under unfavorable 
conditions. Civic groups acted during periods of war or unstable peace. The political contexts in 
which they operated had a history of violent repression of political dissent that created a culture 
of fear. Their pursuit of an end to war through peaceful means was at odds with governments and 
armed groups’ preference for a military solution. They faced the problem of being seen as 
political threats to conflicting parties. In addition, formal negotiations are high-level political 
processes with participation exclusive to conflicting parties with the political, military, and 
economic leverage to alter the situation for peace. Social actors such as the Contact Group in 
Mozambique and the Liberian Women’s Initiative do not qualify as parties to the conflict. They 
do not have the status of political representative, nor the military and economic leverage 
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considered necessary for altering the situation for peace. Civic groups thus engaged with the 
formal negotiations from a weak position. Despite these unfavorable political conditions, some 
social actors persisted in engaging directly with the formal negotiations. The purpose of this 
particularizing inquiry is to understand the process of social actors’ engagement with formal 
negotiations to end intractable conflict that escalated in a number of African countries during the 
1990s. Social actors’ engagement here refers to civic groups’ pursuit of peace objectives in the 
formal negotiation process.  
Research Question and Main Argument 
This study sought to find out: What about the context and conditions accounts for civic 
groups’ engagement with formal negotiation processes? What specific conditions in the broader 
political context and among the civic groups accounts for this? How did the civic groups go 
about engaging with the formal negotiations? Two arguments are made in answer to this 
questions. 
First, certain opportunities existed within the risky political conditions of war and in the 
formal negotiation processes that civic groups used to directly engage with the formal 
negotiations. These had to do with conditions related to social actors, for example the 
humanitarian resources they had that allowed them to play an important role locally and among 
affected populations. Other conditions are external to social actors, such as the international 
community’s frustration with spoiler strategies conflicting parties used to delay, derail, or 
abandon talks. This created an opening for social actors to act in support of advancing the 
negotiation process.  
The second argument is that social actors’ understanding of the violent internal conflict 
as “suffering” and “not the voice of the people” motivated their demand for an end to war and its 
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peaceful resolution. More importantly, the frustration ordinary people felt over conflicting 
parties’ failure to end war—“people’s suffering”—led civic groups to pursue their objective for 
peace by directly engaging with the formal negotiations.  
Research Objectives  
The research tasks of the study were to:  
a) identify the conditions that made it possible for social actors to act for a peaceful 
resolution to the intractable conflicts.  
b) reconstruct the sequence of events linking these conditions to civic groups’ different 
ways of engaging with the formal negotiations.  
Conceptual Framework 
Concepts from the dynamics of contention (DOC) framework (McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007) were used to organize an overall account of plot 
development from the conditions that made social actors’ engagement possible to how these led 
to their engagement with the formal negotiations. The narrative analysis begins with a 
description of broad social change processes resulting from violent political transitions and war. 
This description highlights the key transformative moments that had an effect on peace activists 
such as the complex humanitarian crises that overwhelmed their coping strategies.  
The narrative analysis then shifts towards elaborating on the link between these 
conditions and the process leading to social actors’ engagement. The process begins with social 
actors’ collective attribution of the social consequences of war and their experience of it to an 
unbearable “suffering.” This process involves a few individuals doing something to end the 
suffering. Through mechanisms of encounter and conversations, they lead the process of 
collective attribution of the war and its resolution. They also disseminate the resulting shared 
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story or new theory of war to conflicting parties, the public, and external actors (governments, 
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations). Dissemination involved the 
appropriation of existing social bases and their resources, creation of new vehicles of 
coordination to coordinate their pursuit of an end to war, and later engagement with formal 
negotiations. In the course of collective contention for peace social actors activated sociocultural 
or religious identities such as mothers, prophets, or princes of peace to define themselves.  
Social actors’ interactions with conflicting parties, the public, and external actors 
combined with mechanisms of opening their activity into the broader political context led to 
different forms of engagement. Groups like the Liberia Women’s Initiative and Burundi women 
members of the Collectif des Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) sought entry 
into formal negotiations. Provisions were made for them to participate in formal negotiation 
processes, as in the example of the Somali women’s organizations. The religious leaders’ 
engagement shows they were invited as a result of their roles in brokering communication 
between conflicting parties.  
Definition of Terms 
Social actors are civic groups that organized to pursue an end to intractable conflicts. In 
this study these are groups led by religious leaders and women’s organizations. They are also 
referred to as noncombatant groups. Although they are nonstate actors like the armed groups 
opposed to the government, unlike the latter, noncombatant groups used nonviolent means to 
pursue their objectives for an end to violent political conflict.  
Social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations refers to civic groups’ pursuit of peace 
objectives in formal negotiation processes.  
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Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited to the analysis of two groups of social actors, religious leaders and 
women’s organizations. Ten peace campaigns led by religious leaders and women’s 
organizations were identified in seven sub-Saharan African countries where intractable wars 
escalated between 1990 and 2005 when political transitions turned violent (Appendix 1). These 
countries are Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Since 
this is a particularizing inquiry employing strategies of specific and configurational history, the 
findings are limited to the specific contexts and actors studied and are not intended to be 
generalizable to other periods and contexts.  
Significance of the Study 
The social actors’ pursuit of their peace objectives at the level of formal negotiations is a 
fairly recent and under-studied phenomenon. This study tells the little-known story of these 
noncombatant mobilizations for peace in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Even less is known about attempts by some of the peace activists to engage directly in formal 
negotiations. Analyses of formal negotiations to end the wars of the 1990s in countries such as 
Angola, Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone persistently stress the difficulties mediators 
faced and the daunting challenges presented by conflicting parties with little interest in pursuing 
a peaceful resolution or committing to one. The role of civic groups such as noncombatant 
groups is discussed in terms of their relevance to the mediator or conflicting parties. Thus, civic 
groups appear as auxiliaries to the mediation or as constituents of one or more of the conflicting 
parties. Rarely do they exercise agency in the negotiations themselves. Conflicting parties and 
mediating agents are key actors. Civic groups and ordinary citizens are depicted as having no 
political agency in the direction the war takes. This study highlights the political agency of civic 
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groups in peacemaking and what allowed them to exercise this agency despite the odds against 
them.  
Outline of the Study 
The study is organized as follows:  
Chapter 2 examines how literature on social movements and management of intractable 
conflict addresses the question of social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. Chapter 3 
describes the nature of the study, research process, analytical frame, and constraints encountered. 
Chapter 4 presents the setting of social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. It highlights 
the conditions leading to social actors’ engagement. Chapters 5 and 6 account for the process 
leading to social actors’ pursuit of a peaceful resolution to war. Chapter 5 focuses on peace 
actions led by religious leaders, whereas Chapter 6 focuses on those led by women’s 
organizations. Chapter 7 focuses on how social actors engaged in formal negotiations. The study 
ends with conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Why do social actors mobilized against war engage directly in formal negotiations? What 
are the contexts and conditions that account for this engagement? How do they go about 
engaging in the formal negotiation process? This chapter discusses how scholarly work on 
nonviolent social movements, conflict resolution, and conflict management addresses these 
questions. Analysis focuses first on how the literature accounts for nonviolent civic resistance to 
war, relating these earlier discussions to social actors’ mobilization to end war in sub-Saharan 
African countries during the 1990s and early 2000s. This is followed by a consideration of how 
scholars approach social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. This discussion is directed 
toward contexts and conditions that make nonviolent resistance to internal war possible.  
2.1. Nonviolent Resistance to War 
War resistance movements are a type of peace movement. Both are new phenomena in 
history (Carter 1992, xiii; Cortright 2008, 155–156). Antiwar and peace movements are also 
classified as well-known forms of social movements. Hence they can be defined as “collectivities 
acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational 
channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally 
or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are 
a part” (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004, 11). Similarly, a study of African social movements 
defines these movements as a “broad crystallization of group activity autonomous of the state” 
(Mamdani 1995, 7). Social actors’ peace campaigns fit these descriptions. They were led by 
religious leaders’ and/or women’s organizations that coordinated peace action autonomously, 
outside of political institutional channels. Their actions challenged conflicting parties’ use of 
military means to settle conflict. They supported a peaceful resolution to the war including the 
 
 
 
15 
use of formal negotiations. Mamdani and Wamba argue that their perspective on social 
movements is reflective of “concrete social processes” on the African continent. First, it captures 
the diverse organizational forms that make up social movements. They point out that worker 
movements, as an example, include older groups such as burial societies. In other words, social 
movements in Africa have both old and new forms of self-organization and so defy new social 
movement definitions that differentiate between older class-based movements and new 
community-based movements. Second, this broad perspective focuses on all internal forces, 
whether elite or popular, that are autonomous of the state. Third, social movements in Africa 
may include initiatives by apolitical nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as 
initiatives that are antigovernment and political. Given the realities of the African continent, the 
new social movement orientation restricts inquiry by imposing Western-based definitions on the 
African context. These features apply to the peace campaigns led by religious leaders and 
women’s organizations. They organized in the form of networks bringing together older groups 
like professional associations, labor organizations, students, elites, ordinary people, traditional 
organizations, community-based women’s groups, and NGOs. 
War resistance movements, according to Cortright, are particular reactions to processes 
of militarization or “responses to specific, unjust military actions that are deemed unacceptable 
by large numbers of people.” Antiwar movements are considered examples of pragmatic or 
conditional pacifism. Activists’ perspectives on violence may range from complete rejection of 
military violence to acceptance of limited use of force for self-defense, justice, and protecting the 
innocent (Cortright 2008, 14). Antiwar movements often follow a single objective of preventing 
or ending war. They oppose particular wars or military policies (Carter 1992, 18). They are thus 
distinct from those that engage in mutual understanding and transnational cooperation. 
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Historically they have included “traditional peace organizations,” and people from diverse 
backgrounds who are committed to ending war. Movement participants are also committed to the 
use of nonviolent methods to pursue their objectives. An exact differentiation of antiwar 
movements is difficult. The movements bring together groups and individuals that support an 
end to war in addition to other objectives such as social change or justice. The campaigns led by 
religious leaders and women’s organizations qualify as war resistance movements as they were 
reactions against the unprecedented violence and its traumatic effects in society. They brought 
together groups and individuals opposed to conflicting parties’ pursuit of a military solution to 
settle their conflicts. Their main objective was ending war peacefully. Unlike antiwar movements 
in the West, they did not have “traditional peace organizations,” although they may have been 
supported by external actors who qualify as such, for instance, Quaker peace organizations. 
Social actors did not outrightly reject violence. Although it is difficult to establish conclusively 
whether social actors completely rejected use of violence or force, some, like the Liberian peace 
activists, supported international military intervention to prevent escalation of war.  
2.1.1 Nonviolent War Resistance in Postcolonial Africa. Unlike the extensive scholarship 
on violent resistance in postcolonial Africa, very little scholarly work is devoted to nonviolent 
resistance in the same geographic region. The earliest documented nonviolent antiwar activism 
in Africa is the transnational protest against French nuclear testing in the Sahara (Carter 1992; 
Cortright 2008, 136; Herb 2005, 355; Sutherland and Meyer 2000, 36–42). This protest took 
place during the 1950s and 1960s, the period of the antinuclear movement. Western public fear 
of the effects of nuclear tests and weapons motivated widespread movements against the 
production and testing of nuclear weapons. Ghanian President Kwame Nkrumah fully supported 
the 1959 protests against French nuclear testing in the Sahara that were organized by the 
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Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA). The protests were not covered by the French press 
or other Western media compared to those of Western antinuclear movements. Herb (2005, 355) 
states that despite this, the Sahara Protests led to the establishment of the World Peace Brigade 
and to a training center for nonviolent action in Tanzania in 1961. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia 
requested the World Peace Brigade’s support in training and coordinating mass action for the 
independence of Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe). Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania offered to host the World Peace Brigade Africa headquarters in Dar-es-
Salaam. Inspired by the Sahara protests, these two nationalists wanted the same nonviolent 
methods applied to the liberation struggle in their countries and region (Sutherland and Meyer 
2000, 62).  
Elsewhere in Africa, evidence of peace movements included civic groups in South Africa 
that mobilized against the militarization of society by the apartheid regime’s violent repression 
of the black struggle for liberation during the 1980s (Cherry 2011; Conway 2008; Gidron, Katz, 
and Hasenfeld 2002, 73–74). Groups like the women’s human rights group Black Sash, 
Christian-based youth groups, and the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) in South Africa, led 
by white South African conscientious objectors, pursued a variety of objectives under an overall 
goal of ending state violence against black South Africans. In the 1990s, civic groups mobilized 
for a peaceful transition from apartheid to a democratic state. The apartheid government chose to 
undertake political reforms under great international pressure. Then-president F. W. de Klerk 
initiated negotiations with resistance movements as part of a political strategy aimed at 
dismantling the apartheid state and establishing a democratic system. The negotiation process 
was very difficult. In a number of instances violence seemed to derail the process. Civic groups 
stepped in to mobilize for peace in society. 
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African peace movements rarely get mention in studies of peace movements. When they 
do, the mobilizations for peace in South Africa are often used as an example. Yet, during the 
1990s, news reports of public demonstrations, protests, and marches included references to 
peace. These also mentioned the nonviolent (e.g., peaceful) nature of the demonstrations or 
marches. During the same period, there were regional and international conferences focusing on 
peace. In these and other conferences civic groups reported their peace activism. These were 
responses to the violent political transitions from authoritarian rule that escalated into civil wars 
in some countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. 
Reasons given for the absence of African antiwar protests in the literature on peace 
movements include problems of action going undocumented or ignored by media or receiving 
less publicity, western bias in the literature, and African people’s primary interest in social 
justice and not (nuclear) disarmament (Herb 2005; Sutherland and Meyer 2000). Other reasons, 
such as those given by Herb (2005), do not reflect the complex reality. For instance, she claims 
that most current wars in the South are civil wars and that the population is sharply divided along 
ideological lines. This implies that peace movements are unlikely to emerge in such a context, 
since an important ingredient is the need for face-to-face contact to establish relationships of 
trust. This is not always the case. The women’s campaigns in Liberia and Somalia, for instance, 
emerged despite ideological differences. These differences did not necessarily go away. Women 
had to face the challenge of how to overcome them.  
A second claim is the lack of civilian institutions and democratic structures in many 
developing countries. This claim assumes peace movements can only emerge in contexts similar 
to that of the liberal western democratic state, where freedom of assembly and expression are 
universally granted rights. Again, the reality in Africa challenges this. As Mamdani and Wamba-
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dia-Wamba (1995, 7) have argued, Herb seems to apply a western lens to her examination of 
social or peace movements to the Southern context. With regard to the African social context, 
this prevents her from noticing the variety of organizational forms, traditional and new, that 
already exist and that people in Africa often use to make demands on the state or political elite. 
A group of Somali women, for instance, not only structured their women’s organizations on 
western NGO models but also relied on traditional self-help forms of organizations and networks 
of kin ties to make their case for an end to war. Also, during the period of transition from 
authoritarian regimes, a number of governments repealed laws restricting civil and political 
rights. This study contributes evidence of peace action in countries other than South Africa so as 
to fill the gap in the peace movement literature on antiwar action in postcolonial Africa.  
2.2 Context and Conditions of Civic Groups Mobilized against War and for Its Peaceful 
Resolution 
Collective action in opposition to war is a political act that places the challengers in a 
threatening position. It may cost lives and lead to retaliation from the government and from 
political actors who believe the pursuit of war is a justifiable policy option in the interest of the 
nation or objectives of political transformation. Civic groups engaged in collective action take a 
position that could be perceived as a threat by the political actors they challenge. So why would 
civic groups bother to collectively act for an end to the use of the military in these conflicts and 
demand that political actors pursue peaceful resolution? What about the contexts and conditions 
makes this possible?  
The peace movement literature focuses on peace actions by social actors in Western 
Europe, North America, and Japan (Carter 1992; Cortright 2008; Kaltefleiter and Pfaltgraff 
1988; Nepstad 2008; Rochon 1988). These antiwar movements were a reaction to World War I, 
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the antinuclear and nuclear disarmament movements in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and 1980s, 
and the protests against the US war in Vietnam. They occured in mostly liberal democratic 
regimes and in a global context characterized by two major wars (WWI and II) that involved 
most European countries and a Cold (ideological) War between the United States and the former 
Soviet Union and their allies. 
The predominance of peace activity in Europe (United Kingdom) and the United States is 
attributed to factors in these countries that enabled the flourishing of peace societies such as 
Quaker-influenced groups: Protestant Christianity, political liberalism, and the free market 
economy (Carter 1992, 4). This is a kind of structural argument based on cultural, political, and 
economic conditions that is often invoked to explain the rise of the western liberal democratic 
state; in this context, it explains the emergence of peace action and its ability to sustain itself 
over several years. Some scholars point to social actors’ concern for the “horrors of war,” the 
brutal nature of Nazi and fascist regimes, the danger of atomic and nuclear bombs, the cost to 
society of the arms race, and the unjust nature of wars as motivating factors toward organizing 
against war and militarism. On the other hand, factors that constrain peace action may include a 
“rigid and intolerant political climate” such as the anticommunist and intolerant political climate 
in the United States during the 1950s, diviseness and sectarianism within the movement, political 
backlash created by the movement’s emergence, and the credibility and viability of claims and 
alternative solutions (Cortright 2008, 127–155). These claims show the drivers of peace action to 
be factors internal to peace actors and to an environment restrictive for political action. They 
imply that social actors may act on the basis of beliefs they have about war, yet this action may 
be constrained by a hostile political environment. Most of these factors could apply beyond 
western political contexts to non-Western contexts and are of interest to this study. They 
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combine a structural and agency perspective to accounting for peace action. Other scholars point 
to features of advanced industrial societies, for instance the crisis in the political system, actors’ 
accumulation of resources necessary for launching peace actions, and the political openings 
created by intense competition between rival political elites (Rochon 1988, 16–19). These 
answers show also that scholars search for conditions that make peace movements possible in 
these movements’ external or internal environments. Thus, accounts of what leads to peace 
movements reflect theories of social movements. Social movement research suggests answers 
that highlight structural factors, agency, and a combination of both.  
2.2.1 Structures and Movement Emergence. The dominant structural account of the 
emergence of collective action is the political process theory and its variants (Goodwin and 
Jasper 2004, 3–8). The model focuses on three components that account for the emergence of 
collective action (Morris 2004, 234–237): mobilization structures, political opportunity 
structures, and cultural framing. Mobilizing structures are the informal and formal vehicles of 
collective action. These include informal networks, existing institutional structures, and formal 
organizations. Collective action emerges when organizations engage in recruitment, acquisition 
of resources, and coordination of collective action.  
Political opportunity structures are the dimensions of a given political environment, such 
as the nature of elite relations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly and 
Tarrow 2007), that allow for the emergence of collective action. Examples include divisions 
among political elites, the emergence of new external allies, or the opening of political space. 
Changes in the structure of this political environment create openings that benefit challengers. 
Challengers exploit these changes to mobilize. Expansion or opening up of opportunities thus 
leads to collective action. This happens through mechanisms in the environment such as 
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attribution of opportunities or threats, availability of potential allies, formation of coalitions, and 
framing of contention (Tarrow 2011, 163). 
Collective cultural frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire 
and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and 
Snow 2000, 614–615). Cultural framing processes are interactive in the sense that they involve 
actors negotiating their shared meanings for a problem they face and how to respond. The task 
involves identifying the problem and its attributions (“diagonostic framing,” “prognostic 
framing,” and “motivational framing”). These tasks allow for the consensus necessary for people 
to engage in collective action to mobilize. In other words people make sense of a problem facing 
them in terms that suggest a way out and motivate them to do something about the problem. 
These political process theories were directly relevant to this study’s questions. First, they 
shared with this study a focus on political context and conditions of social actors’ pursuit of 
peace action. Since the political opportunity structure directs attention to political conditions in 
which social movements mobilize, it was useful for identifying and describing the specific 
political factors that led to collective action against war and for entry into formal negotiations. 
Political dimensions of a given peace environment are particularly important in this study. Peace 
movements’ rejection of war centers them in the political arena because decisions about military 
policy are considered the sole preserve of the state and not that of civic groups. They may find 
themselves in the kind of hostile environment describe by Cortright (2008). Second, the political 
process models focus on mobilizing structures and cultural framing, directing attention toward 
conditions among social actors that drive them to engage in peace actions. Inquiry in this study is 
approached from the perspective of social actors’ experiences. Therefore, an important question 
related to cultural frames and mobilizing structures concerns what these actors had in hand and 
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whether it allowed them to act despite politically threatening conditions or even resistance from 
within.  
Variants of political process models give different emphases on each of these components 
and have been critiqued for their “structural bias and determinism.” The dynamics of contention 
(DOC) framework is an attempt to address this criticism by focusing on relational dynamics 
between the three components (Kriesi 2004, 77–79). This directs analysis toward the interactive 
context and accounts for social actors’ peace actions in terms of mechanisms and processes that 
show how interaction between social movement actors and political actors they oppose 
contribute to changes in the larger political context. The DOC framework has a conceptual 
toolkit that emphasizes the dynamic interaction between the three components of political 
process models. It highlights not only the structural conditions but also agency and action of 
social actors. Although the DOC has been applied largely in studying Western peace and social 
movements, proponents have called for its use in systematic analysis of non-Western peace and 
social movements. This particularizing study does not employ the framework concepts with the 
aim of testing theory. However, the study used the mechanisms to construct an intrinsic and 
extrinsic analysis of the politically restrictive conditions for factors that led to social actors’ 
peace actions.  
2.2.2 Agency. Structural variables account in part for what makes social actors’ peace 
action possible. The other part of the story is concerned with the question of human agency. It 
arises from observations such as Einwoher’s that collective action is driven not only by 
environmental factors and conditions external to movement actors. Political openings may exist, 
and mobilizing structures may be available, or people may have an understanding of the 
situation, yet no collective action occurs. This means we have to look for conditions within 
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actors that account for why they bother to do something about their situation. This directs 
attention to the role of human agency. Whereas Morris (2004, 235–37) acknowledges that 
structural accounts of political process models do make room for human agency—for example, 
social movement agency is attributed to a political elite—it is framed as a factor external to 
movement actors, leaving us with little understanding of their agency. He gives the example of 
how the political opportunity structure allows for agency by suggesting that groups collectively 
act if they make use of the favorable conditions created by a new political opening. Even though 
the political opportunity structure approach centers the interaction between political elite (state 
agents) and challengers, more emphasis is given to the former. This neglect of social movement 
actors’ agency prevents us from seeing how challengers are able to generate and sustain 
movements. This argument is similar to Einwohner’s (2003). Her studies of Jewish resistance in 
Poland show that civic groups resisted despite severely restricted opportunities for collective 
action (2003). They went ahead and planned their resistance fully aware that they lacked 
opportunities or that their situation was hopeless. What made their resistance possible was the 
way they framed it as a way to display honor and dignity. The appeal to values or moral beliefs is 
evident in African social actors’ peace actions. South African antiwar activists launched their 
resistance at the peak of the antiapartheid regime’s repression of black uprisings.  
Morris argues that political process theorists’ assumption of a strong relationship between 
external political opportunities and collective action restricts understanding of how the 
mobilization capacity of social actors leads to collective action. Political process theorists 
assume that external political opportunities first become available before challengers take action. 
This characterizes social actors as merely reacting to their external environment when they have 
the potential to take action that shapes it. He considers the collective action a result, too, of the 
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capacity of challenging groups (2004, 236). Therefore, social actors’ peace action happens 
through a reciprocal interaction between mobilizing capacity of social actors and external 
political opportunities. He argues that this more closely reflects empirical evidence than political 
process theories of how external political opportunities make social movements happen.  
To fill this gap in the literature on what generates collective action, Morris focuses on 
“how mobilization capacities generate collective action.” Mobilization capacities refer to 
challenging groups’ agency-laden institutions and frame lifting, leadership configurations, 
tactical solutions, protest histories, and transformative events. He notes that these are movement 
dynamics and not independent triggers of collective action. Agency-laden institutions, such as 
the African American church, are institutions developed by potential challengers. They are 
“configurations of cultural beliefs and practices that permeate and shape their social networks.” 
These institutions contain cultural and organizational resources that potential challengers can use 
to launch collective action. In frame lifting, leaders shape their collective action to fit an 
institutional frame. So the collective action fits in with (2004, 236) “cultural, emotional schemata 
of actors embedded in relevant social networks.”  
Morris’s argument about human agency contributes to work on leadership and its role in 
social movements. Nepstad and Bob (2006) argue that leaders matter at crucial moments such as 
the emergence of social movements. They possess leadership capital, that is, cultural, social, and 
symbolic capital. This capital allows them to read and respond to structural conditions and 
changes in opportunities. Leadership capital is crucial for the emergence of social movements 
because it compensates for a lack of material resources, political opportunities, and 
organizational structures. Ganz (2005, 211) explains in a related argument how actors with fewer 
resources can defeat those with more resources. According to him, strategic capacity—that is, the 
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conditions of a leadership team that facilitate effective strategy—is a crucial condition for the 
emergence of collective action. 
Einwohner adds to this debate on agency and leadership by showing how authority work 
matters in the emergence of collective action. Authority work is “those efforts made by leaders to 
establish their authority in the eyes of potential followers” (2007, 1321). She argues that for 
collective action to emerge, actions leaders take (authority work) must convince people to obey 
them voluntarily. The type of authority work leaders choose varies according to settings, existing 
cultural understandings, and leaders’ perceptions of what resonates with followers. Authority 
work focuses on leaders establishing their credibility and authority. 
Although the recent work on agency centers on the role of movement actors, structural 
factors are not dismissed. The emerging theme therefore is the reciprocal relationship between 
structure and agency. Structural accounts tell part of the story of why civic groups collectively 
act. Collective action requires agency and “conscious awareness” and involves choices about 
initiating one action and not another (Jasper 2004, 2). Structural conditions may be favorable yet 
potential challengers can still lack leadership capital or strategic capacity or could fail to do the 
authority work required to attract followers. These insights on agency resonate with this study’s 
concern with what social actors had that led to their engagement in formal negotiations. This 
question not only considers external but also internal conditions. They direct inquiry to leaders of 
civic groups that organized for peace. This permits a fuller and more balanced account of what 
makes social actors’ engagement of formal negotiations possible. However, accessing 
information that would provide a rich description of social actors’ mobilizing capacity toward 
participating in formal negotiations proved a research challenge. This challenge applies not only 
to the present study but also to studies relying on such sources of information; systematic inquiry 
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requires collection of primary data especially for social actors whose actions have not been 
extensively recorded or are under-studied, such as peace activists in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
study used DOC framework as a first step to further research that would incorporate the insights 
of agency social movement literature. The DOC permits for agency of social actors, and concepts 
from this framework were used to identify specific external conditions and those pertaining to 
social actors that led to their engagement in formal negotiations and how this happened. 
2.3 Structure, Agency, and Civic Groups Mobilized to Seek Entry into Formal Negotiations  
There is hardly any mention in peace movement literature of peace activists pursuing 
their antiwar objectives at the level of formal negotiations. However, Carter notes three 
tendencies in peace movements’ positions on negotiations based on her observation of Western 
antinuclear movements. They tend to a) exert pressure on conflicting parties to achieve success 
or promote a particular negotiating position; b) urge unilateral measures of restraint; and c) call 
for negotiations. The question of engaging in formal negotiations arises in her claim that “in 
challenging military policies peace campaigns have raised key questions about the accountability 
of governments to Parliament and public in this sphere, and about the right of the public defense 
decisions directly” (1992, 23–24). These have relevance for civic groups’ mobilization in Africa.  
Literature on peacebuilding and conflict resolution addresses civic groups’ engagement in 
formal negotiations. The general consensus is that civil society actors have an important role in 
building a peaceful society. This is attributed to the complex nature of internal wars in the post-
Cold war period. A more comprehensive and broad definition of the internal wars and their 
resolution expands options for responding to them at the state and societal levels (Jones 2001, 9–
10; Sisk 2001). These wars affected ordinary people’s lives and livelihoods in profound ways. 
The social impact accentuated issues that mattered, such as suffering, survival (e.g., lives and 
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livelihoods), and values (e.g., predominant use of violence to pursue political goals). These 
human needs issues at the heart of intractable conflicts became as important as concerns with 
political stability and security. Since the state and state elite-oriented traditional diplomatic 
approaches proved inadequate in finding lasting peace, policy makers increasingly relied on the 
support of international and domestic nonstate actors. This is evident in the dominant role 
international NGOs and their local partners play in addressing complex humanitarian and social 
crises created by internal conflicts (Natsios 1997, 338). Similar to the peace activists in this 
study, a number of international and domestic civil society actors became involved in peace 
efforts as a result of their humanitarian work (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 195).  
Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008, 16) note that there is stronger agreement on an important 
role for civic groups in postconflict than in violent conflict and negotiation phases. Whether civic 
groups have an important role to play as peace agents throughout conflict and negotiation 
remains a contested issue mainly because of concerns that the violence severely restricts groups’ 
options and opportunities. They are vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, or threats to their 
lives from conflicting parties or from sections of society opposed to their demands for peace. 
Heightened insecurity and societal tensions keep them from reaching groups across dividing 
lines or traveling to areas outside their operational bases, thereby preventing peace action from 
spreading beyond its site of origin. The religious leaders and women’s peace activists in this 
study faced similar restrictive conditions. Nevertheless, as Nepstad has argued (2008, 5), there 
are instances where peace activists chose to act regardless of a restrictive war opportunity 
structure. This study examines what conditions and contexts make them do so.  
With regard to the negotiation phase, the contention in conflict management and 
resolution literature is over whether civic groups can be mediators or direct participants. Some 
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scholars reject a formal mediator (“track one”) role for civic groups because they lack the 
leverage of a political mediator in terms of authority and resources required to see the 
negotiation process through to a political settlement and its implementation (Aall 1997, 434; 
Dunn and Kriesberg 2002; Westas 1988, 58, 60). Although nongovernmental organizations such 
as the Sant’ Egidio (Mozambique), International Alert (Sierra Leone), and the former Tanzanian 
president’s Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Burundi) increasingly engaged in political mediation 
after the post-Cold War, they relied on the assistance of governments and the international 
community to see the processes through to completion. The nearest that a domestic influential 
social actor took to a political mediation role is when Mozambican Archbishop Gonçalves joined 
the mediation team that included the Sant’ Egidio, a northern nongovernmental organization. 
This study is concerned with how this happened. What conditions led to his participation at this 
level? One answer that is useful for this study is that civic groups participate in formal 
negotiations as a result of their humanitarian work (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 195). 
A second view considers unofficial intermediary roles as more appropriate for social 
actors and within the limits of what they can do. These “track two” roles complement, support, 
or link to the official (track one) peace process through a process of transference. They include 
informal intermediary efforts such as opening up opportunities for communication, facilitating 
communication between conflicting parties and informal mediation, use of good offices, and 
supporting proposals and efforts towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. In performing these 
informal intermediary roles, domestic civil society actors “set the table” for formal negotiations 
(Jessop, Aljets, and Chacko 2008, 94). Their proposals may be adopted by an international 
mediator.  
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As for direct participation in formal peace processes, studies of political negotiation 
processes conceptualize this peacemaking role as the preserve of incumbent governments’ armed 
groups and political parties because they have the political, military, and economic leverage to 
alter the situation (Zartman 1995, 3). Proponents for inclusive political negotiations argue that 
civil society does have a role to play in formal negotiations (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 18). 
Their inclusion would permit public ownership of the peace agreements and contribute to 
sustainable peace (Barnes 2002; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, 80–82). However, skeptics caution that 
opening up political negotiations to public participation may jeopardize their integrity and 
undermine their progress. Conflicting parties would question the participation of ordinary 
citizens with no clearly identified political constituency (Goulding, 2002). Similar to the 
traditional formal negotiations approaches, skeptics consider the exclusive participation of 
governments and armed groups crucial to a negotiated settlement. Nonstate actors may 
participate as mediators or as constituents of conflicting parties (Pruitt 1981, 201–217; Rubin, 
Pruitt, and Kim 1994, 196–215; Zartman 1995).  
In conclusion, social movements literature focuses on peace campaigns in the West. 
Much is known about these campaigns yet little is known about peace movements in Africa. Not 
much is known about the political context and conditions driving domestic social actors’ pursuit 
of peace objectives at formal negotiations. The idea of civic groups’ engagement with formal 
negotiations still seems new despite acknowledgement of the need for new approaches to 
mediating or negotiating intractable conflicts that take into consideration concerns other than 
power interests of belligerents. Human security and welfare needs have gained importance 
because of the complex humanitarian crises and economic devastation caused by intractable 
wars. The conflict resolution literature seems more concerned with an appropriate role for social 
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actors that fit in with traditional approaches to formal negotiations than with learning from what 
it meant to have social actors at the formal negotiations. Systematic study of the different social 
actors’ engagement of formal negotiations is crucial yet lacking. It would shed light on how 
sections of society often conceptualized as constituents of belligerents understand the formal 
negotiation process. This knowledge is important for mediating agents who have to consider not 
only facilitating negotiations between belligerents but gauge public support for the final accord 
and its implementation. It would also shed more light on the challenge of connecting peace 
action from below with action from above so that negotiated settlements are adhered to by 
conflicting parties. Studies of formal negotiations pay very little attention to social actors’ 
engagement and treat it as unimportant. When one mediating agent was asked to give his view of 
the inclusion of women at a formal negotiation process, he replied that they were doing nothing 
at the talks. Dismissive remarks or attitudes do not advance learning on a process that is yet to 
overcome challenges that intractable conflicts present. The examples of Syria, Iraq, Central 
African Republic, and South Sudan show that these challenges are not lessening or getting easier. 
The above analysis of the literature points to gaps in knowledge of social actors’ 
engagement with peace negotiations in postcolonial Africa. The little research and 
undocumented peace actions in African countries does not help advance knowledge of African 
social actors’ agency on matters of peaceful resolution of war. Much needs to be done in 
recording these actions. Although it is encouraging to read memoirs by peace activists such as 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Leymah Gbowee, these are few compared to numerous activists who 
engaged in peace action during the 1990s and 2000s. International and domestic NGOs have 
documented peace actions. However these are oriented toward best practices of mainly peace 
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building and not the peace action that included direct engagement with political actors as social 
actors did at negotiation venues.  
This study fills the knowledge gap by undertaking a specific history of social actors’ 
engagement with formal negotiations. A specific history enabled the reconstruction of conditions 
in the external environment and among social actors that led to such engagement. This 
highlighted the structural conditions of their engagement and their peace agency role. Instead of 
identifying a role for social actors, the study constructed one based on social actors’ 
understanding of war and their own contribution to its resolution. Intrinsic and extrinsic narrative 
analyses were employed to connect to account for what made civic groups mobilize to enter into 
formal negotiations. The dynamics of contention framework, a political process model, was used 
as a narrative frame to guide plot development connecting conditions to social actors’ 
engagement with formal negotiations.  
 
 
 
 
 
33 
Chapter 3. METHODS 
The purpose of this particularizing inquiry was to understand how specific social actors 
mobilized for peace came to engage with formal negotiation processes that sought an end to 
intractable conflicts in specific sub-Saharan African countries during the 1990s and early 2000s. 
According to Hall (1999, 3, 177), a particularizing inquiry is directed more toward a 
“comprehensive analysis” of a single phenomenon than the analysis of this phenomenon as a 
special case of a general theory or law. In light of this explanation, this study sought to 
reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the different forms of engagement rather than 
analyze the social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations as cases of a general theory. The 
aim was not to generalize beyond particular instances of social actors’ engagement with formal 
negotiations. The concern was with what social actors in specific contexts of war did to pursue 
their objectives of peace at formal negotiation processes. Thus the conclusions are limited to the 
particular time frame and locations of social actors’ engagement: the 1990s and early 2000s, in 
the political contexts of specific sub-Saharan African countries.  
3.1 Nature of the Study 
The study examined what made it possible for social actors mobilized for peace to pursue 
this objective further at formal negotiation processes and how they went about it. These two 
questions guided inquiry. The questions suggested an approach to examining social actors’ 
engagement with formal negotiations from their perspective and an analysis of the conditions in 
which their engagement unfolds. This approach is in line with two particularizing strategies (Hall 
1999, 210–220), specific developmental history and configurational history. Practices of these 
two strategies were used in combination to reconstruct social actors’ engagement with the formal 
negotiations and conditions that seemed unfavorable to such action. Specific developmental 
 
 
 
34 
history seeks to understand a sociohistorical phenomenon, that is, a set of events, sequences, 
patterns, or outcomes that are meaningful to actors involved. With regard to this study, the 
strategy of specific history was useful in understanding how social actors went about engaging 
with the formal negotiation process by analyzing this process in terms meaningful to them. In 
other words the reconstruction of the process relied on social actors’ invocation of events and 
what these events meant for them. Configurational history, on the other hand, relies on existing 
theoretical frame or template to account for how events unfold in historical time. In relation to 
this study, the overall account of the engagement with formal negotiations follows the Dynamic 
of Contention (DOC) framework, a political process model that directs attention to the 
interaction between structural conditions and agency of social actors. The concepts from this 
framework were useful for describing the key features of the political context and conditions, for 
breaking these into a series of components that were combined to explain how social actors came 
to pursue their objectives for peace at formal negotiation processes. Configurational history was 
employed where there was not enough evidence to construct a specific history. Thus this study’s 
overall narrative is ordered by theoretical frame of the process of social actors’ contention that 
accounts for unique events in terms of general processes and mechanisms under specific 
conditions (Hall 1999, 213).  
3.2 Research Process  
3.2.1 Sources of Information. The sources of information on social actors’ engagement 
with formal negotiations and the conditions under which this unfolded were archival material, 
members of civic groups that engaged with formal negotiations, and individuals who observed 
civic groups’ actions for peace.  
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Archival Material. This consisted of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources 
contain social actors’ firsthand accounts of what they did and what actions they took to pursue 
their objective for peace at formal negotiations. These were in books, memoirs, narratives, and 
articles by members of civic groups that engaged in peace activism. Other accounts were in grant 
proposals and reports to donor organizations. Secondary sources included: 
1. Memoirs and published interviews of mediators. Mediating agents’ accounts of their 
mediation experiences contain information on the presence of noncombatant groups, what they 
did, and how the mediator regarded them.  
2. Organizational documents of nongovernmental and international organizations 
supporting peace and security initiatives. Organizational newsletters, grant proposals, annual 
reports, documentation of best practices, and reports of meetings that covered issues of women 
and peace contain stories of civic groups’ achievements. Examples are the IGAD newsletters and 
publications by organizations that supported women’s peace efforts, such as Femme Africa 
Solidarité (FAS) and UNIFEM (now UN Women). Other sources include reports on mediation or 
negotiation processes by think tanks such as International Crisis Group.  
3. Press reports of noncombatant groups’ protests, petitions, claims, speeches, and other 
activities. I identified two types of sources, mainstream and alternative press. Mainstream press 
include: news agency reports (e.g., Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Xinhua Agency, and 
AllAfrica) and transcripts of radio and television news broadcasts (e.g., CNN, BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts). I accessed these through the LexisNexis Academic database. I used 
keywords to search for news reports on peace protests by civic groups in Africa covering the 
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period 1989–2005. Alternative news sources I relied on include: Africa Focus,1 PeaceWomen,2 
United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), and the Inter-Press Service. 
These alternative news sources reported on peace activities of nongovernmental organizations 
and other civic groups in countries affected by war. During the period examined (1990s–2005), 
they also reported on Northern civic groups that supported the peace activism of African civic 
groups.  
4. Feature articles on domestic actors’ peace efforts. I accessed these through the 
LexisNexis Academic and other databases.  
5. Audiovisual documentaries on social actors’ peace actions.  
6. Published research on civic groups mobilized for peace in peer-reviewed journals. I 
accessed these from Peace Research Abstracts, PAIS, and JSTOR.  
Interviews. A second source of information was face-to-face and telephone interviews of 
members of the peace campaigns, organizations that supported them (e.g., donors, allies), and 
mediating agents. Semistructured interviews were used to access information unavailable in 
published accounts. This instrument allows participants to share insights on what they did and 
focus discussion on variables of interest to the study (Leech 2002). Interviews of peace activists, 
their allies, and other individuals who witnessed their peace actions were considered important 
                                                 
1For online archives of the Peace Monitor, a monthly publication covering peace activism in various 
African countries during the 1990s (www.africafocus.org).  
2 A project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom that monitors and shares 
information on women’s roles in conflict prevention (www.peacewomen.org). 
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means of verifying information in published accounts, in addition to providing information 
crucial for tracing the peace mobilization process (Tansey 2007). 
Selection of interview participants was done purposefully and on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
a) direct participation in peace actions as leaders or members of civic groups identified in 
accounts of these actions. These are individuals who were present at and/or participated in 
formal negotiation processes. They had firsthand knowledge about the campaigns they 
organized, their organizations’ goals, and their engagement in the formal negotiations to end 
civil war. This knowledge was gained as a result of organizing and leading the campaigns and 
participating in the negotiations as delegates, observers, representatives of civil society groups, 
or intermediaries assisting the mediation team/facilitator. Such individuals (also considered 
elites) have extensive experience, and the historical and contextual knowledge they have was 
useful for the study (Berry 2002; Rivera 2002). 
b) direct support to peace activists. These participants included donors and other civil 
society organizations that supported the campaigns.  
c) actors who were present at and who participated in the formal negotiations and 
interacted with civic groups. These were members of the mediation team, representatives of 
organizations that supported the noncombatant groups’ peace campaigns, and other civic groups 
mobilized for peace.  
Interview participants were identified by reading archival material on peace action by 
civic groups in Africa. Published accounts of civic groups’ experiences in peace building were 
especially useful (Tongeren, Brenk, Helema, and Verhoeven 2005). Another method was use of 
professional networks of contacts from my previous work in peace building and development to 
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suggest names of potential interview participants. Interview participants were also asked to 
recommend other leaders of the organization as well as third-party participants who might have 
information useful to the study (Goldstein 2002, 669–672). Conferences on peace were important 
venues for identifying interview participants. Of the 24 interview participants invited to 
participate in the study, eight individuals responded and six were interviewed. Two individuals 
who observed civic groups’ engagement with a particular peace process agreed to be interviewed 
at a later stage in the study.  
3.2.2 Data Collection and Organization. Data collection took place between 2007 and 
2011. Archival sources of information were examined for information on the identity of citizen 
groups claiming to participate in official negotiations, formation and development of such groups 
(e.g., date formed, reasons for formation, type of organization, membership, activities, resource 
base), claims for the use of and support for negotiations, demands to participate in formal 
negotiations, evidence of participation in specific negotiations, mobilization activities and dates 
(e.g., peace protests, demonstrations, petitions, speeches, and prayer vigils), mobilization 
outcomes and reasons they give for seeking participation, and their relationship with other 
political actors. This information was organized into a catalogue of events listing noncombatant 
group actions in chronological order from 1989 to 2005. This contained information on specific 
mobilization activities and the dates (protest, petition, speech, meeting, etc.), identity of the 
group associated with the mobilization activities, claims made by noncombatant groups, target 
(who the claim was addressed to), opponents (actors opposed to the mobilization activities and 
claims), outcome of the act, and claim made (whether it resulted in a specific action on the part 
of the target, opponent, or other stakeholder). Information on whether or not noncombatant 
groups gained entry into the formal negotiations and the nature of their participation was also 
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recorded. The catalogue of events allowed for a process tracing events from engagement with 
formal negotiations back to political conditions and vice versa.  
Information on the domestic political context was gathered from published research, 
press reports, and published contemporary histories of the countries in which the mobilizations 
for peace unfolded. Analyses of political transitions during the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
an important source of information on the prevailing domestic political context in which the civic 
group actions occurred and on the internal wars that resulted from contentious political transition 
processes. This information was organized according to the prevailing regime, conflict and 
negotiation phase, and key political actors involved in each situation. This was repeated for 
regional and international contexts, since the civic groups’ engagement went beyond the 
domestic context to subregional arenas of formal negotiation processes. The data was useful for 
identifying key prevailing domestic and international conditions in which civic groups mobilized 
to engage with formal negotiation processes. A combination of specific and configuration history 
procedures were used to select cases, identify the specific conditions of social actors’ peace 
actions, and elaborate the sequence of events linking initial conditions to social actors’ 
engagement with formal negotiations.  
3.3 Case Selection 
The construction of historical objects of inquiry (selection of cases), the social actors 
(civic groups), and their engagement with formal negotiations was done intrinsically (Hall 1999, 
210–11, 236). This is a specific history strategy that is based on “an observer’s lifeworldly 
orientation to historical social actors’ convergent invocation of events,” and on the meanings that 
events and situations had for historical actors. An events catalogue developed to organize 
information on social actors’ peace actions was used to identify ten campaigns whose trajectories 
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I could trace broadly from beginning to end. Also, key social actors were identified with these 
peace campaigns (see Appendix 1). Religious leaders and women’s organizations featured 
prominently; thus, this study focuses on them. Although civic groups without a clear religious or 
gendered identity may have participated in peace actions, there was less information on them in 
archival sources. It was inadequate for tracing peace actions over time. However, other civic 
groups seemed to join in with peace actions led by women and religious leaders. The study is 
therefore focused on social actors identified as religious leaders and women’s organizations that 
engaged in peace actions. 
Selection of social actors’ peace actions was also done through “colligation,” that is, on 
the basis of “a criterion of relevance that delimits a particular specific history and not another.” 
For example, the catalogue of events was examined for a time frame beyond which social actors’ 
peace actions were recorded. This helped identify a cycle of peace actions and its duration in the 
1990s and early 2000s. These peace actions by social actors fall within the period after the end of 
the Cold War (from 1989) and before or around the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center. The study is limited to this period. The wars that escalated during this period were 
an outcome of political transitions from authoritarian rule that turned violent. They were not 
influenced directly by the Cold War rivalry as the postcolonial wars of the 1970s had been. With 
the end of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union withdrew military support to 
African allies.  
During this period there was a proliferation of civil society organizations as a result of 
new legislation providing for their registration and autonomous operation. Many of the civil 
society actors, especially NGOs and religious institutions, filled the gap in social service and 
welfare provision created when African governments suddenly implemented economic austerity 
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measures the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank (WB) prescribed to address 
domestic debt. These measures, implemented in the 1980s, drastically reduced the government 
public welfare budget. Economic prescriptions were also made conditional on governments 
implementing political reforms, in particular those concerning democratization of political 
institutions and participation. Thus, civic groups’ peace actions unfolded in a politically turbulent 
period of transition to a market economy and democratic political institutions without much 
preparation within the population.  
In general, the intrinsic identification of social actors yielded ten peace campaigns in 
seven sub-Saharan contexts of war. These campaigns had two dimensions: a) the demand for an 
end to war and for the use of formal negotiation to settle the conflict peacefully and b) direct 
engagement with or demands to participate in formal negotiations. This study focuses on the 
second dimension of the campaign, the engagement with formal negotiation processes. Not all 
social actors, religious leaders, and women’s organizations identified in the ten peace campaigns 
listed in Appendix 1 engaged with formal negotiations. Appendix 2 shows formal negotiation 
processes with which social actors engaged.  
For purposes of analysis, concepts from the dynamics of contention (DOC) framework 
were used to characterize social actors and peace actions as political (McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly 2001). The religious leaders and women’s mobilization to end war were considered a form 
of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 202–3). These 
social actors struggled with armed nonstate actors and incumbent governments over the most 
suitable strategy to settle political conflict. Accordingly, their campaigns to end war were framed 
as an example of contentious politics, defined as “interactions in which actors make claims 
bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests 
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or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. 
Social actors were involved in contention, that is “making claims that bear on someone else’s 
interest” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 4 ) when they urged armed groups and the incumbent 
government to abandon the military option and pursue dialogue to end the war. They acted 
collectively, coming together as different individuals and organizations and coordinating actions 
on behalf of a shared interest in ending the war through peaceful means. This placed them 
squarely in the political arena where they interacted directly with government agents and with 
armed groups opposed to the state and engaged in activities related to a) government rights, 
regulations, and interests and b) armed groups’ interests (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 5). Thus social 
actors previously preoccupied with nonpolitical activities became political actors. They were 
known by collective names they gave themselves—such as Contact Group (Mozambique), Inter-
Religious Council of Sierra Leone, Inter-Faith Mediation Council or New Sudan Council of 
Churches, Women in Peacebuilding Network–Liberia, Liberia Women’s Peace Initiative—or 
labels that other people gave them—such as “Burundi women” or “Somali women” or “Church 
leaders.” They acted as challengers (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 2, 4, 5, 9). 
3.4 Analysis of Social Actors’ Engagement with Formal Negotiations 
This study used intrinsic and extrinsic narrative to account for what made social actors’ 
engagement possible and how this led to social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. 
Narrative is the dominant formative discourse in specific history. As such, narrative orders 
analysis by balancing theory, contingent explanation, and interpretation (Hall 1999, 212). The 
first use of narrative was to show the specific conditions that made social actors’ peace actions 
possible. This description was done intrinsically, using social actors’ invocation of events 
meaningful to them, and extrinsically, using an objective (theoretical) frame of reference (Hall 
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1999, 210–211, 219). For instance, in accounting for what about social actors (conditions among 
them) led to actions for peace, answers were sought in their descriptions of the war and their 
experiences of it. These definitions of war (e.g., “deadly weapon,” “unbearable,” “suffering”) 
were connected to traumatic events that occurred about the time they chose to take action (e.g., 
massacres and mass starvation from war-induced drought). 
The resort to extrinsic analysis was due to the fragmented nature of the historical record 
of social actors’ peace actions in Africa and dearth of systematic research. The shift in narrative 
to extrinsic analysis reflects a move from specific towards configurational history. Existing 
archival sources rarely described in detail the specific ways in which campaign initiators came to 
realize they needed to do something to end the war, how they proceeded from this realization to 
mobilizing the support of others, or how campaign initiators crossed political, religious, social, 
and ethnic divides to build widespread support for a peaceful resolution to the war. Social 
memory was weak since most of the key individuals involved have not recorded their actions and 
analysis. The few interviews did not generate information that was comprehensive enough to 
identify events that were critical to social actors’ engagement.  
The gap in artifactual evidence and social memory (Hall 1999, 87) was addressed by 
using concepts from the dynamics of contention framework, Tilly’s ideas of political opportunity 
structure (conceptual maps of regimes and contentious politics) and trust networks (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 45; Tilly 2005b; Tilly 2006). Tilly’s regime typology (2006, 21–28) was 
used to describe the regime context of the peace campaigns in terms of the regime’s democracy 
and capacity to provide for its citizens. These regimes in which the peace campaigns unfolded 
exhibited features characteristic of nondemocratic, low capacity regimes. They were 
authoritarian military or civilian governments whose relations with established political actors 
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and challengers (such as civil society organizations including opposition political parties) were 
marked by a combination of coercion, capital, and commitment. During the war, both 
governments’ and armed groups’ relations with some sections of the population were based on 
strategies of predation.  
Tilly’s concept of trust networks (2005b, 12), “ramified interpersonal connections, 
consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term 
resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeance, mistakes, or failures of others,” permitted a 
theoretically guided (extrinsic) description of relations between conflicting parties and social 
actors. These relations occurred in the form of particularistic ties, evasive conformity, brokered 
autonomy, and patronage systems (2005b, 30–36). The idea of the structure of opportunity in 
low-capacity, low-democracy regimes permitted a description of the room within which social 
actors collectively acted to end the war. A combination of mechanisms and processes related to 
the violent political transition, the war, and post-Cold War international political developments 
created a fluctuating, unstable political structure that yielded “tight corners” (Londsdale 2000), 
room for political action that was restricted by conditions of war and potential threats or 
intimidation from conflicting parties.  
The narrative analysis connected political developments and actions (e.g., violent 
political transition, war, failure of humanitarian and political interventions), social consequences 
of these events (humanitarian and political crises), actions of domestic political actors (e.g., 
socially and economically destabilizing war strategies), and social experience of war. The 
resulting description of extrinsically and intrinsically defined conditions leading to the 
emergence of social actors mobilized for peace and their engagement with formal negotiations is 
contained in Chapter 4. It is oriented largely toward what directly concerned social actors. As a 
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result, the description highlights the social consequences and experiences of violent political 
transitions and war.  
A second use of narrative is to account for how social actors engaged with formal 
negotiations. The sequence of events linking initial conditions to social actors’ engagement with 
formal negotiations was elaborated using the Dynamics of Contention (DOC) framework as a 
template that subsumed intrinsic and extrinsic narrative (Hall 1999, 86). Intrinsic narrative made 
connections between “specific action conduits”—that is, peace actions or events—meaningful to 
social actors and their observers. For instance, analysis of civic groups’ interpretation of their 
experience of war, especially severe conditions such as mass starvation, mass displacement, 
impoverishment, or unprecedented violence, yielded a general interpretation of war as suffering 
and a particular gendered interpretation of this suffering from the perspective of women peace 
activists.  
Extrinsic narrative analysis invoked concepts from the dynamics of contention 
framework, a political process model, to account for how social actors came to engage with 
formal negotiations (Hall 1999, 213). The dynamics of contention framework focuses on the 
interaction context defined as the level of mechanisms linking structures and configurations 
(conditions specific to the social actors’ context of action) to agency and action (conditions 
specific to social actors) (Kriesi 2004, 77–79). Specific mechanisms and processes involving 
social actors, the targets of their peace actions (conflicting parties, armed groups, and external 
actors), and third parties like the media and the public are combined in sequences of interaction 
that drive contention toward engagement with formal negotiations. 
The DOC framework provided concepts that I used to construct an account of plot 
development that highlighted what was common across the different social actors’ peace actions 
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and what was particular to specific peace activists. For instance, narrative analysis is used to 
show how similar mechanisms of violent political transition and war combine to a) make social 
actors want to do something to end the war and b) produce the campaign trajectory. The religious 
leaders and women’s organizations’ interpretations of war are described in terms of the operation 
of mechanisms of attribution that produce an alternative theory or story of war and its resolution. 
However, this alternative story of war differs for women’s organization. Their interpretation of 
war as suffering is gendered. It is framed in terms of their specific experience as women. Thus, 
the character of contention varied depending on the prevailing political conditions, the resources 
social actors had available to them, and the way they use these resources to pursue their peace 
objectives. This result is a narrative explanation that connects intrinsic and extrinsic accounts and 
highlights regularities and variations in processes of engagement (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 5, 11, 
28). This yields an account that is particular to the social actors studied and is not meant to be 
generalizable to similar actors in different contexts. 
3.5 Narrative Frame 
Narrative analysis begins in Chapter 4 with the broad social changes generated by violent 
political transitions and historical developments leading to the emergence of social actors such as 
the religious women and the peace campaigns they launched. An example is the sudden 
withdrawal of the state from welfare provision when governments adopted market-based policies 
in the 1980s. Numerous civil society organizations emerged to provide social welfare services. 
The intractable conflicts created an overwhelming demand for these services as shown by the 
complex and challenging nature of humanitarian crises. With regard to social actors’ peace 
actions, specific socially transformative events in the political transition and wars are identified 
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that led to their engagement with formal negotiations. These include atrocious acts such as 
massacres or mass starvation from war-induced famine.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, the narrative shifts to elaborating on the process leading to social 
actors’ engagement with formal negotiations by first accounting for what makes them take action 
for peace and how. In these chapters, narrative is used to show how the general mechanisms of 
attribution operate in the specific social actors’ understandings of these key events and the wars. 
Specifically, the intrinsic reconstruction of social actors’ interpretations of these events and the 
connection of this interpretation to an extrinsic interpretation process (attribution mechanism) 
yields social actors’ theorizations of war and its resolution (Tilly 2005b, 64–65, 213). Social 
actors consider war as a “suffering” and their role as “peace agents.” The religious leaders and 
women activists disseminated this theory of war and its resolution to build a shared 
understanding among supporters within their social bases. They also disseminated it to the public 
and conflicting parties to elicit support for an end to war. Dissemination took place through 
interaction mechanisms of encounter and conversations (Tilly 2005b, 138–140). Other 
mechanisms included the creation of new vehicles to coordinate dissemination campaigns at the 
national level and to engage conflicting parties. With regard to resources, social actors 
appropriated religious and cultural rituals and practices and their networks of personal relations. 
These were employed to disseminate their theory of the war and its resolution to conflicting 
parties, external stakeholders such as mediating agents, and external allies. In deploying their 
networks of personal relations in pursuit of an end to war, religious leaders and women activists 
placed their most valuable resources at the risk of mistakes or malfeance of others (Tilly 2005, 
12). The demand they were making for an end to war and their theorization of war could be 
interpreted as politically threatening or even a betrayal at the level of interpersonal relations. My 
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narrative ends in Chapter 7 with social actors’ different paths to engaging with formal 
negotiations.  
3.6 Research Constraints  
3.6.1 Archival Research. A constraint in data collection was the highly fragmented nature 
of information on civic groups mobilized for peace in Africa. It is scattered across a variety of 
the sources mentioned earlier. Also, domestic civic groups that acted during the period the study 
was limited to (1990s to 2000s) rarely documented their activities, as they lacked the resources to 
do so systematically and keep a public record. In addition, given the conditions of insecurity, 
civic groups were not sure that their records would be protected. When they did, their reports 
showcase achievements. There was very little detailed description of actions they took, 
challenges they faced, failed attempts at acting for peace, and the reasons for these failures.  
Access to international nongovernment organization documents was difficult. Requests 
for access to organization documents were met with silence or promises to call back that were 
never fulfilled even after seeking support through personal contacts at the organization. One 
reason could be that organizations do not have the staff, time, and resources to catalogue official 
documents in a way that is easily accessible to researchers or other interested members of the 
public. The costs of doing so are high. Also, organizations tend to be cautious, understandably, 
about giving access to files, especially if they have little control over the final use of research 
findings or consider information to be confidential. 
3.6.2 Interview Process and Outcome. Attempts to secure interview appointments proved 
difficult in the early phase of the research because of the time and resource constraints. 
Appointments for face-to face interviews with participants identified were difficult to secure 
because they had changed jobs, traveled frequently, or had busy work schedules. Although some 
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interview participants agreed to participate in the study, finding time to conduct the actual 
interview was quite a challenge for this group of people who are busy and highly mobile. Others, 
for instance, three key peace activists, were suffering from age-related illnesses and could not be 
interviewed. These difficulties in obtaining firsthand accounts from elite interview participants 
are not new.  
3.6.3 Nature of Evidence I Worked With. Due to the difficulty of obtaining firsthand oral 
accounts of why and how religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized to end war in 
politically risky conditions, this study relied mostly on archival sources of information on peace 
activism in sub-Saharan African countries. Accounts of peace actions vary in the level of detail 
in descriptions of specific events, processes, and social actors leading these campaigns. For 
instance, there was more information on the religious leaders’ peace actions in Mozambique, 
South Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone and the women’s campaigns in Liberia, Somaliland, and 
Sierra Leone than on women’s campaigns in Burundi and South Somalia. Accounts of peace 
actions by religious leaders varied. There was more information on the religious leaders’ 
campaigns in Mozambique, South Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone compared to the campaign 
in Liberia. Although Liberian clergy’s peace actions were reported in the media there is little 
documentation of their actions. Liberian clerics at the center of the campaign have no memoirs of 
their experience, or if they do, these are not easily available to a wider audience. There was little 
written about the late Bishop Michael Francis, who was a key participant in social actors’ calls 
for peace. Unfortunately, he has passed on with a lot of knowledge that would have been 
valuable in understanding why and how social actors mobilize for peace in situations of war. 
Fortunately, campaign initiators in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Sierra Leone have written 
their story. Peace actions by women’s organizations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and North 
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Somalia (Somaliland) are fairly well documented compared to the South Sudanese and South 
Somali women’s campaigns. Of these, the Liberian and Burundi accounts offered more insights 
into the process of engagement. A few key peace activists have written memoirs, including 
Bishop Sengulane and Gonçalves (Mozambique), Nobel Prize laureate Leymah Gbowee 
(Liberia), and Alimamy Koroma (Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone).  
Peace action by social actors in sub-Saharan Africa is under-studied. Social actors’ peace 
efforts in South Africa are often cited in references to mobilization for peace in Africa. Yet from 
the end of the apartheid regime in 1994 and into the 2000s, domestic actors in a number of 
African countries engaged in nonviolent action against war. Examples are peace action by 
Liberian women and religious leaders, women’s organizations in Somalia, and religious leaders 
in Mozambique. There is also little systematic study of the mediation of African civil wars. 
Existing studies do not consider domestic social actors worth serious attention. In general, 
studies of peace action in sub-Saharan Africa focus on the peace efforts of northern transnational 
NGOs and mediating agents. Given the lack of a rich and extensive written record of peace 
action by domestic social actors, most of the knowledge remains in the memory of key activists. 
Many of their stories are undocumented. A number have since passed on and with them very 
important insights and lessons on the role civil society organizations can play in transformation 
of conflict. Others have moved on to other activities.  
For the most part, the accounts offer general descriptions of events and their outcomes. 
The level of detail in descriptions of a particular event depended on whether that event was 
important to the narrator. For example, UNIFEM accounts of women’s peace actions highlight 
these as best practices in line with their organizational interest of promoting women’s 
participation in peace and security. In descriptions of their peace actions at the 1995 ECOWAS 
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summits on the Liberian war, members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative detailed what 
happened when they were at the venue. Descriptions of events leading to their actions at this 
particular venue were left out or summarized even though they may be important. There was 
little or no information on the number of requests women made for invitation to the ECOWAS 
meeting, how they made those requests, who they wrote to, what they wrote (copy of the letter), 
the series of actions leading to their decision to invite themselves, and how they found their way 
to the venue of the Heads of State summit. Some of this information was found in news coverage 
of the negotiations. However, interviews would have been a much better source of information 
on these questions.  
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Chapter 4. NONCOMBATANT GROUPS AND THE MOBILIZATION TO 
END WAR IN AFRICA 
This chapter sets the context for the examination of why and how noncombatant groups 
in Africa mobilized to end war in the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. An important part of 
the setting was the violent political transitions of the 1990s. These occurred in the midst of two 
major developments. The first is the set of economic austerity measures governments and market 
based approaches adopted in the 1980s to manage their economic crises. The second is the shift 
in international intervention and development policy resulting from the global economic crisis of 
the 1980s and the demise of the communist state in Eastern Europe.  
The main focus is on the violent turn the political transitions took in African countries, 
especially the escalation of civil wars. A key part of this violent political transition setting was 
the social transformation resulting from the wars. This is crucial to understanding social actors’ 
mobilization for peace. The description of the violent political transition and resulting wars is 
from the perspective of the influence these developments had on society. I turn to examine the 
nature of international intervention in relation to the emergence of the noncombatant groups who 
engaged with formal negotiations.  
4.1 Violent Political Transitions  
The early- to mid-1990s was a politically turbulent period for states in Africa. A trend 
analysis of regime types in Africa shows that half of the autocratic regimes in Africa fell between 
1990 and 1992 as a result of popular struggles for political change and major foreign policy 
changes sparked by the end of the Cold War (Marshall and Gurr 2005, 42). Seddon and Zeilig 
observe that “in a four-year period, from 1990–1994, a total of thirty-five regimes had been 
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swept away by a combination of street demonstrations, mass strikes and other forms of protest, 
and by presidential and legislative elections that were often the first held for a generation” (2005, 
19). 
The nondemocratic regimes in Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, and Sudan resisted democratization or implemented political reforms in ways that 
ensured they remained in power. The authoritarian civilian and military ruling elite feared their 
political fortunes would no longer be certain under new political arrangements that created new 
opportunities for political opponents and greater autonomy for citizens in determining their 
political fate. To secure their position, ruling elites pursued strategies of prevention and delayed 
implementation, including repressing, frustrating, and undermining political opposition parties, 
delaying elections and constitutional review processes (Ake 2000, 51–52). For instance, leaders 
such as President Siad Barre in Somalia resisted reforms and rejected consultation with political 
participants. In some cases, incumbent regimes such as the FRELIMO in Mozambique and the 
Islamist military regime in Sudan unilaterally defined the terms of political participation. 
Governments such as those in Liberia and Sudan undermined legislation providing for the 
registration, freedom of assembly, and association of political parties by restricting registration 
and activities of political parties considered a threat. Also, sections of ruling elites disregarded 
outcomes of public consultations, referendums, or elections. They overthrew democratically 
elected governments, as the military in Burundi and Sierra Leone, or they manipulated the 
electoral process in their favor, as was the case in Liberia and Sudan (Abrahamsen 2004; Arnold 
2008, 249–250; Azevedo, Nnadozie and João 2003, xxxii-xxxiii; Fyle 2006, xlviii; Idris 2005, 
53–56; James 2004, xxxiii; Lyons 1998, 229; Mohamoud 2000, 126–134; Ofcansky 1998, B369-
370).  
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In general, ruling elites did not tolerate groups they considered a threat such as political 
parties, armed groups, civic groups calling for political change, and ethnic or religious groups 
they perceived as opponents. The intimidation and arrests of government critics, violent 
repression of political opposition, and killing of ethnic communities considered opposition 
supporters point to a general lack of protection of political participants from arbitrary action by 
government agents. The autocratic rulers’ strategies of anticipatory and responsive repression 
undermined public trust and participation in the democratization process. Political actors adopted 
strategies of predation in the absence of credible processes or institutions for renegotiating the 
terms of new political and economic arrangements. Armed groups emerged to counter violent 
repression by ruling elites (Tilly 2005b, 30–35).  
For example, in Somalia, Siad Barre’s violent repression of political opponents and 
members of their clans led to the formation of armed political opposition groups that aimed to 
remove him from power. In Burundi, the military assassination of the first Hutu president in a 
failed coup attempt in 1993 sparked a cycle of killings and revenge killings and created a 
political crisis that ended in a military coup in 1996. It also led to the Hutu rebellion. A section 
of the Hutu political elite, grieved by the Tutsi military elite’s overthrow of a democratically 
elected government and assassination of the first Hutu elected President, formed armed 
movements against the military regime. The emergence of armed groups in society set in motion 
a cycle of violence that spiraled into widespread civil wars in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Somalia. In Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan, rulers’ strategies of repression intensified wars 
dating back to the Cold War period.  
At the beginning of the peace campaigns, the governments in Angola, Burundi, 
Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan had failed to contain the armed groups. 
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Military victory was not certain anymore. The governments had limited capacity to affect the 
character and distribution of populations, activities, and resources within their territories. First, 
they lacked the capital, the economic resources, to do so. Governments were in the midst of an 
economic crisis when the wars of the 1990s escalated. Most had a weak revenue base and huge 
national debts and were highly dependent on external aid. To qualify for further external aid, 
governments implemented austerity measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank. They also adopt market-based approaches to managing the economy in line with 
new Western donor development policies aimed at reducing the size of the state and giving a 
greater role to the private sector and civil society. The new aid policies were contingent on 
implementation of political reforms providing for multiparty democracy, competitive elections, 
and respect of human rights. Ruling elites lacked the capital to buy out political opponents or 
contain the internal rebellion. Furthermore, they could no longer count on the military assistance 
of Western allies to stamp out internal rebellion. With the end of the Cold War and collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and United States withdrew military aid to former allies in 
African countries (Birmingham 2002, 170; Bradbury 1994, 10; Mohamoud 2000, 15, 119–120). 
Also, the optimistic thinking about an emergent new world order in the 1990s emphasized a 
greater role for the UN and regional organizations like the Africa Union (then Organization of 
African Unity) in promoting global peace and security. International actors promoted the 
resolution of wars through peaceful means.  
Second, at the time of political transition, few regimes had functioning civil 
administrative structures extending throughout the territory and capable of providing services 
and adequate security to populations. Thus, vast areas with little or no government presence were 
open to the activities of armed groups. In Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan, vast areas were 
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under the control of armed groups that had emerged to fight the government long before the 
political and economic transition. Governments could not provide services to populations there. 
Instead, government revenue was diverted towards military operations against the armed groups. 
In Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, government capacity to provide services and 
security was weak or nonexistent outside of capital cities and major towns. Armed groups that 
emerged in response to failed transitions established themselves in these areas of weak 
government control. Also, because of the economic destabilizing policies of armed groups and 
government counterinsurgent policies, government services were limited to cities and major 
towns. Nonstate actors like churches and international humanitarian relief agencies provided 
services where government presence was absent or very weak. As in Angola, Mozambique, and 
Sudan, churches and international humanitarian aid agencies provided health, education, food 
relief, and other social services that government ceased to offer throughout the wars.  
Third, the pre-eminent diversity of shared languages, ethnic/regional ties, religion, and 
traditional cultural systems over cultural, political, economic, and organizational uniformity 
posed a challenge to governing through use of mainly commitment. Most governments 
established control through a combination of mostly coercion, capital, and commitment. For 
instance, rulers in Angola and Mozambique experimented with coercive integration of a diverse 
population into a Marxist-Leninist state. In Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, rulers 
combined coercion, capital, and commitment to build patronage systems and particularistic ties 
to control the population. When the Nationalist Islamist Front seized power in Sudan, it resorted 
to coercive integration of the population into an Islamist state (Tilly 2005b, 30–31). The use of 
government resources to forcefully impose an Islamic state and a policy of Arabization in the 
South shows the use of capital and coercion to control the population through particularistic ties 
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of religious and ethnic identity (Ali 2010). The strategy aimed at putting down resistance from 
secular political parties in the north, the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement, and organized 
civic groups in both the north and the south.  
By the time the peace campaigns emerged in the 1990s, political conflict over the nature 
of transition had escalated into violence or gone through some cycles of violence. With external 
military aid no longer guaranteed, ruling elites looked within for new strategies of countering the 
armed rebellions. They combined commitment and coercion with capital depending on whether 
the government had domestic resources. The FRELIMO government in Mozambique resorted to 
a strategy of brokered autonomy with the churches. Government diversion of national resources 
to the war effort devastated the national economies and livelihoods of people to where the war 
became unaffordable. Government failure to respond to the economic devastation and mass 
starvation from the combined effects of the war and the 1990 drought eroded the population’s 
confidence in its ability to end the war or mitigate war-related social and economic crises. 
Restoring religious freedom of worship dealt with the legitimacy problem. Churches provided 
the much-needed humanitarian relief and social services the government lacked the capacity to 
supply. More importantly, allying with the church gave the incumbent regime credibility it had 
lost in the war (Chan and Venâncio 1998, 19–20; Morier-Genoud 1996b, 1–3). In Chapter 5, I 
show how churches seized openings such as this one to demand a peaceful resolution to the war.  
Countries like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan relied on alternative sources of 
revenue such as minerals (oil and diamonds) and natural resources (timber). Although control of 
natural resources shifted between government and armed groups, revenue generated was 
reinvested in countering the armed groups and not in improving the socioeconomic conditions of 
the people. Groups such as the UNITA in Angola, RUF in Sierra Leone, and Charles Taylor’s 
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NPFL controlled areas with natural resources that they used to finance their operations 
(Birmingham 2002, 182–183; Ellis 2007, 164–170; Reno 2000, 326–327). In Somalia, groups 
vied for control of lucrative trade such as qat, a narcotic leaf popular in Somalia and elsewhere in 
Eastern Africa (Waal 1996, 11). Like the incumbent governments, these armed groups rebels did 
not use revenue from these natural resources to establish civilian administration in areas under 
their control. Just like the governments they opposed, rebel commanders invested the profits in 
themselves and their armed movements (Orogun 2003, 291). Where government forces lacked 
the capacity to operate in areas under control of armed groups, they recruited alternative forces to 
supplement the government army. For instance, the Government of Sierra Leone contracted 
international mercenaries like the Executive Outcomes. Sudan sponsored militia to fight 
alongside government forces. Ruling elites in Burundi used this strategy to intimidate opponents. 
In Somalia, the Siad Barre government armed clans supportive of his regime to fight against 
clans perceived to be supporters of political opponents. The Sudanese government also took 
advantage of factional rivalries among the armed groups to win over some of the groups onto its 
side.  
These top-down strategies of coercion and commitment in the form of particularistic ties 
(shared ethnic or religious ties) and the bottom-up strategies of predation that armed groups used 
to counter government repression created acute political crises and cycles of violence in Burundi, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan the wars threatened to tear countries 
apart. This eventually happened in Somalia where the central government in Somalia collapsed 
and no armed group emerged with the capability of gaining a military victory and establishing a 
central government. The cycles of violence pitting armed groups against the state elite set in 
motion processes that destroyed lives and livelihoods of the people.  
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4.2 War and the Transformation of Society  
Studies of post-Cold War violent conflict in Africa address in detail the nature, dynamics, 
and variation among these conflicts in terms of who the armed opponents are, when and how 
they emerge, political agendas, and how they recruit, conduct war, and mobilize resources to 
sustain their armed operations (Allen 1999; Clapham 1998; Ellis 2007; Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 
2001; Mkandawire 2002; Reno 1998; Richards 2005; Weinstein 2007). My concern, however, is 
with the civilian experience of the conflict between government and armed forces opposed to it, 
as this is crucial for understanding civic groups’ mobilizations to end war.  
The armed groups and government forces pursued war strategies that destabilized 
economic and social life in the country. Armed groups’ frequent acts of economic destabilization 
included the destruction of government installations, public facilities (water, gas, and electricity 
supply), communication lines (roads, bridges, and railways), and social institutions (government 
and church schools and hospitals). They extended this destabilization policy to the civilian 
population by looting villagers’ crops and livestock, burning farms, and planting landmines in 
farms, along paths and roads. Economic sabotage was a common practice of older groups such as 
the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) in Mozambique and the União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola, and of newer transition-related 
armed groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Chingono 1996, 50–52; Hayward and 
Kandeh 2000, B165; Malaquias 2001, 523; Newitt 1995, 564; Waal 1996, 13).  
Incumbent governments’ counterinsurgent policies were just as disruptive of economic 
life as armed groups’ attacks. The forceful evacuation of communities considered rebel 
sympathizers from areas under government control (Burundi, South Sudan), the forceful 
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reorganization of civilians into settlements under control of the army to cut rebels’ access to 
villagers for supplies, scorched earth policies aimed at destroying rebel bases in dense forests, 
and looting of peasants’ crops and livestock by government forces destabilized populations 
economically.  
The economically destabilizing military policies of the armed groups and government 
forces impoverished once economically self-sufficient populations by denying the population 
access to basic services and forcing civilians to abandon their livelihoods (farming, employment, 
trade, and other economic activities). The large-scale displacement of populations within and 
outside national borders disrupted agricultural production or led to its demise in Angola, 
Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan (IRIN 2003). Large numbers of people 
fled to cities leading to a sudden increase in urban populations that greatly stressed public 
facilities and created social crises in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Those 
who could not make it into cities or refugee camps in neighboring countries were cut off from 
the rest of the country and were forced to fend for themselves.  
The protracted nature of the wars overwhelmed well-known coping strategies civilians 
used to survive in drought-prone areas of eastern and southern Africa and in fertile areas where 
intense fighting prevented agricultural activities for very long periods. Civilians thus suffered 
twice, first from the direct effects of the war and second from the interaction between the effects 
of economic destabilization and mass involuntary displacement and the effects of natural 
disasters (droughts, floods). The combination of drought and sabotage produced mass starvation 
and diseases in Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia (Chingono 1996, 52–53; Gberie 1995a; 
1995b; Hilhorst and Serrano 2010, 186–189; Ofcansky 2000, B396; Roque 2008, 380; Simon 
2001, 505–506, 512). It is significant that armed groups seemed unconcerned about the mass 
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starvation the populations experienced and did little to address it. Also, governments lacked the 
capacity to prevent or mitigate starvation even in areas under their control. With no alternative 
livelihoods and ineffective coping strategies the population became dependent on humanitarian 
relief provided by the churches, women organized at the community level (Somalia), and 
international NGOs. Yet, as in the case of Somalia and South Sudan, armed groups extended 
their acts of sabotage to the distribution of humanitarian relief by looting or restricting access to 
affected populations. This necessitated negotiating access to affected populations even though 
this did not guarantee that the delivery of humanitarian relief would be protected.  
The violent transition wars destabilized society in addition to the economy. At the social 
level, civilian encounters with the fighting forces of the government and opposition armed 
groups were violent and brutal. The wars’ frontlines extended into civilian spaces. Indiscriminate 
attacks, massacres, and mutilations of civilians, sexual abuse of women, abduction of children, 
and the use of civilian populations as human shields characterize these encounters (Chan and 
Venâncio 1998, 11–13; Chingono 1996, 51, 57; Ellis 2007, 111–120; Hayward and Kandeh 
2001, B178–179; Hilhorst and Serrano 2010, 186; Inter-Press Service, 12 December 1996; Kieh 
2008; Litherland 1995; Malaquias 2001, 531–2; Newitt, 1995, 564, 146; NSCC 2002, 29; 
Ratnasabapathy 1995; Xinhua News Agency, 15 November 1995). Government forces lacked 
capacity to protect civilians as their counterinsurgent operations resembled revenge attacks 
against populations suspected of being sympathizers or ethnic kin of the armed groups. Civilians 
were caught between armed forces. They became tools of war as shown by the sexual abuse of 
women, mutilations, and abduction of children and villagers for use as soldiers, workers, and 
human shields.  
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The confusion, fear, hostility, suspicion and bitter resentment resulting from these violent 
and brutal encounters aggravated social tensions along ethnic, gender, and generation identity 
lines. In some of the wars, ethnic, religious, and clan tensions triggered cycles of revenge and 
counterrevenge attacks that polarized previously heterogeneous communities. This process of 
polarization fixed politicized ethnic identities geographically through a spatial reordering of 
populations into ethnic enclaves. The large-scale displacement of civilians within and outside 
national borders split families, friendships, and other relationships that cut across various 
identities. It also displaced large numbers of people out of their homes to internal camps within 
the country or refugee camps outside the country (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999, 47–51; 
Litherland 1995; Lubabu 1999b, 31; Ofcansky 2000, B396; 2001, B414; Ratnsabapathy 1995). 
Polarization processes that created ethnic enclaves are evident in all the civil war contexts under 
study here. They differed only in terms of the combination of ethnic, regional, and religious 
identities and the extent of polarization along territorial lines.  
The indiscriminate nature of the brutal encounters show that armed groups did not 
necessarily select their targets on the basis of ethnic identity. The armed groups often did not 
care who they attacked. Women, children, and the elderly fell victim to their brutal attacks. Some 
villages would be attacked and others left untouched. It seemed like the ultimate decision 
regarding who would be attacked lay with armed combatants or with roving criminal bands that 
emerged to profit from the confusion and high level of uncertainty. This created great confusion 
and anxiety in society. These reprehensible and brutal attacks breached indigenous laws of war. 
In some instances, civilians resisted these brutal and violent attacks by mobilizing their own 
militias since government forces lacked the capacity to protect them. The Naprama religious 
warriors mobilized to resist the RENAMO who were fighting against the Front for the Liberation 
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of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government in Mozambique (Chingono 1996, 53–54; Newitt 1995, 
573). The Kamajor, Tamaboro, Kapras, and Donsos vigilante groups in Sierra Leone emerged to 
defend local populations against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and sobels renegade 
soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army who collaborated with the RUF (Hayward and Kandeh 2000, 
B170–173; Muana 1997). Across these conflicts, the proliferation of weapons and their 
unregulated use created cultures of violence that had a traumatic effect on family and other social 
relations. It also led to the militarization of society characterized by local mobilization of civilian 
militia, fragmentation of armed groups into factions, and the emergence of roaming bands of 
armed youth, such as the White Army in South Sudan, with no political allegiance to the 
government or armed opposition (Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011, 65–66, 68–70). 
The gender and generation dimensions of the brutal civilian-military encounter merit 
attention. Concerning gender relations, women became heads of households as men joined the 
military, were killed in attacks, or abandoned the family. In addition to their traditional 
household roles, women took on the tasks of providing for the family under very difficult 
conditions. Doing so required engaging in income-generating activities that took them away 
from the home. Without the protection of their husbands and other relatives, women also became 
vulnerable to armed group attacks. The generational effects of the war can be observed in the 
large numbers of children and teenagers who became orphaned or separated from their parents. 
Without adult protection, many were vulnerable to recruitment into military for survival, some 
for protection or revenge (Peters 2004, 30–31). The recruitment of large numbers of youth into 
armies altered relations between generations. Armed groups forced child soldiers to attack and 
kill members of their own family and community as part of their initiation. This severed their ties 
with families and communities who saw these atrocious acts as a great betrayal and ensured that 
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the child soldiers would remain loyal to the armed group. Also, a large number of children and 
teenagers possessed arms that they used to threaten or intimidate community members regardless 
of their gender or seniority. Traditional elders found it difficult or impossible to discipline armed 
children and youth, as in Sierra Leone and in South Sudan. The powerlessness of elders to 
control and discipline an increasingly militarized generation of youth eroded the legitimacy of 
patriarchal traditional authority structures. With traditional authority structures in doubt, 
discipline at the family and community levels became difficult to maintain. Overall, the 
governments’ inability to protect its civilians and the traditional authorities’ weakening control 
of the younger generation resulted in a breakdown of order at national and local levels.  
It is difficult to see how the armed groups could have mobilized and sustained 
widespread popular support by brutal attacks. During initial phases of the war the population 
may have initially welcomed armed opposition as “liberators” from the regime of the day. 
However, as the wars stretched on without end, armed oppositions split into rival factions that 
resorted to indiscriminate, brutal, and predatory methods. Popular support dwindled. Instead, 
people experienced the destruction of their lives and livelihoods. The deterioration in quality of 
life created what humanitarian policies and studies refer to as complex political emergencies—
profound social crises induced by war or natural disaster (Binder 2009, 332). 
4.3 International Intervention 
The political and humanitarian crises resulting from these wars and the security threat 
they posed to neighboring countries compelled regional and international intervention to contain 
the conflict. The flight of thousands of people to neighboring countries and their settlement in 
border regions outside of government reach and control created insecurity. Armed groups took 
advantage of government inability to secure these regions and established bases from which to 
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attack. Sometimes, neighboring countries became involved as shown by the way the Liberian 
wars spilled over into Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry, threatening to destabilize the region. 
Also, when the Khartoum government attacks on South Sudan armed groups extended beyond its 
border with Uganda, the latter retaliated.  
The protracted nature of the wars and the complex humanitarian crises they created posed 
two main challenges to intervention by domestic civic groups, international nongovernmental 
organizations, and the United Nations. The first challenge concerned how to provide emergency 
assistance (food, water, medical care) to affected civilians under conditions of insecurity and 
impaired transport infrastructure. The second challenge involved finding the best means of 
transforming the lethal conflicts to constructive ones. 
4.3.1 Civil War and the Challenge to Humanitarian Intervention. High levels of insecurity 
and destruction of roads and railways made it very difficult for international humanitarian 
organizations to locate and access affected populations, adequately assess the humanitarian 
problems, and ensure timely provision of relief supplies and health services. During the first 
Liberian civil war (1990–96), humanitarian assistance was confined to cities or regions deemed 
relatively secure. In South Sudan and Somalia, international humanitarian agencies had to 
negotiate with armed groups for safe passage although this was not always guaranteed. 
International aid agencies operating in Burundi, Somalia, and Liberia withdrew because of 
threats or armed attacks on relief convoys, abductions and killings of international aid workers, 
and lootings of relief agency premises and property (Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006; United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 1997).  
In the absence of international humanitarian assistance or limited intervention by external 
actors, concerned individuals within communities mobilized residents and whatever resources 
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they could to address the suffering and humanitarian needs. In Liberia, professional women in 
Monrovia worked with women traders who traveled between the city and the interior, to ensure 
continued food supplies to the city despite the fighting between armed factions (Africa Women 
and Peace Support Group 2004, 9–14). Zarah Ugas Farah, a Somali woman who lived through 
the civil war in Mogadishu, recounts how she organized meetings with other women to discuss 
ways of working together to meet the survival needs of families and victims of war, especially 
the provision of food and medicine. These discussions led to the formation of the Family 
Economy and Rehabilitation Organization (FERO) in 1992 (Dyck 2003, 9–13).  
A few domestic groups, aware of the importance of collaborating with others inside and 
outside the country, partnered with international actors such as the UN or nongovernment 
organizations. The World Food Program–Somali appointed the local women’s organization 
FERO to lead food distribution (Dyck 2003, 13). Dahabo Isse, a Somali woman in Mogadishu, 
came together with other women in Mogadishu to provide food for hungry children. She later 
directed 140 kitchens in south Mogadishu for the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(Lorch 1992, 1). The Church played an important role in the provision of humanitarian relief. 
Compared to women and other civil society organizations, churches have a greater outreach and 
longer history of charitable work in the country. In Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sudan, 
church infrastructure served as alternative mechanisms for humanitarian relief. The church also 
addressed the psychological trauma and suffering resulting from the war (Beaudet 2001, 647; 
Fouke 1991, 853–858).  
Humanitarian support to domestic providers of humanitarian relief was intermittent or 
short-lived. International donors or partners feared the security risks of operating in conditions of 
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war. According to Zarah Ugas Farah, founder of a local Somali NGO, the Family Economy 
Rehabilitation Organization (FERO): 
We don’t get much support from donors because some areas in Somalia are not safe. It’s 
the local NGOs that are working inside Somalia. The international donors, UN agencies, 
and international organizations mostly have offices in Nairobi [capital city of Kenya] for 
security reasons and their support to Somalia is limited. The problem is escalating and 
our needs are so big; the support from the donors, international communities, and UN 
agencies is very little. (Dyck 2003, 15) 
Also, domestic religious organizations, women groups, and other domestic actors carried 
out their humanitarian relief operations under threat of attack and looting of property and at great 
risk to their lives. Even though they may have had the advantage of being indigenous to the area, 
they faced the same security threats as the international organizations. For example, Dahabo 
Isse’s uncle ordered her at gunpoint to divert food aid from the ICRC kitchens she managed to 
relatives. She refused to do so (Lorch 1992, 1). Armed groups also attacked, looted, and burned 
down churches (Fouke 1991, 854).  
As with international organizations, churches, women’s organizations, and other civil 
society organizations faced the challenge of persuading armed groups to allow safe passage of 
humanitarian supplies and resumption of social services. In Angola and Sudan, the church and 
other civil society actors called for the creation of humanitarian corridors for safe access to 
suffering populations (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004; Gidley-Kitchin 1992 
Kibble and Vines 2001, 542; Lean 1996). The deteriorating social conditions and cycles of lethal 
conflict constrained limited domestic efforts to respond to the suffering. Provision of 
humanitarian assistance, a short-term measure, morphed into a long-term activity due to the 
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protracted nature of the wars. This was not sustainable. In Chapters 6 and 7 I show how the 
challenges lethal conflicts posed to local and international humanitarian intervention compelled 
domestic civil organizations to consider an end to war.  
4.3.2 Civil War and the Challenge of Conflict Management. The United Nations, the 
Commonwealth and Organization of African Unity (now the Africa Union), and subregional 
organizations (Economic Community of West African States, Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development, and the Southern African Development Community) attempted numerous 
mediation efforts to resolve the wars of the 1990s. International nongovernmental organizations 
(Negotiations Network, Sant’ Egidio) and African ones (All Africa Conference of Churches, 
Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation) also mediated in a number of the formal negotiation processes. 
This study focuses on mediation processes that peace networks I study supported and sought to 
participate in (see Appendix Table 2).  
Regional and international mediation of the 1990s civil wars proved a formidable 
challenge to mediating agents and guarantors of the peace process. Perhaps the biggest challenge 
was overcoming their intractable nature. The proliferation of armed groups in the course of the 
negotiations constrained progress on substantive issues or threatened to derail the negotiation 
process. New entrants required a reformulation of existing terms of negotiations to accommodate 
them. The resulting stalemates or frequent postponement of talks frustrated hopes civilians had 
for an end to war. They also sent a signal to civilian populations that armed groups were not 
necessarily interested in ending war (Burgess and Burgess 2006, 178–180; Elnur 2009, 127; 
Foaleng 2008; International Crisis Group 2002). 
Since armed groups wanted to keep the military option open even as they pursued a 
negotiated settlement, the talks were often disrupted by displays of military power, for instance, 
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in the SPLM/A-Garang attack and capture of Torit during the IGAD-led negotiations (Waihenya 
2006, 97). Frequent violations of ceasefires such as this frustrated mediators’ efforts to move the 
negotiation process forward. This cast doubt on the integrity of the negotiations and commitment 
of parties to the peace process since they seemed keen on pursuing absolute power through war 
as shown in the Liberian, Burundi, and Somali wars (Aboagye 1999, 63, 127; Bentley and 
Southall 2005, 6; Mohamoud 2000).  
The apparent alienation of the political elite from the civilian population they claimed to 
represent presented a political problem. In addition to the hostile relations conflicting parties had 
with civilians whose interests they claimed to represent, both parties lacked political visions that 
appealed to broader sections of the population. Malaquias observes that: 
new internal wars in Africa are no longer fought at the military level to achieve political 
objectives. War is no longer viewed as part of a broader contest for political loyalty and 
legitimacy that involves, first and foremost, winning “the hearts and minds” of the 
people. In fact, now people are regarded as burdens, if not obstacles, whose removal by 
military means is justified. By removing people from, say, diamond producing areas, 
UNITA rebels can enrich themselves without the political and administrative costs of 
governing. (2001, 531) 
Few, if any, of the armed opposition in the 1990s carried out political education 
campaigns that communicated a clearly understood and unifying political agenda to win the 
support of the civilian population or even established civilian administrations in liberated areas. 
This departed radically from the armed resistance model characteristic of the Ugandan, 
Ethiopian, and Eritrean armed resistances in the late 1980s (Chan and Venâncio 1998, 12; 
Clapham 1998; Kasfir 2005; Mkandawire 2002; Weinstein 2007). Resolving conflicts of this 
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kind is a daunting task indeed for any mediator. It was made even more difficult by the 
reluctance of the international community and limited capacity of regional organizations to 
enforce peace, as was the case in Liberia, Burundi, and Somalia. In some of the cases, armed 
groups (e.g., Taylor’s NPFL, Somali warlords) or sections of the ruling elite (Burundi) opposed 
external intervention.  
In sum, the negotiations took place in contexts in which the general population did not 
necessarily consider the negotiating parties credible leaders, much as they desired an end to war. 
Indeed, in some cases, civilians rejected the notion of armed factions forming a democratic 
government. This happened in Sierra Leone where the population rejected the Revolutionary 
United Front at the polls during the 2002 general elections, marking the end of the transition 
government. Although the armed group transformed itself into a party, the Revolutionary United 
Front Party, it received less than 2% of the vote (Gberie 2005, 193–194). Alternatively, civilians 
were resigned to the expedient even if unacceptable assumption of power by armed groups. This 
occurred in Liberia where Liberians voted for Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) because they feared he would return the country to war if he lost. Charles Taylor 
won 75.3% of the vote in the July 1997 postaccord elections (Adebajo 2002, 156, 222–23). Thus 
the mediator and conflicting parties face the challenge of persuading the general population that 
a negotiated agreement will guarantee an end to war and ensure a new political dispensation.  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter set the context for the noncombatant groups’ mobilization to end the civil 
wars in the 1990s and early 2000s—the violent political transition to democracy. I highlighted 
the key domestic and international developments relevant to the emergence of the peace 
networks and their mobilization for a peaceful resolution of the civil war. The expansion of civil 
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and political liberties provided the legal openings for the registration and autonomous operation 
of a variety of civil society organizations, including the peace networks described here. The 
return to multiparty politics and general elections in some countries provided new opportunities 
for interaction among civil society organizations, including newly formed political parties.  
Unfortunately, elite struggle for power under new political institutions took on a violent 
turn in countries where leaders reluctantly implemented political reforms or prevented this from 
happening despite popular demand. Thus the contention for peace took place in adverse and 
highly risky conditions of war in addition to incomplete or manipulated transitions to democratic 
rule. The brutal conduct of war and its devastating effect on society is closely associated with 
initiatives for peace. These domestic conditions alone do not account for the emergence of 
noncombatant groups identified here. I noted the way external regional and international 
developments impacted the contention for peace, specifically the limits of international 
humanitarian intervention in the face of the kind of intractable conflict that unfolded and the 
challenges external mediating agents faced. Also, the failure of numerous formal negotiations to 
deliver peace despite the adverse social consequences of war forms the negotiation context in 
which some of the social actors described here contend to participate in formal negotiations. This 
setting is crucial to understanding the contemporary historical conditions of the campaigns to end 
war and the seemingly prominent role of women and religious leaders.  
 
 
 
72 
 
 Chapter 5. RELIGIOUS LEADERS’ MOBILIZATION FOR AN END TO 
WAR THROUGH DIALOGUE 
Why and how did the religious leaders and women’s networks mobilize for an end to war 
through dialogue despite the political risks involved? I argue that certain key moments, sudden 
transformative events in society caused by the war or the threat of war, compelled a few religious 
leaders and women leaders to reconsider whether the roles they played in society were relevant. I 
described these events in Chapter 4 and their impact on society. Here I show that these war-
related socially transformative events were not sufficient for collective action. The religious 
leaders’ and women’s interpretation of war as a threat motivated them to do something to end it 
through collective action. I show how they did this by reconstructing processes of collective 
attribution using evidence from accounts of the processes leading to the peace campaign written 
by religious leaders and women involved, the organizations supporting them, from position 
statements and pastoral letters.  
I sketch the process of attribution as follows: A few individuals (religious leaders and 
women) proposed the need to address the root causes of the conflict. They constructed an 
alternative understanding of the wars and their resolution—a shared story about the futility of 
war and the possibility of its resolution peacefully through the participation of all as peace 
agents. The story formed the basis for their demand that conflicting parties end the war 
peacefully through use of dialogue. The story also offered targets (warring parties) and subjects 
(the public) the promise of peace through inclusive participation that addressed the roots of the 
conflict. The construction of the story occurred during encounters and conversations with other 
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religious leaders and women so as to secure widespread participation within religious institutions 
and among women for collective action to end the war.  
In answer to how the religious leaders and women mobilized to end the wars, I argue that 
they diffused the shared story to the warring parties and the public through a number of 
mechanisms aimed at changing their thinking and behavior towards war. I reconstruct the 
process of mobilization by elaborating on the key mechanisms of mobilization across the ten 
campaigns for an end to war. These include the diffusion of the shared story about war and its 
resolution to build solidarity and reinforce commitment for the peace campaigns and the joint 
coordination of action at different sites, i.e., the conflicting parties, the public, and international 
stakeholders. 
I begin my analysis with the key moments in the wars or the political transitions that 
served as a wake up call to the women and religious leaders to do something about their 
situations. After this, my analysis shifts to the religious leaders’ and women’s attribution of 
threat and opportunity, the actual campaign for an end to war, and the outcomes. I present my 
analysis in two parts. This chapter focuses on the five religious leaders’ campaigns and their 
outcomes. In the next chapter (Chapter 6), I address the five women’s peace campaigns and their 
outcomes and conclude with a comparison of the religious leaders’ and women’s campaigns and 
outcomes.  
5.1. Key Moments and the Motivation to Collectively Act for an End to War 
Certain key moments, atrocious acts committed by either of the conflicting parties, 
disturbed a few religious leaders enough to do something to end the war. These include incidents 
such as the Homoine massacre of 380 peasants (mainly women, children, and the elderly) by the 
RENAMO in 1987, the Liberian government’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign in 1990 
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targeting civilians in areas where NPFL launched its attacks, and the vicious interethnic factional 
fighting accompanying the SPLM/A elite split in 1991 Sudan. Also included are the violence 
accompanying the political elite’s refusal to submit to electoral processes, for example, the 1997 
military coup in Sierra Leone that ousted a democratically elected civilian government and 
provoked civilian outrage, setting off a new cycle of violence, and the brutal and destructive 
violence of the 1992 postelections war and the post-Lusaka accords3 war (1998–2002) between 
the government and the UNITA in Angola. In all these incidents, the unprecedented violence 
cost thousands of lives, altered social relations by polarizing communities and families, broke 
traditional, cultural, and moral values, and made it difficult for churches to operate in the 
affected areas. Religious leaders were concerned with the insensitivity of fighting forces toward 
the plight of civilian populations and the heavy moral toll the war had on society.  
They were also concerned that the violence impoverished the people and the country. The 
policies of economic sabotage and destabilization cost the people their livelihoods and 
devastated the national economy. The loss of livelihoods created conditions of mass starvation in 
Mozambique (1983–85), famine in Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan (Bahr el Ghazal 1998–99), 
and in Angola. Although the churches provided humanitarian relief to internally displaced 
populations and refuges, they were frustrated by the futility of providing humanitarian relief on a 
near-permanent basis. The Sudanese Catholic Bishop Parade Taban of the Diocese of Torit 
likened the provision of humanitarian relief alone to “fattening a cow for slaughter,” and 
Alimamy Koroma of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone saw it as “simply reacting to 
the war” ( Koroma 2007, 287; NSCC 2002, 12). They and other religious leaders wanted to go 
                                                 
3 The Angolan government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol on November 1994. After a contentious 
implementation process, the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi resumed war and called for fresh negotiations. 
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beyond merely relieving the symptoms of the war (disease, hunger, famine, displacement) to 
addressing the causes of war.  
 Within the religious organizations, the process of collective attribution of threat and 
opportunity began with a few high-ranking clergy who initiated conversations about the need to 
end the war and the suffering it caused the population. A few church leaders in Southern Sudan, 
motivated by the need for a better way to serve their people, proposed the establishment of an 
ecumenical body that would work for unity, justice, and peace as long-term solutions to the civil 
war (NSCC 2002, 12). Some religious leaders, like the Roman Catholic clergy in Mozambique 
(D. Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, and Bishop Alexandre dos Santos) and Liberia 
(Archbishop Michael Francis and Lutheran Bishop Ronald Diggs), took individual stands against 
the war and its excesses. They publicly called on conflicting parties to end it through dialogue. 
Others, like the Protestant clergy in Mozambique (Anglican Bishop Dinis Sengulane, Bishop of 
Libombo, Pastor Jeremias Mucache, President of the Christian Council of Mozambique) and 
Sierra Leone (Alimamy Koroma) and Protestant and Catholic clergy in Angola, initially engaged 
fellow church leaders and conflicting parties in private conversations before making public calls 
for dialogue to end the war. Whether outspoken or cautious, these key individuals opened debate 
on the politically sensitive question of war and its resolution.  
The clergy interpreted war as a senseless threat to human dignity and to the moral, social, 
and economic order. The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) claimed that the civil war 
was “devastating,” it benefitted no one, and it caused suffering of the people (McVeigh 1999, 
183–185; Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998, 33). In Angola, Catholic Bishops called the war a 
“twice deadly organization—it kills with weapons and kills with hunger” (Vines et al. 2005, 27). 
Liberian clerics protested the lack of military discipline among troops. When the civil war 
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escalated a second time, they claimed, “Liberians cannot withstand another round of warfare” 
(Agence France Presse, 1999). The religious leaders considered dialogue the only viable option, 
given the failure of war to secure a permanent peace. They committed to promoting its use by the 
conflicting parties. 
For the religious leaders across the five campaigns, collective action for an end to war 
and the use of dialogue gave the church an opportunity to play a more relevant role in society. 
More importantly, it gave the church an opportunity to be recognized as credible peace brokers 
with the capacity to make a difference in society by facilitating the kind of relationships that 
would end war peacefully and ensure social stability. According to Bishop Sengulane, when the 
CCM became involved in the search for peace, it was looking for “an appropriate role for the 
church in the larger society.” He adds that “we considered reconciliation to be the vocation of the 
church” and that this role was driven by “gospel tenets” (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 192, 
197, 198). For churches in South Sudan, playing an appropriate role meant being “a voice of the 
voiceless,” a credible facilitator of peace and reconciliation capable of dealing with the root 
causes of war and poverty and creating a just, stable future for the peoples of Sudan. They 
regarded their peacemaking role as “an obligation for the Church to be in the midst of and care 
for the suffering” and believed that it involved bringing together the South Sudanese people, 
leaders, and members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the National Council of 
Churches (NSCC 2002, 10, 13).  
Like the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee 
in Liberia (IFMC) conceived their role as mediators and advocates of the voiceless (PanAfrican 
News Agency [PANA], 2 September, 1999). Alimamy Koroma of the Inter-Religious Council of 
Sierra Leone stated that the religious leaders needed to be more proactive in addressing the 
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causes of the political crisis facing the country in addition to the coordination of social services. 
In doing so they took on a variety of roles. They brokered communication between the 
government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. They bridged relations between the RUF and a public 
hostile to the armed group. They advocated dialogue, and they acted as a voice for all Sierra 
Leonians. Koroma notes that in adopting a proactive role, they emulated religious leaders in 
Liberia (Koroma 2007, 287; Pham 2004, 58; Pomeroy 1999; Turay 2000, 51; Winter 2000). For 
the churches in Angola, being peace brokers and prophets was an opportunity to restore the 
credibility, respect, and authority they had lost due to their close affiliation with either the 
colonial or postcolonial governments (IRIN 2003).  
This role of peace broker fit quite well with the peace and reconciliation mission of the 
church and with society’s expectation of them. The churches’ adoption of their peace-brokering 
role activated two identities that feature in the biblical tradition: the reconciler and the prophet. 
As reconcilers, religious institutions would be identified with facilitating social relations that 
allow for dialogue and an end to war. As prophets, they would be identified with the voiceless, 
speaking out against the injustices in society. Although the religious leaders do not state this in 
their accounts, the identities the churches activated were political, as they intended to engage 
directly with the state and armed groups even as they mobilized support within society. Their 
prophetic role in particular elicited sharp response from incumbent governments and attacks by 
armed groups. In Chapter 8, I analyze the political threats the churches faced, especially the 
threat of violent intimidation and how they navigated the political minefield nonviolently.  
The process of eliciting agreement on the churches’ promotion of dialogue as a means to 
end the war varied. Encounters took place at the level of individual churches and councils of 
churches within the Protestant churches and at the level of senior bishops within the Roman 
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Catholic Church. In Mozambique, the first conversation among the Protestant Churches took 
place in the October 1982 Synod meeting of the Anglican Diocese of Libombo. This Synod 
decided to request the CCM to meet with the FRELIMO government and discuss abolition of the 
death penalty. Few churches were willing to do so. In 1984, the CCM created a Commission on 
Peace and Reconciliation and then wrote a letter in 1985 informing member churches of its 
formation and its task of peace and reconciliation (McVeigh 1999, 182–83; Sengulane and 
Gonçalves 1996, 196; 1998, 28–29). The Protestant churches in Angola endorsed the need to 
engage politically at the 1984 Conference of the Council of Christian Churches in Angola 
(CICA) and again at the 1995 first meeting of the Protestant and Evangelical churches in Angola 
(EDICA). The Roman Catholic Bishops in Angola did so through consensus-building at the level 
of senior bishops, members of the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé (CEAST) 
(Comerford 2007, 492, 494, 509). In southern Sudan, widespread agreement among Protestant 
and Catholic leaders led to the formation of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in 
1990. Member churches agreed, at the first General Assembly (1991), that the church would act 
as an advocate and prophet of southern Sudanese peoples, broker relationships and cooperation 
between the churches on the basis of ecumenical principles, and build the capacity and programs 
of churches to fulfill their roles (New Sudan Council of Churches 2002, 12).  
The construction and diffusion of the shared story about religious institutions’ role in 
promoting peace was a difficult process. Accounts of the peace processes provide few details 
concerning the difficulties in getting widespread agreement. In his own account of the Inter-
Religious Leaders Council of Sierra Leone (IRLCS), Alimamy Koroma observes that, while 
leaders of Christian and Muslim traditions came together and found agreement over issues that 
united them (no violence, peace and reconciliation), the exercise was not easy (Koroma 2007, 
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279). Accounts of the Angolan process indicate that building consensus among Roman Catholic 
Bishops required overcoming political affiliations and divisions among them that reflected 
Angolan society (Comerford 2007, 492; Chatham House 2005, 13).  
Member churches’ response to the 1982 Synod (Anglican Diocese of Libombo) request 
to engage the government over the death penalty reveals great reluctance. According to Bishop 
Sengulane, then Bishop of the Diocese of Libombo: 
One church declined to answer, saying the subject was too complex politically. Another 
replied that it needed more time to consider the proposal. The head of one church 
reported to the secret police, although this was considered confidential. The CCM never 
officially dealt with the issue, in spite of requests from the originating synod for a 
decision. 
It took two years of ad hoc committee work on the issue of peace before the CCM 
established a Commission of Peace and Reconciliation in 1984. Bishop Sengulane also observes 
that Mozambican churches’ intention to promote use of dialogue to end the war was not well 
received by churches during their tour of the United States. He notes that, “Our hosts [the 
National Council of Churches in the USA], who had not been aware of their visitors’ intentions 
regarding RENAMO, turned out to be adamantly opposed to the idea. Their feeling was so 
strong that some felt they had been betrayed” (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 196–197; 1998, 
29). Bishop Sengulane elaborates further on the nature of resistance they encountered in the 
United States, “on one side our hosts put so much pressure on us to use non-conciliatory 
language, condemning one side; while among those who came to hear what we had to say, there 
were persons who wanted us to condemn the other side” (cited in McViegh 1999, 185). Clearly, 
church supporters in the United States rejected the Mozambican churches’ decision to adopt a 
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peacemaking role. This contrasts with the Catholic Church’s support from its networks in Rome 
and the Vatican.  
Accounts of the participation of Muslim clerics in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean peace 
campaigns provide little information on how Muslim clerics participated in the construction of 
the shared story. Gifford (1995, 282) observes in his analysis of the churches’ role in politics in 
Liberia that statements on church positions were in a Christian language, and cooperation was on 
Christian terms with no attempt to draw on Islamic peace tradition or language. This observation 
is applicable to the dominance of Christian discourse and tradition in the Sierra Leone campaign. 
Accounts point out the positive participation of the Muslim religious leaders and organizations 
but are silent on their specific contribution to the framing of the shared definition of peace 
through dialogue. 
Overall, it is not surprising that the construction and diffusion of the religious leaders’ 
peacemaking role met with resistance within the church. Most churches had been perceived as 
supporters of either the colonial or oppressive postcolonial regimes. Also, promoting peaceful 
resolution of the war, especially the prophetic role of engaging the conflicting parties publicly, 
was political activity. Not all religious leaders were used to this role because it represented a 
break from previous ones of abstaining from political participation.  
5.2 From Suffering to Mobilization: Religious Leaders’ Campaign for Peace  
Initially, religious leaders appropriated their churches’ national leadership structures to 
launch their campaigns for peace separately as Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches and 
Muslims. For instance, Protestant Churches used the national councils of churches and alliances 
of evangelical churches. The Roman Catholic Church issued statements through their Episcopal 
Conferences of Bishops, whereas Muslim clerics made claims in the name of National Muslim 
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Councils. Thus, the Council of Churches in Mozambique, the Liberian Council of Churches, the 
National Muslim Council of Liberia, the Council of Christian Churches in Angola, the Angolan 
Evangelical Alliance, the Sudan Council of Churches, the New Sudan Council of Churches, and 
the Conference of Bishops in Mozambique, Liberia, Angola, and Sudan were the initial 
organizational bases from which religious leaders made their public call for an end to war, 
pursued dialogue, and mobilized congregations’ support for peace.  
Some churches created new vehicles to coordinate activities promoting their claims for 
the use of dialogue to end the war. The mainstream protestant churches’ Council of Churches in 
Mozambique established a Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and appointed Bishop 
Denis Sengulane to lead it (McVeigh 1999, 183). The Roman Catholic Churches in Sudan 
established diocesan, regional, and national commissions to address peace and justice issues 
(Diocese of Rumbek 2001, 39). The Roman Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Commission in 
Liberia was also actively involved in campaigns for peace in addition to human rights 
monitoring.  
Religious leaders also created organizations to jointly coordinate their separate 
campaigns for peace nationally and internationally. These ecumenical vehicles varied in 
membership. The Contact Group/Task Force combined the resources and activities of the 
CCM/Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and the Roman Catholic Church in 
Mozambique. In Angola, the Episcopal Conference of Angola and Sao Tome, the Council of 
Christian Churches in Angola, and the Angolan Evangelical Alliance formed the COIEPA. The 
Liberian Council of Churches, the National Muslim Council of Liberia, and the Roman Catholic 
Church formed the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC), which later became the Inter-
Religious Council of Liberia (IRCL), a national affiliate of the Religions for Peace (Lampman 
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1999; PR Newswire, 1999; Woods 1996, 25). Major Christian and Muslim organizations in 
Sierra Leone, including women’s religious organizations, formed the Interreligious Council of 
Sierra Leone to advocate for an end to war. This council in turn formed a Sensitization 
Committee that broadcast messages encouraging the need for conflict resolution over the radio 
and television and a working group tasked with resolving the conflict (Pomeroy 1999). The 
Sudan Ecumenical Forum (SEF) brought together Sudanese churches and their international 
partners, such as the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the 
Caritas Network, to lobby for peace at the international level (Kur 2008).  
The joint coordination of separate activities crucial to mobilization differed among the 
religious leaders’ campaigns. In Angola, church leaders took longer to combine their efforts and 
forge an ecumenical vision for peace. In Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the various 
religious organizations overcame whatever may have divided them to engage in ecumenical 
initiatives for peace. In Sudan, the ecumenism evident among the Protestant and Roman Catholic 
Christians was absent among Christians and Muslims. Although other civic groups launched 
their campaigns and also participated in public campaigns led by the Inter-Faith Mediation 
Committee (Liberia), the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, and the COIEPA (Angola), 
my analysis focuses on the campaigns led by the religious leaders as they (and the women’s 
networks I examine in Chapter 6) emerged as leading actors in the struggle for peace.  
Through churches they appropriated, the new vehicles they created, and alliances with 
other civic and political actors in society, religious leaders launched peace campaigns that 
diffused a shared story about the war. They called on conflicting parties, the public, and 
international actors to promote an end to war through dialogue. This story offered an alternative 
interpretation of the violent conflict as a threat to social peace, especially to human dignity, 
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because of its senseless and devastating impact on moral, social, and economic order. Where war 
had failed to settle political conflict, as in Mozambique and South Sudan, they called for 
peaceful dialogue and reconciliation in society as alternatives to military victory and intervened 
to broker communication between fighting parties. Where formal negotiations and agreements 
failed to end the war, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola, they called on conflicting parties 
to adhere to negotiated settlements, attempted to reestablish broken communication lines 
between conflicting parties, and called on mediating agents and the international community to 
enforce peace agreements by conflicting parties. Religious leaders communicated these demands 
through a variety of performances aimed at persuading conflicting parties and the public that 
dialogue was an opportunity to be agents of peace instead of agents of war. My examination of 
these performances highlights the key mechanisms of mobilization operating in the religious 
leaders’ diffusion of their story to conflicting parties and the public. 
Ecumenical vehicles were particularly important for coordinating religious leaders’ 
separate and joint actions to persuade conflicting parties to settle their disputes through 
negotiations. They portrayed the religious leaders as autonomous nonpartisan actors united in 
their pursuit of peaceful resolution to the conflict. The religious leaders in the campaigns I 
examined first established contacts with leaders of conflicting parties through personal networks 
and written requests for meetings. At these meetings, religious leaders communicated the need 
for the government and the armed groups to end the war, persuaded both sides to enter talks with 
the other, and offered to facilitate these talks. In Mozambique and South Sudan, where 
conflicting parties had not engaged in direct talks, the religious leaders persuaded conflicting 
parties to see the opportunity that dialogue offered for being agents of peace and unity who 
ended the suffering of the people. By offering conflicting parties an inclusive way of framing 
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political identities, as citizens, religious leaders created a face-saving opportunity for both sides 
to shift the basis of their interactions from mutually exclusive political identity boundaries 
(whether ideological or ethnic) to inclusive citizenship identity. The Mozambican religious 
leaders, for instance, argued it was possible for conflicting parties to seek peace and appreciate 
each other if they saw themselves as Mozambicans. They called on both sides to see dialogue as 
an opportunity for Mozambicans to be reconcilers, committed to peace and not to winning or 
defeating the other (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 198). The New Sudan Council of Churches 
saw dialogue and reconciliation among the armed factions as an opportunity for them to forge 
the unity and peace required for the development of stable and productive communities and to 
prevent the Khartoum government’s manipulation of the southern Sudanese people. In Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Angola, where the conflicting parties had already entered into talks, religious 
leaders emphasized the opportunity that dialogue provided for them to be credible agents of 
peace and reconciliation and concerned about the interests of the people. Members of the Inter-
Faith Mediation Committee, especially the outspoken Roman Catholic Archbishop Michael 
Francis, emphasized the opportunity to be peacemakers committed to protecting the human 
rights and physical security of the people. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone 
encouraged the parties to see peacemaking as an opportunity to cooperate in ending violence in 
the country. Religious leaders in Angola saw in the government’s stronger position the 
opportunity to be peacemaker and saw peacemaking as an opportunity for leaders of the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) to create a basis for democratic practice, a culture of peace, and new social and 
political relations, and for restoring the dignity of Angolans (Kirkwood 2001). In general the 
 
 
 
85 
religious leaders appealed to an inclusive national identity and need for national integration when 
persuading conflicting parties to enter into talks and settle differences peacefully.  
The Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Sudan cases show that the religious leaders’ 
shift to communication brokers depended on positive responses from the armed groups and 
governments. The Inter-Faith Mediation Committee convened and mediated the first talks in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, aimed at preventing a full-scale war between the National Patriotic 
Liberation Front and the Liberian government under President Doe. After getting agreement 
from President Chissano, the Contact Group of religious leaders in Mozambique initiated contact 
with the RENAMO leaders and persuaded them to enter into talks with the FRELIMO 
government. This led to a series of separate encounters with RENAMO and President Chissano 
in which the Contact Group acted as emissaries for both sides, passing on positions and 
responses to them. The Contact Group members also acted as advocates for peace, pressuring 
both sides to enter into talks as the only viable alternative. The churches’ efforts led to both sides 
agreeing to face-to-face talks mediated by the Sant’ Egidio community in Rome. The Inter-
Religious Council of Sierra Leone’s direct engagement with the government and the RUF 
followed a pattern similar to that of the Contact Group of Mozambique and the Inter-Faith 
Mediation Committee in Liberia. The council reinitiated face-to-face talks between the RUF and 
the government of Sierra Leone during the second civil war after receiving agreement from both 
sides to do so (Pham 2004, 60). At the historic Yei Dialogue between the New Sudan Council of 
Churches and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in July 1997, the 
churches resolved differences with the movement and gained the mandate to pursue their 
peacemaking work among the different political military groupings and the population (NSCC 
1997, 10; 2002, 48–51).  
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The Sudan and Angolan campaigns show religious leaders more active in mobilizing for 
peace in society than in engaging with political elites, unlike their counterparts in Mozambique, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, who engaged both conflicting parties and the public. The Angolan 
government rejected completely the religious leaders’ call for peace through dialogue and their 
offers to facilitate talks between it and UNITA even though the latter responded positively. The 
COIEPA campaign focused its efforts on speaking out against the war publicly and mobilizing 
people’s support for peace and reconciliation. Brokering agreements to negotiate among the 
military factions proved difficult in South Sudan because some military leaders were reluctant. 
Yet most did not prevent the New Sudan Council of Churches from mobilizing the people for 
peace and reconciliation. While the Angolan example shows outright rejection of the churches’ 
offer to broker peace, in South Sudan the conflicting parties may have rejected the churches’ 
offers of mediation but did not prevent the same churches from mobilizing the population for 
peace.  
The Mozambican, Liberian, and Sierra Leone religious leaders relied on regional, 
transnational, and international networks of church organizations for assistance in brokering 
conflicting parties’ agreements to talk and mobilizing resources for their campaigns. The 
religious leaders in Mozambique diffused their call for peace during a tour of churches in the 
United States and used the opportunity to establish contacts with RENAMO representatives in 
the United States who later put them in contact with representatives in Nairobi. The All Africa 
Conference of Churches, World Council of Churches, and National Council of Churches in 
Kenya provided support in facilitating the Contact Group’s meetings with RENAMO 
representatives in Nairobi and the Kenya government, then an ally of RENAMO. The All Africa 
Conference of Churches participated in the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee’s brokerage of 
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peace between Liberian factions and also provided training in conflict resolution skills to 
religious leaders (Fouke 1991, 851). The Religions for Peace also participated in a similar role in 
Sierra Leone (PR Newswire 1999). The Church of the Brethren (USA) assigned two of its clergy 
as Peace Officers to the New Sudan Council of Churches to help build the peace program (NSCC 
2002, 47). In all the campaigns, the international relief and development programs of churches 
(e.g., Lutheran World Relief, Church World Service) and Christian international NGOs 
(Christian Aid, World Vision, Caritas, Catholic Relief Services) contributed humanitarian 
assistance through the churches during the war and postwar periods. The religious leaders also 
went on tours organized by church networks in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and continental Europe, during which they updated congregations on the situation and raised 
funds for their peace and humanitarian work. Angolan religious leaders also had secular 
organizations as allies (Austin 1999; NSCC 2002, 73; Fouke 1991, 854–59; Frerichs and 
Bowman 2001, 8; Winter 2000).  
The religious leaders’ mobilization efforts targeted congregations and the general public. 
Accounts show that religious leaders borrowed mainly Christian religious practices—prayer, 
fasting, vigils, bible studies, sermons, ecumenical services, and pastoral letters—to mobilize their 
congregations’ support for an end to war and for efforts aimed at getting conflicting parties to 
pursue a negotiated settlement. Evidence of Muslim leaders’ participation in the peace 
campaigns in Liberia and Sierra Leone and of traditional leaders in Angola and Southern Sudan 
indicates that these two groups may have emulated Islamic and traditional practices in their 
peace campaigns. With the exception of the South Sudanese grassroots peace movement, I did 
not come across documentation detailing the use of Islamic and traditional religious traditions in 
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Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola to diffuse the religious leaders’ call for peaceful resolution of 
the war.  
In my view, religious rituals like prayers, songs, bible studies, and fasting provided 
congregants with the opportunity to express their feelings about the war without fear. Together 
with sermons and pastoral letters calling for peaceful resolution of the war, the rituals opened 
public debate on a politically sensitive issue and created a safe space for discussions. Since the 
rituals emphasized religious teachings on peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation, they also 
activated new identities and social relations by compelling a change in the way congregants 
thought about the war and their relations with groups they considered against them. They 
encouraged a shift in identity among congregants by promoting the new identity of congregants 
as agents of peace—peacemakers—like their religious leaders. Since participation in church 
activities is open to the public, it is likely that the religious performances attracted the 
participation of nonmembers.  
Beyond their specific congregations, religious leaders mobilized general public support 
through pastoral letters, public statements, press conferences, and peace messages published in 
print media and also broadcast through radio and television. Religious leaders in Liberia and 
Angola staged peace marches and rallies. Peace marches led by the Inter-Faith Mediation 
Committee in Liberia often ended in prayers. The rallies and peace marches demonstrated public 
support for peace and the people’s outrage at the continuing war. Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
clergy also staged stay-home strikes to demonstrate outrage at the unacceptable behavior of 
armed groups. The nonviolent civil resistance in Sierra Leone protested the military coup in 1997 
by officers in the Sierra Leone army and the latter’s inclusion of the RUF in power in breach of 
the 1996 peace agreements and a popularly elected civilian government.  
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The Roman Catholic Bishops in Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia wrote pastoral letters 
expressing their position on the war and need for peaceful resolution. These and statements by 
Protestant Bishops appealing for peace were read at churches, broadcast through the church 
radio, and published in the newspapers where there was a relatively independent press like in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, the religious leaders also convened press conferences 
to communicate their position or what they were doing to the public. The direct diffusion of 
these letters in church and indirectly through the radio and print media opened public debate on 
alternative views of the war and its resolution. Accounts of the religious leaders’ campaigns in 
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia mention use of radio to disseminate messages of peace. The 
Roman Catholic church-owned radio stations in Angola and Liberia were important mediums of 
educating the population on human rights, civic education, and other themes of concern. The 
Angolan people relied on the radio for connecting with members of the family they had been 
separated from as a result of the war. The radio connected religious leaders to congregations and 
members of the public beyond their congregations who were scattered by the war. Given 
widespread illiteracy, the radio was a key tool for diffusing the shared story, in addition to 
updating the population on community events.  
In all the campaigns, religious leaders convened several meetings, like the seminars to 
prepare people for peace in Mozambique, visioning workshops and training in conflict resolution 
in South Sudan, and conferences at which influential members of society discussed peace in 
Angola. At these meetings religious leaders mobilized support for peace through conversations 
aimed at changing the thinking and behavior of influential individuals and groups in society—
civil society group leaders, politicians, parliamentarians, traditional elders and chiefs, 
professional associations, women, and youth—with regard to the war and its resolution. The 
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direct diffusion of the religious leaders’ shared story about the war and its peaceful resolution 
through presentations and discussions compelled participants to see themselves as agents of 
peace and consider how to end the war. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone convened 
meetings with the President, parliamentarians, paramount chiefs, traditional leaders, UN 
officials, and their leaders to mobilize their support for the religious leaders’ efforts at 
reestablishing dialogue with the RUF leader Foday Sankoh and his ally President Charles Taylor 
of Liberia. These meetings resulted in a Working Group tasked with developing ways for 
resolving the conflict and helping the country recover from the war. Different individuals and 
groups, some from across lines of division, came together through the itinerant brokerage of 
religious leaders. These face-to-face encounters with each other provided opportunities to forge 
relationships of trust and confidence required for a united and strong support for peace in society. 
They had the potential to alter social relations among groups and create coalitions and alliances 
for peace.  
The religious leaders’ campaigns also activated new identities and institutions in a way 
that elaborated further on the call to the public to be agents of peace. The campaign for 
disarmament in Liberia led by the Church and in which women peace activists participated 
included activities aimed at providing teenage combatants with occupations. The South Sudanese 
peace campaign reached out to youth by training them to be peace monitors. Mozambican 
religious leaders held symbolic rituals where children brought war toys, such as guns, to church 
and smashed them to symbolize their rejection of tools of war and demonstrate their commitment 
to peace and “devotion to the Prince of Peace.” This innovative use of ritual and the activation of 
new institutions was aimed at promoting new peacemaker identities among teenagers and youths 
who were key targets for recruitment into the armed forces by conflicting parties. The religious 
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leaders continued with provision of humanitarian relief even as they engaged in the campaigns 
for peace because most people were impoverished by the war and unable to produce food. 
Mozambican religious leaders considered this part of the peace process. In their view, 
humanitarian assistance demonstrated support for human life and dignity by protecting lives. Yet 
the provision of humanitarian assistance by Angolan churches is criticized for constraining 
popular mobilizations for peace, as people were more interested in food and other relief items 
than in participating in a campaign for peace. The New Sudan Council of Churches seems to 
have found a way out, by encouraging communities to contribute to supplies required for the 
several peace meetings even as they received support from international aid agencies.  
Other than tours to northern countries to mobilize resources for their church activities, 
including the peace campaigns, accounts also mention that religious leaders mobilized the 
support of actors for their peace campaigns at the transnational and international level. Although 
they do not detail the process of doing so, the regional nature of the conflict in South Sudan and 
Sierra Leone and the international intervention in the Angolan peace process necessitated 
engaging key stakeholders at these levels. The Sudan Ecumenical Forum jointly coordinated the 
peace advocacy activities of the Sudan Churches and their international partners at international 
fora (Kur 2008, 293). The New Sudan Council of Churches relied on brokerage of regional and 
international councils of churches (the National Council of Churches of Kenya, All Africa 
Conference of Churches, and World Council of Churches) to broker talks between fighting 
factions in the South (Kobia 2008). Angolan churches sent delegations to the United Kingdom to 
request the latter’s support in convincing the Angolan government to negotiate an end to war. 
The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone sought meetings with President Charles Taylor to 
get his support for peaceful resolution of the war. Through the brokerage of the Religions for 
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Peace, the Sierra Leone religious leaders established links with northern governments who could 
be potential mediators.  
Where armed groups refused to adhere to a negotiated agreement even after the religious 
leaders’ attempts to persuade them to do so, the religious leaders demanded international 
intervention to enforce peace and save the population from further suffering. The Liberian 
Council of Churches and the National Muslim Council of Liberia called for an international 
peacekeeping force to supervise a ceasefire agreement by armed groups (Faul 1992). During the 
second Liberian civil war, the Roman Catholic Bishop Michael Francis claimed that “the US has 
a moral duty to intervene in Liberia because it helped found the state” (Agence France Presse 
2003). While on an international speaking tour, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bahr al Ghazal 
(Sudan), Macram Max Gassis, called on the international community to push for peace in Sudan 
(Nolen 2001). The Sudan Catholic Bishops published a statement in which they appealed to the 
US government to exert pressure on conflicting parties to accept a negotiated settlement (PANA 
2002).  
The war imposed a geographic constraint on nationwide mobilization of the public. 
Campaign activities were more prevalent in cities (Monrovia, Freetown, Luanda) and certain 
regions in South Sudan. Interaction between groups across regions under control of armed 
factions was not possible in Angola, South Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Angola, for 
instance, the religious leaders organized under COIEPA were more active at the international 
level and in Luanda, while in the rest of the country individual church denominations or groups 
took on coordination of campaign because accessing areas under control of UNITA and MPLA 
in the countryside was very difficult. This was done to avoid intimidation or harassment by the 
government or UNITA. It is not clear how the individual churches mobilized in their 
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communities and whether they did so. The campaigns appear fragmented as connecting local 
actors required brokers who could cross warfronts. These were in short supply due to the nature 
of the war and to the paucity of resources available to the religious leaders. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Overall, the Mozambican religious leaders succeeded in brokering communication 
between the conflicting parties. This led to formal negotiations and a peace agreement in 1992. 
The conflicting parties requested that one of the Contact Group members, Archbishop 
Gonçalves, participate in the mediation of the formal talks. Other religious leaders 
complemented his role by pressuring parties to continue with talks when they threatened to stall. 
They also developed a new constituency for peace at the local level in support of the formal 
negotiations and gained credibility as important agents of peace in society. The South Sudan 
People-to-People peace process resulted in two peace agreements among communities—the 
Wunlit Dinka-Nuer covenant (1999) and Liir agreements. The process could not expand to other 
areas because of heavy fighting and militia inability to provide the security required for a 
sustained dialogue process. The South-to-South process targeting political and military elites 
proved difficult because of the SPLM/A leadership split on whether to enter into talks with 
militia affiliated with the Islamist regime in Khartoum. The Angolan campaign broke the culture 
of silence and opened debate on politically sensitive issues. Although religious leaders in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia brokered communications between fighting parties, this did not avert war. It 
took other factors to bring about some peace. In Liberia, the ECOWAS assumed peace brokerage 
but relied on the religious leaders’ communication brokerage in the series of negotiations leading 
to the 1997 general elections that brought Charles Taylor to power despite widespread 
opposition. Taylor’s resignation in 2003 is a result of a combination of factors—outbreak of war, 
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formal negotiations, Taylor’s indictment by the Special court in Sierra Leone for crimes against 
humanity, and the women’s campaign for peace.  
There are a few details of changes in members of the international community the 
religious leaders reached out to, e.g., the subregional organizations mediating formal 
negotiations like the ECOWAS, the United Nations, and key western donor countries such as the 
United States. Yet from the accounts, I observed that in general international actors certified the 
religious leaders’ campaign for peace. These actors contributed significantly to the formal peace 
process. For the Mozambican religious leaders’ Contact Group, this certification is seen in one of 
the members participating in the mediation of the formal talks. The ECOWAS worked with the 
religious leaders in Liberia to move the formal negotiation process forward. They were critical in 
brokering armed factions and also pressuring them to talk. The United Nations recognized the 
Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone as a crucial actor in brokering peace. In South Sudan, 
the IGAD invited the religious leaders to participate as observers in the IGAD-led formal 
negotiations, but accounts do not show they participated actively as communication brokers in 
the same manner as their counterparts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. They did initiate a parallel 
process aimed at reconciling the armed factions in the south as a way of securing implementation 
of the comprehensive agreement.  
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Chapter 6. WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE 
Why and how did the religious leaders and women’s networks mobilize for an end to war 
through dialogue despite the political risks involved? In the previous chapter, I argued that the 
religious leaders’ motivation to collectively act to end war originates in how they interpreted and 
responded to the sudden transformative events in society generated by the 1990s civil wars. In 
this chapter I take up this argument in relation to the women’s organizations that campaigned for 
peace. I draw on findings from four of the five women’s campaigns (Burundi, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, and Liberia). Accounts of these four campaigns describe how women called for an end 
to war through peaceful means. Although South Sudan women are mentioned as being part of the 
church led People-to-People peacemaking process, I have left them out because details of the 
exact nature of their involvement are few or too general to outline the process of their 
mobilization. Accounts of their campaign for peace provide more details on their demand to 
participate in formal negotiations. I examine this in Chapter 7 together with the other four 
campaigns.  
My reconstruction of the women’s mobilization for peace begins with the key events that 
made women aware of their need to collectively act against the war. I begin with the process of 
collective attribution across the campaigns to show how women moved from this awareness to 
eliciting support for collective action. Similar to my account of the religious leaders’ collective 
attribution process, I highlight the framing mechanisms involved in the way women attributed 
threat to the war and opportunity to their participation in ending it nonviolently. I reconstruct the 
mobilization process to show how women campaigned for an end to war. Similar to the religious 
leaders’ campaigns, I focus on the key mechanisms of mobilization. I show that women’s 
organization diffused the shared story to elicit support. They appropriated social bases and 
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created new vehicles to coordinate action at different sites (among women, the general public, 
conflicting parties, and key international stakeholders). I conclude the chapter with a comparison 
of the religious leaders’ and women’s campaigns to end the war and the outcomes.  
6.1 Motivation to Collectively Act for an End to War through Use of Dialogue 
Like those of the religious leaders, women’s networks in the ten campaigns I examined 
realized that the killings and brutal cycles of violence had to stop and a lasting peace was needed 
for the recovery of livelihoods and moral values required for peaceful relationships. Certain 
events I refer to as key moments provoked outrage among a few women and led to the need to do 
something to end the war. For the Burundian women it was the government and political parties’ 
inability to stop the cycles of revenge and counterrevenge sparked by the 1993 assassination of 
the newly elected President Ndadaye (Interview, July 2009). Liberian women opposed the July 
1993 Cotonou agreement for giving armed factions greater control of the new transitional 
government than civilians and for letting armed faction leaders assume their positions in the 
administration before disarming and demobilizing their troops (Africa Women and Peace 
Support Group 2004, 61–62). During the second Liberian war it was then-President Charles 
Taylor’s refusal to prevent its escalation in Liberia and regionally to Sierra Leone and Guinea-
Conakry.  
Women peace activists in Sierra Leone were disappointed in the failure of the military 
government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), to end the war with the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) despite promises it would do so, and the government’s 
inability to protect citizens from RUF and “sobels” (Femmes Africa Solidarité [FAS] 1997, 22–
23). In North Somalia, the outbreak of clan fighting in Burco and Berbera (1992), soon after the 
region declared independence from the rest of Somalia, angered women who expected a return to 
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peace and reconstruction of the region (Bennett, Bexley, and Warnock 1996, 53–57). Similarly, 
women in south Somali were angered by the escalation of clan fighting soon after peace accords 
because it disrupted their activities in Mudug, Bosaso, Kismayo, and Mogadishu (Bryden and 
Steiner 1998, 55–56, 58, 70).  
I argue that these key moments and the outrage they provoked among individual women 
and women’s organizations compelled a reconsideration of whether their efforts at ensuring 
survival of the family and community made a difference with continued cycles of violence. 
Along lines similar to that in the previous chapter, I reconstruct the process of collective 
attribution as follows. A few women, outraged by the turns of events in the conflict, proposed the 
need to address the root causes of the conflict. I suggest that they came up with an alternative 
interpretation of the war as a moral and social threat to society and women’s participation in 
ending it as an opportunity for them to be recognized as credible political players with the 
capacity to make a difference through peaceful means (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 148). 
They diffused this story during encounters and conversations with others so as to secure 
women’s widespread participation. The women’s shared story of the war and its resolution 
formed the basis of their demand that conflicting parties end the war peacefully through the use 
of dialogue including formal negotiations.  
6.2 Women Should Do Something to End this War—Women’s Shared Story  
The process of collective attribution of threat and opportunity among the different peace 
campaigns began with a few women who were concerned that their efforts to rebuild the lives 
and livelihoods of families and communities seemed pointless with the frequent outbreaks of 
war, and something more had to be done. They realized that women’s direct political action to 
end the war would perhaps secure their humanitarian activities. This awareness began with 
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encounters and conversations where women shared ideas for direct political action. Some of 
these encounters and conversations involved individual women like Mary Brownell, Leymah 
Gbowee, and Vaiba Kebeh Flomo (from Liberia), who shared their ideas with a few other 
women. Other encounters and conversations involved a much larger group like women in 
Burundi and those from different regions in Somalia (Somaliland, Mogadishu, Mudug, Boosaso, 
Kismayo, and Puntland), or took place at previously planned meetings like the Sierra Leone 
women’s meeting to prepare for the 1995 women’s conference (Africa Women and Peace 
Support Group 2004, 17; Bryden and Steiner 1998, 55–56; Burke, Klot, and Bunting 2001, 2; 
Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143; Interview, July 2009; Jama 2010, 62–63; Jusu-Sheriff 2000, 
46–47; Koenders 2010, 4, 29–33; Ndikumana 1995, 26–275).  
The women activists attributed personal, social, and economic problems they experienced 
to the wars they deemed “senseless.” The combatants’ humiliating and abusive behavior towards 
women posed serious physical threats to women’s dignity. These included rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, mutilation, and the indiscriminate killing of women, children, and the elderly 
in complete disregard of codes of war. The Burundian women were particularly concerned about 
the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS resulting from this. Social threats included the destruction of 
families and communities, an increase in child- and women-headed households, mass 
displacement, a breakdown of social order, and the militarization of society. According to 
women in northern Somalia, the war turned previous relations within and among families, 
friends, and neighbors into power struggles that caused great pain (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 
136–137, 162; Warsame 2002, 43). Liberian women activists saw the large number of weapons 
in the hands of youth and their use by the latter to intimidate, harass, or kill as a threat to social 
order (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 19). Among the economic threats women 
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mentioned are the collapse of the economy and the disruption of trade and agricultural and 
livestock production, leading to widespread hunger and famine.  
These physical, social, and economic threats made it very difficult, if not impossible, for 
women to provide for their families and the community. Their capacity to cope was exhausted. 
Across the campaigns, women complained that they were tired of the war. Soon after war 
escalated a second time in Liberia, women at a Women’s Peace Network rally said, “Liberian 
women are fed up. We want immediate peace…We are tired, the women of Liberia say they are 
tired. Women are sick of seeing our children dying” (Jarkloh 2003a). According to women in 
Burao, Northern Somalia, “It [intra-clan fighting] serves no purpose” and “adds to the suffering” 
(Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143). They also claimed that “people wanted to rebuild lives.” 
Women in South Somalia and also the Sudan expressed similar views. Aisha Haaji Elmi, Vice 
Chair of the Civil Society Committee at the Mbagathi peace process, said that the message from 
Somali women and children to Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) member 
states, the international community, and fellow Somalis is that “they [women and children] are 
sick and tired of the ongoing conflict” (IGAD News 2002c). 
Given the wars’ adverse impact on individual, social, and economic life, it is not 
surprising that women across the five campaigns regarded collective action for an end to war 
through peaceful means as an opportunity to do something about the unpleasant conditions of 
women, children, and the society as a whole. Women in Burundi saw in collective action an 
opportunity to do something about the violence in society sparked by the 1993 assassination of 
the first democratically elected Hutu president. This meant facilitating peace and reconciliation. 
For the Liberian women it was the opportunity to be advocates of the peace process who drew 
attention to the plight of women and children and the welfare needs of all Liberians. Women 
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activists in Sierra Leone saw the opportunity to be a pressure group for peace and key political 
participants in the return of the country to civilian rule through multiparty elections. According 
to Jusu-Sheriff (2000, 49), “Women believed that their hard work in the democratization process 
would be rewarded by places at the negotiating table.” Somali women activists saw in collective 
action the opportunity to be peace envoys, peace workers, and conciliators with the capacity to 
diffuse clan tensions, pressure fighting clans to settle peacefully, and communicate their need for 
a secure environment in which to carry out their humanitarian activities. They also saw the 
campaigns for peace as an opportunity for women’s organizations to be a platform for women’s 
contributions to reconciliation and reconstruction (Jama 2010, 63). Although specific political 
circumstances influenced how women conceived of their agency in ending the war, in all the 
campaigns, collective action to end the war presented an opportunity for women to be recognized 
as credible political actors with the capacity to make a difference.  
Women appropriated familiar cultural identities and used them for political action when 
they collectively presented themselves as credible peace activists with the capacity to pressure 
for an end to war. They appropriated and improvised pacifist roles deriving from sociocultural 
identities of mother, caregiver, and nurturer, as well as the international discourse on the 
advancement and empowerment of women in political participation to represent themselves as 
credible peacemakers. Doing so required encouraging a shift in women’s definitions of their 
political identities in terms of divisive political ideological, clan, ethnic, and religious identity 
boundaries to a more inclusive identity that emphasized the unifying elements of sociocultural 
identities, for instance dual group identity and kin ties (mother and sister), and the gender 
empowerment discourse premised on women’s discrimination and marginalization (as citizens) 
from political decision-making processes.  
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Women in Sierra Leone, for example, conceived of themselves as natural peacemakers, 
while Liberian women represented themselves as mothers and sisters (African Women and Peace 
Support Group 2004, 8, 22; Interview, June 24 2009). In Burundi, women based their credibility 
and capacity as peace activists on cultural views of mothers as family peacemakers and on the 
dual clan/ethnic identity of women as wives (FAS 2001a, 28). They argued that as mothers they 
often diffused tension and mediated disputes between siblings. As wives they could act as 
brokers between two disputing groups (their husbands’ and their own group). The use of a 
culturally assigned brokerage role in society for recognition as credible peace brokers is more 
visible in accounts of the Somali women’s campaigns. Here, in the absence of a central 
government and structure, the clan structures became the unit of governance and administration. 
Within this clan structure, women’s dual kinship identity allowed them to act as brokers, opening 
communication lines between their clan and that of their husbands, delivering messages, and 
keeping communication open because culturally it is believed that women do not have a single 
unquestionable loyalty to one clan. Their network of relations cuts across several clans, unlike 
that of their male kin, whose network is limited to the father’s clan, with weak ties to other clans. 
They coordinated action aimed at eliciting widespread support from women across clan, class, 
and other divides through this network of interpersonal relations. The cultural role of interclan 
broker (communication channel and envoy) is familiar to all women. Women peace activists thus 
appropriated sociocultural views of women as peacemakers and improvised these sociocultural 
identities to gain recognition as credible political actors in peacemaking.  
Women peace activists also appropriated international policy discourse on women’s 
advancement and empowerment to collectively conceive of themselves as peacemakers. The 
discourse emerging from the United Nations International Women’s Decade and the series of 
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events and conferences associated with it is particularly important. Participation in these 
processes permitted the diffusion and emulation of thinking and performances of women 
peacemakers from other countries. The question of women and peace in Africa was first 
addressed at the 1993 Regional Conference on Women and Peace (Kampala, Uganda), which 
produced the Kampala Action Plan on Women and Peace. This was followed by a series of 
regional meetings and conferences convened by the United Nations Development Fund for 
Women/African Women in Crisis Umbrella Program (UNIFEM/AFWIC), the United Nations 
Economic Commission/African Centre for Women (UNECA/ACW), and the Organization of 
African Unity, and by regional networks of African women NGOs. It seems like the most 
influential conferences in shaping African women’s identity as peace agents and connecting this 
identity to their political participation in democratization process was the 5th African Regional 
Conference on Women in 1994 (Dakar, Senegal), which produced a common position on the 
advancement of women (the 1994 African Platform for Action), and the 1995 UN Women’s 
Conference (Beijing, China), where the African Women’s common position was presented.  
In Sierra Leone, the question of women’s involvement in ending the war and its link to 
discussions on women’s participation in democratization was first posed at a meeting convened 
by different women’s organizations to prepare for the 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing. 
Also through the brokerage of the United States Information Center, women contacted 
counterparts from other parts of the world and learned from what they were doing (Jusu-Sheriff 
2000, 47). Women from Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi, and Liberia attended the 1994 Dakar 
and the 1995 Beijing conferences. They met each other for the first time, shared experiences, 
built contacts, and got new ideas on how to mobilize and work to end the war. For Zahra Ugas 
Farah, the 1994 Dakar conference was a good opportunity to meet other African women in 
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similar situations of war, share experiences, and access a regional network that facilitated her 
attendance at the 1995 Women’s Conference in Beijing. She also discovered new ideas for 
working with women to support peace (Dyck 2003, 13). Thus the series of regional events and 
conferences convened by the United Nations and NGOs and the UN Women’s Conference in 
Beijing were important sites of diffusion and emulation of ideas, learning, and peace 
mobilization strategies for African women peace activists. They appropriated and improvised on 
these ideas and practices to campaign for peace in their specific contexts.  
The new thinking and policy debate on women’s participation in the peace process 
emerged and developed in tandem with thinking and debates on how to resolve the violent 
outcomes of the 1990s movements for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Women peace 
activists’ understanding of their role in all peace processes evolved through their participation in 
these two processes and their campaigns for an end to war. Although accounts of the campaigns 
refer to the 1994 Dakar and 1995 Beijing conferences as significant in advancing their work for 
peace, the use of women’s empowerment discourse to frame their self-definitions as 
peacemakers was less explicit in this phase of their campaign. Perhaps this has to do with the 
tensions arising from reconciling the cultural definitions of their political agency in matters to do 
with security with those emerging from the international feminist discourses of the UN 
policymaking processes. The reliance on international feminist discourse is more evident in the 
second phase—women’s campaigns to participate in formal negotiations that gained prominence 
from the late 1990s. I analyze this further in Chapter 7.  
Accounts provide few details of how women peace activists elicited widespread support 
for the shared story about the threats the war posed to women and their children and the political 
opportunity for women to collectively end the fighting and violence. Nevertheless I piece these 
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fragments of evidence to show that this was achieved through cognitive mobilization, creation of 
emotional energy, and alliance formation. It also involved improvisation. Women learned what 
to do next while on the job. They adjusted their interaction with conflicting parties, members of 
the public, and international stakeholders according to the responses of these three groups. The 
reconstruction of this collective attribution process I present here is retrospective and premised 
on the idea of creative interaction (Tilly 2002, 211). Women peace activists convened and 
facilitated meetings, workshops, consultations, and trainings on peace and reconciliation for 
women. At these meetings they offered new interpretations of the war as a threat to women’s 
dignity, the family, and society, the attribution of these threats to the dehumanizing behavior of 
the combatants and actions women could take collectively to end the war. Discussions of these 
new interpretations of war at meetings, such as the mass meeting Mary Brownell and a few 
Liberian women convened to reach out to women, the day of reflection Burundi women peace 
activists held to discuss women’s contribution to restoring peace, the Women’s Forum and the 
Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Initiative, and the training in women and conflict transformation 
conducted by the Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET–Liberia) changed the way 
women thought about the war and their role in ending it. They produced a shared story that 
emphasized war’s specific impact on women and children and women’s central role in ending 
this suffering.  
Leymah Gbowee describes the content of the training she received from the West Africa 
Network for Peace/Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET) and that she in turn offered to 
Liberian women through the Liberian chapter of the network (WIPNET–Liberia). Training 
combined learning about nonviolence, building skills in communication, negotiation, and 
mediation skills, understanding gender roles through use of participants’ experiences, and 
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exercises that built self-confidence. A session she considers particularly powerful, and that 
highlights the role of demobilizing and mobilizing emotions (Gamson 2011, 261), is one where 
women shared their painful experience of being abused so as to “shed the weight of this 
experience.” The training helped Leymah connect the process of facilitating emotional release to 
political action by overcoming the debilitating emotional pain to access the strength required for 
action. According to her: 
You cannot negotiate lasting peace without bringing women into the effort, but women 
can’t become peace makers without releasing the pain that keeps them from feeling their 
own strength. Emotional release isn’t enough in itself to create change, but WIPNET 
channeled that new energy into political action. This was a way to do it all. (Gbowee 
2011, 114, 117–118) 
She used her trauma healing experience as a social worker to help women overcome 
demobilizing emotions resulting from their trauma. The WIPNET training allowed her to 
connect a gendered analysis of war to this experience. This gave her insights into how to 
mobilize women traumatized by the war by helping them overcome debilitating emotions and 
recover the strength and self-confidence required for political action.  
While this training is not exactly representative of what happened in meetings across the 
women’s campaigns I examined, it sheds some light on the cognitive and emotional mechanisms 
of eliciting women’s participation in the campaign to end war and the importance of strategic 
action. Mobilization involved appealing to the injustices women experienced, expression of 
demobilizing emotions (despair, hopelessness, shame, and lack of confidence), building their 
self-confidence and sense of dignity, and tapping into their moral outrage to mobilize for 
political action. A group of women from this training, eager to act on what they had learned, 
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proposed a Peace Outreach Program and became WIPNET–Liberia’s core organizers. They went 
out to ordinary Liberian women, disseminating their shared story and eliciting their participation 
in the campaign to end the second Liberian war. Over several weeks, they built a strong 
grassroots base for the women’s mass action campaign.  
The women’s meetings brought together women from diverse backgrounds. They led to 
formation of alliances across ethnic and religious divides, development of a common vision, and 
creation of new vehicles for collective action. The Christian Women’s Peace Initiative and the 
Muslim Women for Peace together launched the WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign. Sierra 
Leone Christian and Muslim women came together to demonstrate for peace. Women in Burundi 
from across ethnic and political divides formed the Women for Peace and later the Collectif des 
Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) organizations, whose aim was to promote 
peace and reconciliation at the local level. Somali women from different clans worked together 
to stop the clan fighting in different autonomous regions. 
Eliciting widespread support of women for the campaign for peace was a difficult 
process. Many women felt that matters to do with war were a male preserve and feared direct 
political action. For instance, in Burundi women feared being seen as opposing their husbands. 
Some thought it better to prevent conflict from within the family sphere (FAS 2001a, 28, 32). 
This example shows that not all women enthusiastically embraced the story of war as an injustice 
to women and the idea of women as peace brokers. This story and engaging political actors 
directly were quite new for some of the women. Jusu-Sheriff, a peace activist, notes in her 
account of the Sierra Leone women’s peace movement, that “many of the women’s groups were 
not comfortable in the spotlight” (2000, 49). 
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A second difficultly had to do with religious, ethnic, generation, and political divisions. 
Christian women in Liberia objected to joint action with Muslim women. They felt that praying 
with Muslims would dilute their faith and blamed the Muslims for prolonging the war because 
members of the new rebel group that had just launched attacks against President Charles Taylor’s 
government, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), were mostly 
Muslims (Gbowee 2011, 128; Koenders 2010, 34–36). Burundian women peace activists 
confronted political and ethnic divisions among some of the women in order to forge a common 
front. Similarly in Sierra Leone and Liberia women activists faced competition from those who 
held strongly to positions of their party, armed groups, or ethnic communities. The Liberian 
women’s peace campaign shows evidence of generational/class tensions between some members 
of the older Liberian Women’s Initiative and the younger WIPNET–Liberian mass movement 
(Gbowee 2011, 156). Nevertheless, the formation of new vehicles to launch and coordinate 
campaigns and joint action with other civic groups in society suggests that women tried to put 
aside their unresolved differences and pursue the common goal of ending war. 
6.3 Women’s Campaign for Peace—Social Appropriation, Creation of New Vehicles 
Women activists appropriated existing organizations or created new campaign vehicles to 
coordinate campaigns targeting the public, conflicting parties, and international actors. Women 
in Liberia mobilized from within the churches and the mosque before creating new vehicles. In 
the first Liberian civil war, the Liberia Women’s Initiative was created to lead the women’s 
campaign for peace and disarmament. It was part of the broader campaign for disarmament that 
the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee launched. During the second Liberian war, the Christian 
Women’s Initiative used the Lutheran church and the Muslim Women for Peace used the 
mosques as bases for coordinating prayers for peace before the formation of a new vehicle, the 
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Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET)–Liberia, to coordinate the outreach program and 
mass action for peace. Members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative joined with women from 
Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry to form the Mano River Women’s Peace Network 
(MARWOPNET) to coordinate campaigns for peace at the regional level.  
The Women’s Forum in Sierra Leone served as the organizational base for the Women’s 
Movement for Peace in Sierra Leone and later the Sierra Leone chapter of the international NGO 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Burundi women peace activists created 
new vehicles, the Women for Peace and CAFOB, an umbrella organization that linked member 
organizations with international allies in addition to coordinating activities of member 
associations aimed at ending the fighting and the economic sanctions that had a debilitating 
effect on the lives of ordinary Burundians, especially women and children. In Somalia, women’s 
organizations providing humanitarian social services were the organizational base for the peace 
campaigns. Accounts of Somali women’s campaigns mention a variety of organizations 
mobilizing for peace in the autonomous northern region (e.g., Somaliland Women’s 
Development Association) and South Somalia (e.g., IIDA,4 Coalition of Grassroots Women, and 
Save Somali Women and Children). Most accounts describe women from different clans coming 
together, sometimes under the umbrella of an organization, to call for an end to clan fighting.  
Overall, the CAFOB, the WIPNET–Liberia, and Somaliland women’s organizations 
acted autonomously, unlike the Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement, which was under the 
umbrella of a national women’s movement. The women also allied with other groups in society. 
The Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement participated in the broader civic movement for 
democracy. Women’s organizations in South Somalia (especially Mogadishu) allied with other 
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civic groups to demand an end to war. The Liberian Women’s Initiative, for instance, was part of 
the civic campaign for disarmament led by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC). They 
also participated in the All Liberian National Council meetings to find ways out of the political 
crisis. The WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign received the support of the religious leaders 
who came to the sit-in venue. Women’s groups in Mogadishu organized under the Coalition for 
Grassroots Women’s Organization (COGWO) also mobilized other civic groups under another 
umbrella organization, the Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN) to coordinate 
peacemaking activities (United Nations Security Council 2000; Saferworld 2008). Somali 
women also built alliances with clan elders, moderate Islamists, and members of the business 
community sympathetic to their cause.  
Through the religious and civic organization bases they appropriated, the new vehicles 
they created, and alliances with other civic and political actors in society, women launched peace 
campaigns that diffused a shared story about the war, calling on the public, conflicting parties, 
and international actors to think and respond differently to the war. They offered an alternative 
interpretation of the violent conflict as a threat to social peace, especially to the lives and 
livelihoods of ordinary people, safety and dignity of women and children, and peaceful relations 
between different groups. They called for peaceful dialogue, a return to democratic civilian rule 
through free and fair elections, and peace and reconciliation in society as alternative ways of 
settling political conflict instead of violence and the pursuit of military victory. Where formal 
negotiations failed to end the war, like in Liberia, women attributed this to the failure of the 
mediating agents and international community to secure a ceasefire agreement from conflicting 
parties and ensure that they disarmed and demobilized troops before installing a transitional 
government. Through a variety of performances and mechanisms of mobilization, they 
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persuaded the public, conflicting parties, and international actors that peaceful resolution of war 
through dialogue was an opportunity for all to be agents of peace instead of agents of war.  
Evidence shows that women peace activists deployed emotional energy creating activities 
that enabled the collective action of other women and solidarity building based on their new 
understanding of war’s injustice to them and their children and that was aimed at changing 
thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and other political leaders. Public demonstrations in 
Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia tapped into women’s outrage, frustration, and 
despair at combatants’ refusal to end the war. In the four campaigns examined, women sang 
songs, carried placards, and chanted slogans calling for peace during the peace protests. Women 
who participated in the WIPNET–Liberia mass action dressed in white T-shirts as an expression 
of solidarity while in Somaliland, women tied white headscarves to symbolize their sorrow. 
These cultural symbols were visual expressions of solidarity with the cause of peace and of 
sorrow, grief, and anger (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143; Gbowee 2011, 136; Associated 
Press, 2003).  
News reports of public demonstrations in Burundi, Sierra Leonean, and South Somali 
campaigns were sporadic yet show evidence of nonviolent protests. For instance, reports of the 
Burundi women peace activities mention a demonstration for the restoration of peace in 
December 1993 (Ndikumana 1995) and another in 1995 (Radio France Internationale [Paris], 9 
December 1995). A number of news agencies report that Sierra Leone Women’s Peace 
Movement staged demonstrations between February 1995 and April 1996 (Agence France Presse 
15 February 1995; Gberie 1996; Hecht 1996). A United Press International news wire reports 
that mainly women and children demonstrated against war in Mogadishu and other regions in 
South Somalia (1 April 2004). The sporadic reporting by international media yields evidence that 
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is not detailed enough to establish the frequency of public demonstrations. However, I infer from 
the prevailing violent conditions that in Burundi and South Somalia staging public 
demonstrations may have placed women in grave danger because of the highly tense political 
atmosphere, outbreak of violence, and threat of intimidation by incumbent government forces, 
opposing armed forces, and youth militia. The violent interactions between extremists from both 
sides of the conflict in Bujumbura (Burundi) dominated the political crisis between 1993 and 
December 1995 and so closed opportunities for staging public demonstrations without threat of 
attack. In South Somalia, civil society organizations and their members lived in fear of attack 
from armed factions who interpreted their activities as politically threatening. In 1992, troops 
loyal to one United Somali Congress faction opened fire on a peace demonstration in 
Mogadishu, staged by Somali youth organized as United Somali Salvation Youth (Human Rights 
Watch 1993). In Mudug, women demonstrated publicly in 1994 to protest a likely outbreak of 
fighting after a peace accord was threatened when one of the main signatories, the SSDF, split 
into two rival wings. However, the 1993 Mudug accord lasted until 1997, when tensions between 
factions surfaced and threatened the peace (Bryden and Steiner 1998, 56). The rapidly shifting 
structure of opportunity, especially the swing between highly tense and cordial relations with the 
armed groups, made regular staging of demonstrations difficult and dangerous. The war’s 
fragmentation of society geographically confined most public demonstrations to the city and 
constrained their diffusion nationwide. In Chapter 4, I examined these constraints as part of the 
political opportunity structure that limited the possible expansion of campaigns.  
Yet, in Somaliland and Liberia (second civil war), women staged public demonstrations 
protesting an escalation in fighting after ceasefire agreements that continued until the conflicting 
parties negotiated an end to the war and a return to peace. Here women combined demonstrations 
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with the use of more confrontational performances such as venue occupation and sit-ins, 
especially when previous performances were ignored and failed to get the fighting groups to 
settle peacefully. For example, women peace activists in Somaliland refused to leave the 
presidency and parliamentary building after presenting their declaration to end war to the 
National Council of Elders. They remained until a reconciliation committee was formed to 
develop a final peace proposal. When this committee failed to act immediately the women 
organized a demonstration and threatened to force the doors of the meeting hall open and stone 
the members of the reconciliation committee if they did not agree on a date and pace for the 
reconciliation meeting (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, p146-147).  
The women’s mass action campaign organized by the WIPNET–Liberia bypassed 
President Taylor’s ban on street marches by resorting to the performances of assembling, 
occupation of important public places, and sit-ins (Associated Press [Monrovia], 11 April 2003, 
Jarkloh 2003a, 2003b; The News (Nigeria), 29 May 2003; Paye-Layleh, 2003). They coordinated 
these activities through use of private independent media. For the first assembly action, the 
women broadcast a public announcement through the Catholic Radio Veritas calling on residents 
to assemble on the steps of the Monrovia City Hall, early in the morning and to wear white. 
Hundreds of women, some religious leaders, Taylor’s soldiers and supporters, and local media 
turned up. The women assembled gave President Taylor three days to respond to their demands 
to negotiate an end to the war. They staged a sit-in at a field near the fish market and along 
Tubman Boulevard, where the president passed daily on his way to and from Capital Hill. On his 
way to work, women protesters walked to the road and faced the presidential convoy at the risk 
of being shot. When Taylor did not respond to their demands within the three days they gave 
him, the women assembled outside Parliament. They returned to the field when he did not 
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acknowledge them and issued a second ultimatum to respond to their demands in three days. 
After the three days, the women occupied the Parliament parking lot blocking anyone entering or 
exiting until the Speaker came out to talk to them. They gave the president a third ultimatum and 
returned to the field, after which the president agreed to meet with them (Gbowee 2011, 137–
139). The WIPNET–Liberia campaign went even further with dramatic performances such as the 
women’s sex strike to send a strong message to the public that they were serious about ending 
the war (Gbowee 2011, 147; O’Reilly 2011; Reticker 2008).  
Women appropriated and improvised traditional, Islamic, and Christian religious 
practices of prayers, vigils, songs, traditional poetry, and personal testimonies, using them to 
express their suffering from the war and to communicate their desire for peace. The improvised 
appropriation of these practices also deployed emotional energy that built solidarity, elicited 
support of potential participants from the public, and also aimed at changing the thinking and 
behavior of political leaders and armed groups about the war. Although some of these practices, 
especially songs and prayers, were performed during public demonstrations, evidence of the 
Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Somali women’s campaigns for peace show that they were held as 
stand alone performances. Christian and Muslim women in Sierra Leone and Liberia held joint 
prayers. Liberian women held prayers services, prayer chains, fasting, and praying during the 
first civil war (Caesar 1994, 6). The strong reliance on prayer continued during the second 
Liberian civil war, as illustrated by the Christian and Muslim women who met three times a 
week for several months at a Lutheran church. These prayers preceded and continued throughout 
the Outreach Program and mass action phases of the WIPNET–Liberia campaign. In northern 
Somalia (Somaliland), young men participated in the Allabiri (traditional Islamic prayer) recitals 
women held to express their desire for peace. The use of prayers shows the great value women 
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had for appropriating and improvising on religious practices and beliefs to compel changes in 
thinking and action on women participants in collective action, elicit support of the public to the 
women’s cause, and express their desperate need for an end to the fighting.  
The Somali women also appropriated and improvised the Buraanbuur, a long and well-
known tradition of using poetry as a medium of social criticism to express their suffering, pain, 
and grief from wars that did not make any sense. The Buraanbuur performances deployed these 
emotions to compel a change in the thinking and behavior of the public, clan militia, and clan 
elders. Warsame states that the poems women composed were “intended to raise the 
consciousness of the masses” (Warsame 2002, 44). One account shows how the emotive power 
of the Buraanbuur moved the armed militia to stop fighting. The wailing and crying poems 
women sang as they ran between two fighting clans made the men throw down their weapons 
(Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 144). Also, during the WIPNET–Liberia campaign, the emotional 
public personal testimonies women told of how they were affected by war provoked public 
sympathy and support for their cause.  
Women peace activists in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somaliland often read petitions, 
statements, communiqués, and declarations presenting women’s positions, especially the war’s 
adverse effects on women and children and the need for peace at the end of a protest march, 
published them in the local papers, or had them broadcast by radio and television. These 
communicated women’s analysis of the war, their position, and demands for peace in the form of 
proposals. Together with the public demonstrations and other performances, these aimed to 
communicate an alternative understanding of war and its resolution to that of the conflicting 
parties. Women activists in Somaliland petitioned the new government to end the clan fighting 
(Bradbury 1994, 72). During the first Liberian war, the Liberian Women Initiative presented 
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petitions and position papers to the representatives of the United Nations, Organization of 
African Unity, Economic Community of West African States. They also picketed outside the US 
Embassy, government offices, faction headquarters, UN offices, and embassies of the ECOWAS 
countries. During the second Liberian war, WIPNET–Liberia presented their position statement 
to the International Contact Group of Liberia. When armed groups refused to adhere to the 
negotiated agreement, the Liberian women in particular demanded international intervention to 
enforce peace and save the population from further suffering. The Liberian Women’s Initiative 
called for the deployment of African peacekeeping troops throughout Liberia and international 
enforcement of the 1992 UN arms embargo on the country (Xinhua News Agency 18 May 
1995). During the second war, representatives of women’s groups in Liberia (Coalition of 
Women in Political Parties, Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia, and Mano River 
Women’s Peace Network) called for an immediate deployment of a UN or US peacekeeping 
force to monitor the ceasefire, disarm and demobilize combatants, facilitate safe passage of 
people trapped between fighting lines, and allow for the distribution of relief aid (Associated 
Press 2003, The News [Nigeria] 2003; GBC Radio 1, 2003).  
In all the campaigns women used media to coordinate action among members of the 
public. They used radio and television to broadcast messages of peace and reconciliation 
throughout the country (Anderlini 2007, 34; Dini 2009, 35). This mediated diffusion of their 
shared story of peace and demand for an end to war allowed women to provoke public debate on 
their alternative solution to peace and reconciliation. Also, women worked with selected groups 
in society, specifically women affected by violence and male youths, to change attitudes toward 
the war and social relations in society. Women’s interactions with these two groups show they 
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experimented with promoting new identities and institutions through modeling the idea of people 
as peace agents. 
Meetings with women from both sides of the conflict divide were aimed at raising 
women’s consciousness about the war and its adverse impact on women, the importance of 
peace, women’s agency in stopping the war, and bringing about peace. These meetings were also 
aimed at reducing tension in the community by helping women victims develop community 
projects that allowed them to cope with difficult conditions. These projects focused on providing 
humanitarian assistance, vocational training, income generation, and trauma healing. They 
promoted peace by helping women find ways of working together on common issues.  
Women activists’ attempts at demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating teenage boys 
active in the different militia or armed groups show they experimented with promoting new 
identities and institutions by offering teenage boys the opportunity to be agents of peace and 
security and by encouraging them into peaceful occupations. Burundi women talked to the youth 
in Bujumbura to dissuade them from engaging in armed militia. Somali women in Mogadishu 
mobilized funds from local businessmen and used these to convince teenage boys serving in 
militia to hand over their guns and attend school. They later mobilized the boys to be security 
guards in parts of the capital so as to keep it safe. Liberian women used radio to appeal to 
combatants to disarm and return home after the 1994 Agreements that formed the Liberian 
Transitional National Government. They also launched programs to purchase guns from 
combatants, rehabilitation of female combatants, and vocational training (Anderlini 2007, 34; 
Caesar 1996, 6; Dyck 2003, 11; Interview July 2009; Menkhaus 1998, 223).  
The coordination of action at sites beyond the initial site of contention varied 
geographically in the campaigns. The Burundi women’s mostly reconciliation and humanitarian 
 
 
 
117 
assistance activities were carried out in displaced camps across the country. The Sierra Leone 
women’s campaign was largely confined in Freetown, the capital city, due to the increasing 
insecurity in the countryside forcing people to flee to the city. The Liberia Women’s Initiative 
campaign was also limited to the capital city of Monrovia because of high insecurity. However, 
during the second Liberian war, the WIPNET–Liberia mass action coordinated sit-ins at nine 
counties. In Somalia, the women’s campaign remained fragmented. Coordination of activities did 
not extend beyond the autonomous regions, cities, or towns where activities took place.  
Among the women’s campaigns examined, the Liberian women’s campaign to end war is 
the only one that coordinated direct action at the subregional level. During the second Liberian 
war, the Liberian Women’s Initiative joined together with women peace activists in Sierra Leone 
and Guinea-Conakry to form the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET). This 
was possible with the brokerage of Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS). They relied on 
interpersonal networks of Guinean and Sierra Leonean members of the network to get audience 
with Presidents of Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone and present their case for a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict. They also met with President Taylor and persuaded him to work with 
the presidents of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry to end war in the region. Once President 
Charles Taylor and the LURD agreed to talks in April 2003, some of the women initiators of the 
WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign traveled to Freetown (Sierra Leone), where the Liberian 
Council of Churches was meeting with leaders of the LURD movement to resolve the issue of an 
appropriate negotiating venue. The WIPNET–Liberian activists mobilized women from a 
Liberian refugee camp to picket at the meeting and call on the LURD leaders to go to Ghana for 
talks. They traveled to Accra (Ghana) ahead of the scheduled talks between President Taylor and 
the LURD to mobilize women refugees there. WIPNET members from northern Ghana joined 
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their sit-in and picketed at the negotiation’s venue. When the talks dragged on and fighting 
escalated in Monrovia, the women sat outside the entrance to the meeting room where 
negotiations were taking place and refused to leave until the parties agreed to settle. The women 
even threatened to strip naked, a traditional practice women in several African societies use to 
communicate complete outrage, when security officers attempted to remove them from the hall. 
It took the intervention of the mediator, General Abubakar, to stop the two women leaders from 
stripping and together find a way out. While the threat did not deliver immediate results, it 
marked a turning point in the negotiation process. The women’s action generated a lot of local, 
regional, and international attention and sent a message to the conflicting parties that they could 
not ignore the women’s demands. President Taylor resigned and went into exile, the talks 
resumed, the LURD and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) ended their siege of 
Monrovia, and a peace agreement was signed a month after the women’s threat (Chanda 2003; 
Dalieh and Fahngon 2003; Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2003; GBC Radio 1, 2003; Gbowee 2011, 
143, 161–62; Koenders 2010, 40–42).  
6.4 Conclusion  
In Chapters 5 and 6 I sought to account for why and how religious leaders and women’s 
networks mobilized for an end to war in politically risky conditions of violent political 
transitions. I suggested that they mobilize collectively for an end to war when they interpreted 
certain transformative events in society caused by the war as a threat to their interests and those 
of society. I proposed a sketch of the process of attribution based on evidence from accounts 
written by religious leaders and women involved, organizations supporting them, position 
statements, pastoral letters, and news reports. Regarding how the religious leaders and women’s 
networks mobilized for an end to war, I initially argued that they did so by diffusing the shared 
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story to conflicting parties and the public with the aim of changing the thinking and behavior of 
these two groups toward war. They diffused their alternative theory of the war in nonviolent 
ways. I showed this through a reconstruction of the mobilization process highlighting the key 
mechanisms of mobilization.  
Across the ten campaigns, evidence shows that religious leaders and women’s networks 
mobilized for an end to war for three reasons. First, they saw in the adverse conditions of war an 
opportunity to do something to end it. Specifically, civilian outrage at atrocious acts committed 
by combatants and political elite disregard for the electoral process and for the suffering and 
trauma caused by war provided the occasion for a few individuals, religious clerics and women 
leaders, to do something to end the violence once and for all. Although unprecedented violent 
events served as the occasion to do something about the war, compared to the religious leaders’ 
efforts, the women’s campaigns are concerned with the gendered and generational nature of the 
violence. Specifically, women were concerned about the combatants’ deliberate targeting of 
women as part of their war strategy, the plight of children and youths and the cycles of revenge 
and counter revenge that destroyed family and community relationships. Mass rape, sexual 
abuse, and other forms of violence against women reveal a breach of customary norms of war 
and that women lacked protection in the private (family) and public sphere. Also, women were 
disturbed by the plight of children (dying) and the recruitment of large numbers of youth into the 
war.  
Second, they perceived the war as a threat to society and the humanitarian assistance they 
provided at the time as a temporary and not permanent relief to war’s impact on the populations 
they assisted. Also, the war made it increasingly difficult for the religious leaders and women to 
carry out their social and humanitarian roles. The religious leaders and women’s networks saw 
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war as a threat to human dignity, social, moral, and economic wellbeing of the people and a 
threat to the humanitarian relief they provided the population. However, the women emphasized 
the threat war posed to their dignity as women, to the survival of their children, and to their 
family and community relationships. The women’s interpretations thus highlighted the suffering 
war caused at the personal and family level. The spiritual and material support religious leaders 
provided affected populations, and the women’s care of the sick and the elderly, in addition to 
providing for the family, all seemed incapable of addressing the consequences of the 
unprecedented violence. This compelled them to do something more about the deteriorating 
social conditions, something more relevant and lasting than the humanitarian responses they 
undertook.  
Third, doing something more, that is, acting to end the war peacefully, gave the religious 
leaders and women’s networks the opportunity to be credible agents of peace and to contribute to 
the transformation of the value basis of political relations (changing thinking and behavior). The 
religious leaders framed their peace agent role in terms of the biblical models of the reconciler 
and prophet. The women, on the other hand, drew on international feminist discourse on equality 
of women and on cultural conceptions of mothers and wives as social peacemakers and clan 
envoys/connectors. As peace agents both actors sought to change thinking and behavior of 
conflicting parties and the population by developing relationships that facilitated dialogue as a 
means to settle war. The women went further and saw in this an opportunity to gain political 
recognition in the democratization process.  
In answer to how religious leaders and women mobilized to end war, evidence shows 
they did so by diffusing an alternative understanding of the war aimed at changing thinking and 
behavior of conflicting parties, congregants, and the population. Diffusion occurred mainly 
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through encounters and conversations, brokerage, the media, activation of new identities and 
institutions, and scale shift. Brokerage was the most recurrent of diffusion mechanisms in all ten 
campaigns. Campaign initiators combined brokerage with personal networks of relations to 
disseminate their alternative understandings of war and its resolution to conflicting parties, 
influential members of society, and influential international actors. They also broadcast the new 
story of war and peace mainly through radio and print media.  
The diffusion of the shared story through encounters and conversations was more 
common within social bases as the religious leaders and women who were campaign initiators 
promoted the alternative theory so as to gain support of members. Although the spread and 
adoption of the shared story may have been confined within churches, women movements, and 
spaces created by both groups, these spaces were open, also, to individuals and groups other than 
just congregants or women members. For instance, young men participated in the prayer recitals 
and vigils organized by women in Somaliland, and members of the public and religious leaders 
expressed solidarity with the Liberian women’s campaigns. Similarly, much as the activation of 
new identities and institutions among specific social groups (i.e., women, youth, and 
congregants) indicates that the diffusion of the message was confined to these groups, the South 
Sudan local peace campaigns in Wunlit and Liir shows that other groups such as traditional 
religious and political leaders participated. In my view, the activation of new identities and 
institutions reveals an attempt by peace activists to promote models of new thinking and 
behavior required of peace agents.  
Evidence shows the relative absence of scale shift from the national level to local levels 
nationwide because of the structure of war and violence, especially its geographical constraints 
on space and places and demographic upheavals, pushing large numbers of population outside 
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and within the country. The diffusion of the shared story remained localized in the capital city or 
main towns. However, transnational diffusion of the story occurred through brokerage of 
campaign initiators, in particular their encounters and conversations with influential international 
actors whose support they wanted. The women’s campaigns included encounters and 
conversations with women in refugee camps in neighboring countries.  
My arguments on why and how religious leaders and women’s groups mobilized to end 
war are based on evidence that varies in terms of detail and event focus across campaigns. 
Nevertheless, the cases show that civic groups will mobilize when there are individuals who 
choose to do something about the suffering caused by the war, when the benefits of addressing 
the root causes of suffering seem more promising than those derived from addressing the 
symptoms and when the cost of taking action to address the root causes is no more than the cost 
of inaction. Campaign initiators will mobilize the support of others by proposing and 
disseminating an alternative understanding of the war and its resolution based on a common 
experience of war as suffering and of peace as possible through the agency of all (conflicting 
parties and the public). The cases show that disseminating this understanding across lines of 
divisions in society depended a great deal on the brokerage of campaign initiators and 
supporters, creative appropriation and improvisation of cultural resources common to all social 
groups, and the use of the media. Although the campaigns did not yield peace directly, a major 
outcome is that they opened public debate on a political issue that governments considered their 
responsibility and that ordinary citizens avoided because of the political risks involved.  
The findings show that instead of merely protesting or criticizing the conflicting parties, 
campaign leaders and supporters offered a solution that expanded on who was responsible for a 
peaceful resolution to the war. Although the solution emphasized the responsibility of conflicting 
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parties, the idea of peace agent was extended to the broader society. In other words, conflicting 
parties may be the primary agents in promoting peace, but they are not the only actors. Citizens 
were just as responsible and capable of being agents of peace instead of promoters and pawns of 
war. This raises the question of what kind of power the religious leaders and women brought to 
bear in a political arena dominated by actors with military and economic power and keen to 
protect their control of this power.  
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Chapter 7. MOBILIZATION TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS 
Much as the women and religious leaders’ campaigns endorsed the use of dialogue to 
peacefully settle the conflict, peace activists soon became disillusioned by the conflicting parties’ 
inability to secure a lasting peace through formal negotiations. For some of the actors this led to 
a new phase in their mobilization for peace in which they engaged directly with the formal talks 
as participants. Why and how they did this is the focus of this chapter. Evidence from accounts 
of the religious leaders and women’s campaigns shows that while religious leaders’ and 
women’s motivations for engaging directly with the formal negotiation are similar, they differ in 
how they become participants. With the exception of Angola where the government rejected the 
religious leaders’ demand for dialogue, religious leaders’ communication, and peace brokerage 
opened the way for their participation in negotiations to end war in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Sudan. The women’s direct engagement came by way of collective action that 
pressured mediating agents, key regional and international stakeholders and international allies to 
include them as official participants. Thus women were uninvited guests at the negotiating table 
unlike the religious leaders.  
Along the same lines of analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, I begin by examining why women 
mobilized to participate in formal negotiations. I use evidence from accounts of the women’s 
peace campaigns in Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan to identify the key 
moments that make the women consider participating in formal negotiations. These moments are 
related to developments in the formal negotiation processes and an emerging international 
discourse on women and peace building during the 1990s. I show how they interpreted these key 
moments as threats and opportunities, developed a shared story of the need for their participation 
in formal negotiations and diffused this story to elicit support for their participation in the 
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negotiations. I argue that women demanded participation in formal negotiations because a) they 
wanted a peace agreement that reflected the needs of the suffering population, b) they wanted to 
ensure conflicting parties committed to ending the war. In some instances, women seem to 
promote the agenda of conflicting parties they affiliate with.  
In the second part of the chapter, I analyze how women mobilized to participate in the 
formal negotiations and the outcomes of their mobilization. I outline the process of mobilization 
based on the argument that women up-scaled their coordination of action to the regional and 
international arena to gain entry into formal negotiations. At these levels, women interacted with 
mediating agents, regional and international actors, at negotiation venues in neighboring 
countries. To ensure an inclusive negotiation, they coordinated activities between the negotiation 
venue and in country by reporting back to women’s network members, other women mobilized 
for peace at local levels and general public.  
My analysis shifts to the religious leaders’ engagement with the formal negotiations to 
end war in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. I leave out the Angolan religious 
leaders because they did not participate in formal negotiations and the government rejected their 
attempts to broker communication between it and UNITA leaders. Since my aim is to show the 
difference between the two groups’ engagement with the negotiations, I end with a comparison 
of the women’s and religious leader’s direct engagement of the formal negotiation in terms of 
how they came to directly participate in formal negotiations. 
7.1 Women’s Mobilization to Participate in Formal Negotiations  
7.1.1 Motivation for Collective Action. The motivation to campaign for participation in 
negotiations stems from a number of developments related to the formal negotiations and the 
emergence of an international discourse on women and peace building. In their campaigns to end 
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war, women pressured conflicting parties to negotiate an end to the war. However, the twelve 
peace agreements and ceasefires by Somali fighting factions (1991-1999), the 1995 power-
sharing agreement and 1996 Mwanza peace talks involving Burundian political parties, the 
formation of a Reconciliation Committee to end clan fighting in northern Somalia, the numerous 
mediations and the ceasefires and agreements to end war by Liberian fighting factions between 
1989 and 1994 did not end the fighting. This created the impression in society including women 
peace activists that conflicting parties did not take the matter of ending war as seriously. This 
awareness may have led to women peace activists to reconsider whether the nature of their 
engagement with formal negotiations needed to change in order to achieve their demands for 
peace. The negotiations had failed to remove the threats that war posed to society and to women 
in particular.  
The women interpreted the conflicting parties’ lack of concern for their interests and 
those of the wider population as a threat to lasting peace. My examination of claims women 
made shows three main threats women attributed to the failure of formal negotiations to secure a 
lasting peace. These are the intransigent positions of the conflicting parties, the dominance of 
armed and mostly male participants concerned with their own interests and the lack of 
mechanisms to enforce the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups before establishing 
new governments. The conflicting parties’ intransigent position of parties was a major source of 
frustration not only for women peace activists but also religious leaders and the wider society. 
Women in Burundi blamed the negotiating parties refusal to focus on common problems on this 
is attitude. It is also evident in the Reconciliation Committee’s tardiness in convening peace talks 
in Somaliland, the South Sudanese factions’ refusal to negotiate peace with each other and 
militia affiliated with the Government of Khartoum, the failure of the Somali warlords to secure 
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a peace agreement and the numerous breaches of ceasefires and agreements by the Liberian 
armed factions. The delays and breaches turned formal negotiations into a long drawn out 
process that stretched the people’s patience. This was most evident in Liberia where the 
breakdown of the Accra negotiations (January 12, 1995) between conflicting parties in the first 
Liberian civil war provoked mass protests in the capital city Monrovia (Mcall 1995). Angry 
residents sealed off the airport and almost lynched armed faction leaders returning to the country 
from the negotiations (Agence France Presse 1995). During the Accra negotiations (July 2003) 
between Taylor and the LURD armed group, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported that twenty 
women members of the Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia chapter:  
laid seige to a room where their compatriots were trying to fine tune a comprehensive 
peace plan' to end the war. Women sat outside room and blocked negotiators from 
coming out of the room. Only the mediator Gen Abubakar would be allowed out. 
Coordinator Leymah Gbowee threatened to strip naked to protest the effects of the war on 
them (22 July 2003). 
Women in northern Somalia (Somaliland) threatened to force open the meeting hall doors 
and pelt members of a Reconciliation Committee of government representatives and members of 
two fighting clans if they did not agree on a meeting date for talks on a final peace proposal. 
They demanded that the Reconciliation Committee agree on a date and place of meeting and 
carry out its activities immediately (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 147).  
The Somaliland women’s realization that the exclusively male participation in the 
negotiations cast doubt on whether women’s specific concerns would be given serious attention 
in the deliberations and spurred their intention to participate in the talks. This awareness of male 
delegates’ tendency to neglecting or ignoring women’s concerns also underlies the Liberian 
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Women’s Initiative’s insistence on presenting their perspective and position on the war to the 
ECOWAS Heads of State Summit in 1995, the Burundian women’s lobbying President Yoweri 
Museveni and Mwalimu Nyerere for room to present their views, and the lobbying by South 
Somali women for official status in the Djibouti and Kenyan negotiations so as to voice women’s 
concerns (Xinhua News Agency, 18 May 1995; Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 
26-27; Burke, Klot and Bunting 2001, 7-9; Tongeren et al. 2005, 118-119).  
The continued presence of armed groups in society with a history of indiscipline, sexual 
abuse and violence directed at women children and elderly by armed groups did not guarantee 
the safety of women and other vulnerable groups in society especially when no other recourse to 
justice at the local and national levels existed since courts, police and traditional mechanisms 
were ineffective, weak or destroyed during the war. The Liberian women’s demand to participate 
in the negotiations, for example, stems from the absence of a strong mechanism for disarming, 
demobilizing and reintegrating combatants in the post-agreement phase of the peace processes. 
Women wanted to focus attention on the urgent need to protect them and the children (Africa 
Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 19). In Chapter 6, I showed how women elicited public 
support by calling on groups in society to be agents of peace and also created new local 
institutions aimed at promoting this new identity. I showed how women in Liberia, Somaliland, 
and Burundi appealed to young men to be agents of peace by creating new institutions to 
dissuade teenage boys in the community from joining the militia. However these community 
efforts at building a constituency for peace were unsustainable without political leaders 
committed to disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants into civilian life and 
restoring order in society.  
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 The second development that caused women to consider direct participation in formal 
negotiations is the international discourse on women’s participation in politics and decision-
making processes. The Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) and the 
subregional and regional preparatory processes preceding it were particularly influential 
encounters for women peace activists who attended. Through conversations, presentations, and 
discussions, women peace activists learned from the experience of women peace activists from 
other countries within and outside the continent. They also gained knowledge of subregional, 
regional, and international policy instruments acknowledging the important role of women in 
peacemaking and endorsing the right of women to participate in all level of decision-making 
including peace negotiations. Additionally, women contributed to the development of a common 
for agenda for action for the Africa region ahead of the 1995 Beijing Conference. With this new 
awareness, women made connections between their concerns for peace, women’s rights and 
social and economic welfare.  
The women’s exposure to international discourse on women and peace building and their 
participation at subregional and regional meetings on women and peace building made them 
aware of new openings for their participation, new spaces for organizing and support, new 
possibilities of engaging the formal negotiations. They became more conscious of a new political 
role. Like the South Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace, the conferences also provided 
opportunities for visibility and international support for their domestic campaigns for peace in 
the form of training, funding and invitations to meetings where they presented their work for 
peace (Hilhorst and van Leeuwen 2005, 547). The United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325, passed on October 2000, opened the way further for women’s participation in formal 
negotiations. It gave women an important tool for justifying their participation in formal 
 
 
 
130 
negotiations as part of international commitment to empower women’s participation in decision-
making.  
7.1.2 Why Women Should Participate in Formal Negotiations—The Shared Story of 
Inclusive and Gender Sensitive Participation. Women’s shared story of participation in formal 
negotiations and its potential for guaranteeing a lasting peace originated from the same collective 
attribution processes that launched their campaigns for peace. The story developed in the course 
of mobilization to end war (see Chapter 6) and the participation of some of the activists in 
subregional, regional and international women’ conferences. I characterize the collective 
attribution process that yielded the shared story of their participation in formal negotiations as 
one involving the following mechanisms: a) re-interpretation of their continued adverse 
conditions based on an assessment of their expectations of the conflicting parties’ ability to 
deliver on peace and of whether their mobilization was yielding the kind of results they desired; 
and b) the adoption of ideas of women as peace agents at regional and international conferences. 
The story’s composition involved the same women peace activists who initiated the campaign 
for peace (initiators) and the same organizations with the exception of Sudan. In the latter 
country, the development of the shared story did not build on a national campaign for peace 
jointly coordinated by women from the north and south. This happened through the intervention 
of an international actor, the Netherlands Embassy and so its mobilization involved brokerage of 
an external actor. Unlike their counterparts in northern Sudan, South Sudanese women peace 
activists were actively involved in a grassroots peace process led by the church within Southern 
Sudan.  
The continued violence despite numerous attempts at negotiating an end to war made 
women aware of the futility of expecting conflicting parties and mediating agents to understand 
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the unbearable psychological, social and economic toll of the violence on women and children. 
Women blamed the continued violent brutalization of their bodies, the forceful recruitment of 
children, their economic deprivation from violent disruption of lives and livelihoods, and the 
disruption of humanitarian and social service provision on the failure of the mostly male political 
leaders and leaders of armed factions to bring about the order and security needed for a normal 
life. In a speech delivered at the Boroma Grand Conference in 1993, on behalf of women in 
Somaliland, Zeynab Mohamed argued that that the reason women were compelled to do the 
“traditionally unthinkable,” that is speak out in a male forum, was because the men had failed in 
their traditional responsibility of protecting women and children and abandoned them to all kinds 
of social, economic and environmental hazards (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 149). This 
realization that “men could not protect them anymore” is implied in the Burundi women’s 
attribution of women’s economic deprivation resulting from the damage to the economy, 
agriculture and social service to their political leaders’ refusal to negotiate an end to war. It is 
also implicit in the connections Liberian women made between continued sexual abuse and 
widespread violence, and the Liberian armed factions’ refusal to disarm and demobilize; in the 
connections between the rape, abduction, economic deprivation, forceful recruitment of children 
and continued fighting between Southern Sudanese factions despite attempts to unite them; and 
in the connections between constant disruption of women’s attempts to resettle and rebuild their 
lives and livelihoods and the refusal of failure of warlord centered negotiations to secure peace. 
In the women’s view, the problem lay not with negotiations as a tool to end war but with the 
mainly armed groups’ use of it to pursue their own interests rather than the interests of the 
people. In Liberia, the women also attributed the problem with the negotiated agreements to the 
international community’s reluctance in enforcing peace. The resulting frustration, 
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disappointment and disillusionment at the continued violence compelled women to collectively 
demand their participation in the formal negotiations.  
Women considered participation crucial to ensuring that their concerns and those of the 
wider society received the serious attention they merited from mediating agents and conflicting 
parties. First, as the Liberian and Burundian women actions show, participation offered women 
an opportunity to present their experience and understanding of the war. They offered an 
alternative and gendered understanding of the war to that of the conflicting parties. Secondly, 
participation would provide an opening for women to focus attention on issues that concerned 
them. More importantly, participation would allow them to have their ideas and concerns 
incorporated in the contents of the negotiation agenda and agreements. Women in Burundi 
demanded that their rights and the priorities of both men and women incorporated in the content 
of the peace agreement (Burke, et. al 2001, 5.13). Similarly, the Sudanese women hoped to have 
their ideas and concerns incorporated in the negotiation agenda. They also wanted compliance of 
the armed groups to human rights and a culture of peace. The Liberian Women’s Initiative also 
saw their participation as an occasion to argue for disarmament of all armed groups before 
assuming positions in a new government (Hassan 2009, 3; El-Amin 1999; Kamil 2000, 23; 
Anderlini 2000, 20). The Burundi women’s demand that the principles of drafting the new 
constitution reflect their priorities and the Somali’s women’s demands that women be included 
in future political institutions shows participation offered the chance for the incorporation of 
women’s rights in legal instruments establishing a new state and secure a leadership role for 
women in future political institutions established by the peace agreements.  
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Third, the South Somali women’s demand to be included in the Somali negotiations 
mediated by the Kenya government (2002–5) show that participation was important for women 
to secure gains made in previous negotiations. The Somali women wanted to protect gains they 
made at the Arta (Djibouti) negotiations mediated by the Djibouti government in 2000 and 
secure more commitments to women’s participation in political leadership. Fourth, participation 
also gave women the chance to gain official recognition as peacemakers at the national level. In 
Chapter 6 I showed how the women saw their collective action to end war as an opportunity to 
gain public recognition as agents of peace. The outcomes show that public recognition did not 
necessarily mean official recognition. The campaign to participate in formal negotiations thus 
provided an occasion for official recognition of their contribution to peace. As the Somali 
women claimed, participation gave women a chance to create a new and enhanced role in politics 
(Tongeren, et. al. 2005, 119). For Burundi and Liberian women peace activists, direct 
participation meant breaking or correcting the practice of exclusion and marginalization of 
women and a chance to raise women’s consciousness of their role in reconstructing the lives and 
livelihoods of all (Burke, et. al. 2001, 5, 13; Anderlini 2000, 36).  
This was the first time the women peace activists interacted directly with the formal 
negotiation process. The idea of women participating in formal peace processes was new and so 
for the women peace activists involved, the campaign was an opportunity to inaugurate a new 
role for women as active participants in decisions about future political institutions and the 
reconstruction of the country. In Chapter 6, I show that women’s self-constitution as credible 
peacemakers was premised on the view of women as natural peacemakers and as cultural 
brokers, by way of marriage, connecting different families, clans or ethnic groups. Like the 
Burundi women who saw their participation in negotiation as an opportunity to hold the society 
 
 
 
134 
together, women peace activists applied these same culturally premised self-definitions to justify 
their demand for participation in formal negotiations (Burke et. al. 2001, 5). Yet, they also drew 
on the emerging international discourse on women and peace building to frame their 
participation in negotiations as women’s right to participate in all areas of political life on equal 
basis with men. As with the campaign to end war, women framed their peacemaker identity in 
terms of sociocultural and international policy views of them as social actors. However, 
international policy discourse on women in peace processes played a greater role in framing 
justifications for their participation in formal negotiations. This may have to do with the fact that 
formal negotiations, except for those in Somaliland, were convened at the international level, 
involved international actors and drew on international intervention policy.  
7.1.3 Diffusion of the Shared Story among Women. The generation and diffusion of the 
shared story about women’s participation in negotiations occurred as part of their efforts to end 
war. Women used the same organizational bases to mobilize and sustain support of other women 
for their participation. In Liberia, Burundi, and north Somalia (Somaliland) the same women 
who initiated the campaigns for peace at the national also initiated the campaign for participation 
in negotiation. In Sudan new groups of women became initiators. Also campaign initiators faced 
the same ethnic, religious, and political divisions similar to what they encountered when building 
support for the campaign to end war. However, evidence from accounts of women’s campaign 
for negotiations in Burundi, Sudan, and South Somali shows that these divisions became more 
pronounced in the campaign to participate in negotiations. Women’s demands for participation 
raised the question of whether they should participate as an autonomous group or through party 
affiliation. This question touches on the political identity women preferred as the basis of their 
participation in negotiations. Also unlike the broader campaign for peace, few women could 
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participate in negotiations because of the way these are structured. They had to agree on who 
would represent them and whether they represented the diverse backgrounds of women in 
society. Competition emerged, also, in the process of developing a common agenda. Political 
party interests, clan leaders’ attempts to undermine women’s campaign and religious, ethnic and 
political divisions existing in society posed a challenge to addressing these three questions.  
This competition played out in different ways. In Burundi, the campaign for participation 
was led by the group of 7 women who also were responsible for initiating the broader campaign 
for peace. Competition emerged when the 7 women who spearheaded the campaign for peace 
went to the negotiation venue, uninvited, and sought the support of the mediator, Mwalimu 
Nyerere, for women’s participation in negotiations. Despite his intervention on their behalf, the 
heads of delegations rejected the women’s participation as an autonomous group and suggested 
that the women do so as members of political parties, civil society and the church as provided by 
the rules of participation. The Burundi 7 were unable to rally strong enough domestic support of 
women for a change in the rules to allow autonomous participation. They faced resistance from 
women aligned with the parties’ position, and from women who feared directly confronting male 
politicians. The second competition was over building support for a common agenda and finding 
a way to have this agenda incorporated in the negotiations agenda and agreement. The Burundi 7 
did this through meetings with women inside the country, where they reported back on the 
negotiation process and planned what to do next (Klot et. al. 2001, 28). Accounts do not mention 
competition with women they reported back to in the city and countryside. However, the Burundi 
women peace activists lacked strong support of women members of political parties because the 
latter were not united on issues of common concern to women. The turning point in efforts to 
build a common agenda came through the collaborative brokerage of the UNIFEM and Mwalimu 
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Nyerere Foundation, the mediating agent in the Burundi talks. They convened the All Party 
Burundi Women’s Peace Conference in July 2000, the first time women from different parties 
met together with the Burundi 7 women, women representing refugees, diaspora, professions and 
civil society to discuss a common agenda. At this meeting, women addressed issues of concern 
to them in the draft peace agreement and made recommendations that were incorporated in the 
final agreement. The meeting relied on the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and the 1995 UN Women Conference Beijing Platform of Action 
to guide discussions and recommendations.  
Strong political party positions fueled competition between women in the north and south 
Sudan and prevented them from building a strong national women’s constituency for peace that 
women could use to leverage their demand for participation in the negotiations. As a result, 
women’s peace campaigns were fragmented within and between the north and south. The 
Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum and Nairobi intervened in 1997 through the launch of the 
Sudanese Women’s Initiative (also referred to as the Dutch Initiative). Through this national 
level series of encounters, held between 1997 and 2000, the Netherlands Embassy connected 
Northern and Southern women from all political groups in the conflict to build a common vision 
for peace (El-Amin 1999, 35). The women formed working committees of members drawn from 
different parties in the civil war and women’s organizations. The committees were tasked with 
generating a local understanding of the conflict and women’s possible contribution to 
peacemaking through meetings with constituents and male leaders. At the same time women 
members of the Initiative received training in conflict resolution facilitated by the ACCORD. 
This included a study tour of the Parliament and civil society organizations in South Africa 
(Kamil 2000, 23-24; ACCORD 2007, 26). The external brokerage of the Netherlands embassy 
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was crucial in eliciting widespread support for a shared story of the Sudanese women’s 
participation by guiding women through its interpretation and grounding it in local 
understandings of constituents, through what was expected of participants in negotiations 
(conflict resolution skills) and in future political institutions (leadership skills). The aim was to 
move away from issues that divided them to focusing those common to them as women. Yet, the 
process was not without its difficulties. Two participants in the process observed that bringing 
women together was very hard because of the complexity of issues involving strong political 
actors: members of government, political opposition (NDA, SPLM/A and Nuba mountain 
groups), and civil society organizations). The women “were all aggressive and quarreling,” they 
“shouted and screamed at each other” even though they proposed the inclusion of women in the 
negotiations between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A (Omang and Darvich-Kodjouri 
2007 9; Majteny 2003).  
The Somali women overcame clan differences at the the Somali National Peace 
Conference in Arta, Djibouti (March–October 2000) and united under an autonomous group, the 
Sixth clan, to leverage their voting power in the negotiations. However, the Sixth clan coalition 
seems to have demobilized after the Arta talks. In later talks, South Somali women mobilized 
under separate initiatives to build a common agenda and participate in the next Somali 
Reconciliation Conference convened in October 2002 by the IGAD and mediated by the Kenya 
government. The Save Somali Women and Children, one of the groups that formed the Sixth 
clan, organized a workshop in August 2002, facilitated by the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa to 
develop a common agenda and build the kind of momentum that resulted in the Sixth clan 
coalition at the 2000 Arta conference in Djibouti. Another women’s organization that was part of 
the Sixth clan, IIDA convened a separate meeting of women representatives from five regions in 
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South Somalia to prepare a common platform for action. The meeting was supported by the 
United Nations (Timmons 2004, 16). These separate yet similar initiatives show that women 
peace activists were unable to sustain the Sixth clan coalition and leverage their influences at the 
Kenyan talks as they did in Arta 2000. In sum, competition among women over the forging of an 
agenda and the nature of their representation at the talks resulted in the external brokerage of a 
common agenda by international allies. This allowed some unity among women, despite the 
different divisions, and some leverage to pursue their campaign for participation.  
The campaigns to participate in negotiations were part of women’s broader national 
campaigns to end war through dialogue. Consequently, women used the same vehicles for 
coordinating the campaign against war to coordinate collective action aimed at mediating agents, 
conflicting parties and regional and international actors supporting the negotiation process. They 
also used new vehicles created to coordinate activities at the regional level, like the Liberian 
women’s use of the MARWOPENT and Women in Peace Building Network during the second 
civil war. They relied on external brokers such as UNIFEM and the Dutch Embassy in Sudan for 
assistance with this coordination.  
7.1.4. Uninvited Guests at the Table: Collective Demands for Participation. Civil society 
participation in formal negotiations depended on the openness of rules providing for who 
participates. These varied from the mediator’s provision for participation of civil society 
organizations in the negotiations that the women in Burundi, Sudan, South Somalia and Liberia 
(second civil war) targeted to mediator exclusion of civil society organizations as participants in 
the negotiations that ended the First Liberian war and the northern Somali Reconciliation 
conferences. I examine the negotiation structure of opportunity in Chapter 4. The point I want to 
emphasize here is that although civil society organizations could participate in some of the 
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negotiations, no provision was made for the participation of women as an autonomous group 
alongside conflicting parties and other civil society organizations. Women could participate as 
members of civil society organizations or as members of political parties. Furthermore civil 
society organizations had observer status. This allowed them to attend plenary sessions and listen 
to deliberation. They had no right to vote nor contribute to deliberations.  
Women campaigned for official recognition as delegates with full participation, voting 
rights and as an autonomous group. Like the Liberian and Burundian women, autonomy allowed 
them to be neutral and not supporters of either side of the war. They began with requests for their 
inclusion in the negotiations like the Liberian Women’s Initiative peace activists who wrote to 
the ECOWAS seeking invitations to the Accra Clarifications Talks in December 1994. They 
sought the support of influential negotiating parties, regional heads of state, and international 
allies who advocated on their behalf. The women’s campaigns in Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, and 
South Somalia show this use of influential domestic and external stakeholders as advocates of 
their inclusion in the negotiations. The Burundi 7 approached President Buyoya and requested 
his support for the inclusion of women in the ongoing Arusha negotiations. He in turn consulted 
with the FRODEBU leadership and the government and FRODEBU agreed to appoint three 
women each to attend the negotiations as observers. Also, through interpersonal networks the 
Burundi women approached Dr. Specioza Kazibwe, then Vice President of Uganda and also the 
President of the OAU Women’s Committee on Peace, and the Minister of Gender Affairs in 
Rwanda. They communicate their concerns with adverse effects of the economic embargo on the 
population and requested the support of the two senior political leaders in lobbying for its 
removal and for the participation of Burundi women in the Arusha negotiations. The Ugandan 
Vice-President convened a peace conference, in Kampala, sponsored by the OAU Women’s 
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Committee on Peace. This conference provided the occasion for the women to meet with 
President Museveni whom they asked to lift the economic sanctions and also intervene on their 
behalf regarding their inclusion in the talks. By accepting to communicate the women’s demands 
to the facilitator of the Arusha negotiations, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President Yoweri 
Museveni acted as their advocate. The conference is an example of the use of strategic 
scheduling of meetings by external brokers to facilitate an audience with influential political 
actors (Interview, August 2010). 
Women invited themselves to the talks, since they were not recognized as delegates. 
Having arrived at the negotiation venue by imposition, women proceeded to coordinate action 
there. They sought audience with regional heads of state, international actors supporting the 
negotiations and with mediating agents so as to make their case for participation and the 
incorporation of their concerns in the negotiation agenda and protocols of the agreement. When 
the ECOWAS did not respond to the Liberian Women’s Initiative request to be invited to the 
Accra Clarification Conference (December, 1994), the organization mobilized funds from local 
benefactors, purchased tickets and sent six women to the conference. Once they arrived the 
women lobbied factional ECOWAS, factional leaders and international actors to give them a 
hearing at the talks. At the Abuja summit (May 1995), the women sent three women and 
requested to be placed on the agenda. Their request was denied by the ECOWAS secretariat. 
Through interpersonal networks they met with the ECOWAS secretary, the President of Gambia, 
the special assistant to President Rawlings, Nigerian Ambassador to Liberia, and the Nigerian 
Foreign Minister to plead for an opportunity to present their views at the assembly (African 
Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 68, 76). Somali women in Somaliland petitioned the 
committee convening the Boroma conference to include their participation. When clans excluded 
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South Somali women from their official delegations to the Somali National Reconciliation 
Conference (Arta, May 2000), the women activists approached Djibouti President Omer Guelleh, 
who was the mediating agent and persuaded him to secure a position for them at the talks (Jama 
2010, 64).  
Women diffused their demands through the media and through joint coordination of 
action with international organizations keen to support the inclusion of women in the negotiation 
process. When representatives of the Liberian Women Initiative realized that delegates and the 
mediating agent were unwilling to give them a hearing at the Accra talks (1994), one of the 
women used her personal and professional network of media colleagues to access the Ghanian 
media and international press. They deployed the media to publicize their concerns and exclusion 
from the talks. The ECOWAS granted the women temporary observer status as a result of the 
international publicity (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 24). Somali women 
established a Women’s Resource Center at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, 
Mbagathi Kenya (2002-2004) with the support of the IGAD and the UNIFEM. The Center 
served as a working area for women delegates and a communication hub. The UNIFEM 
provided two support staff, electronic equipment, and internet services. Through email, women 
reported to Somalis at home and in the diaspora on the negotiations. They also used the centre to 
research, access negotiation documents, conduct research, and hold their own meetings. Political 
leaders also used the centre for informal negotiations with women and among themselves (IGAD 
2005, 34–36).  
Women partnered with African nongovernmental organizations like Femmes Africa 
Solidarité (FAS), international organization agencies like the United Nations Fund for Women 
(UNIFEM), and subregional organizations the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
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(IGAD) Women’s Desk. Through the external brokerage of the Femme Africa Solidarité (FAS), 
Burundi women met with Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the facilitator of the Arusha talks. He in turn 
convened a meeting with leaders of the political parties’ delegations to talks where the women 
presented their case for participation. From then on, he persuaded the negotiating parties to 
include women in the talks despite the political parties’ refusal and so acted as an advocate of the 
women’s cause. The Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, an African peace resource NGO brokered 
the Sixth Clan including the Save Somali Women and Children and the Kenyan mediating agent 
by requesting that the mediator include women in the Somali National Reconciliation 
Conference (2002–5), presenting their case for official recognition and endorsing the 
organization’s demand for the incorporation of women’s issues in the agreement.5 The UNIFEM 
and IGAD women’s desk also advocated for the inclusion of Sudanese women in the Naivasha 
talks. 
Women used their own strategies and appropriated those developed by external allies to 
demand that negotiating parties and mediating agents incorporate their concerns in the 
negotiation protocol. Like the Somaliland women at the Boroma conference and the Liberia 
Women Initiative at the Abuja talks (1995), the women petitioned for space on the agenda to 
present their views to delegates at negotiations. They lobbied delegates individually at the 
conference venue and distributed statements expressing their position and recommendations like 
the Burundi women, South Sudan women, and the Liberian Women Initiative. South Somali 
women delegates to the Somali National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti (2000) borrowed 
and improvised on the clan identity when they organized as the Sixth clan coalition. In the 
                                                 
5 NPI-A letter to the Chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee, 28 February 2003, seeking observer status for the 12 
women members of the Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) organization. 
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absence of a central government, clans (community level units) served as the basis for 
participation in the negotiations (Abdullah 2007, 73). Women realized that they could exercise 
greater influence if they united their efforts and voted as a bloc and not from within their clans. 
In this way, women leveraged their numbers, autonomy and unity to pressure male delegates to 
work towards peace and include women’s concerns in the discussions and agreements. One of 
the demands women made was for a 10% women’s quota in the future Transitional National 
Assembly. According to one account of the South Somali women’s campaign (Abdullah 2007, 
27), they deployed religious traditions supportive of women by arguing for their right to political 
participation from within Islam, kept to Islamic codes of conduct and dress and allied with 
intellectual groups, other civil society activists and the Al-Islah, a moderate Islamic movement 
that had strong influence at the Arta talks (IGAD 2005, 29). Women used the emotional power of 
buraanbur (traditional poetry) expressing the suffering women and children experienced from 
war to get male delegates to pay serious attention to negotiating peace (Dyck 2003, 17; Timmons 
2004, 18; Tongeren, et. al. 2005, 119).  
 Most accounts of the campaigns show that women leveraged their partnership with 
external allies gave them to get their demands incorporated in the negotiations discussions and 
agreement. The Burundi campaign illustrates the important role of external brokerage in 
enhancing women’s advantage by giving greater weight to their demands and helping them work 
with the constraints negotiation rules placed on their participation. In their account of the 
women’s peace campaign, Klot, Burke, and Bunting (2001, 16) refer to the use of strategic 
scheduling of meetings by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and the UNIFEM. Some of these, 
like the All Party Women’s Conference mentioned earlier, served the double purpose of building 
support among women divided along ethnic and political party interests and of persuading the 
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delegates to incorporate women’s concerns into the negotiation agenda and agreement. Strategic 
scheduling of meetings involved convening meetings ahead of key negotiation committee 
meetings. These pre-negotiation meetings addressed women’s concerns regarding their 
participation, negotiation agenda and final agreement. They were aimed at the 19 delegations of 
the negotiating parties. Discussion of these concerns fed into the actual negotiation committee 
meetings and so influenced the incorporation of gender concerns in the agreement.  
At one such meeting, a high level briefing on how women’s rights could be incorporated 
into the formal accord (June, 2000), women experts from Eritrea, Guatemala, South Africa and 
Uganda briefed the heads of the 19 delegations, facilitation team, envoys of international and 
regional organizations, donor agencies, and countries with special ties to Burundi. These women 
experts drew on their experience of political participation in countries emerging from violent 
conflict. This briefing took place before the establishment of Committee V on Guarantees on 
Implementation of Agreements Emanating from the Peace Negotiations and before the 
Committee II on Democracy and Governance made final amendments. The Committee IV on 
Reconstruction and Development also held gender sensitive workshops that were open to the 
participation of the Burundi women peace activists. At a third meeting, the All-Party Women’s 
conference (July 2000), women representatives from political parties, refugee communities, 
diaspora, professions, civil society, and women’s peace campaigns discussed gender issues in the 
protocols of the peace accords. They used the Convention on Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) to guide 
their recommendations. Finally, the MNF and UNIFEM facilitated closed door sessions with the 
mediator, former South African President Nelson Mandela where women presented their 
recommendations for a gender sensitive peace accord.  
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The UNIFEM and IGAD Women’s desk also made strategic use of meetings that helped 
South Somali women have their demands included in the final agreement of the Somali National 
Reconciliation Conference (2002–4). One such meeting, a Consultative meeting supported by 
UNIFEM, reviewed the progress made by women from opposing sides of the conflict had made 
(IGAD 2005, 32). The IGAD Women’s Desk, UNIFEM, and UNDP also organized a workshop 
to review draft reports produced by the technical committees (IGAD News March-April 2003, 
6). Strategic meetings, such as those convened by UNIFEM and MNF in Burundi and by 
UNIFEM and FAS for the Somali women delegates, helped women assess whether their 
demands were being incorporated in the agenda, agree on action required to get neglected 
demands adopted and make recommendations for changes in the drafted documents that reflected 
women’s concerns. Strategic meetings were also learning opportunities for women delegates 
who were engaging for the very first time with a political process of this kind. In the Burundi and 
South Somali meetings experts addressed women on topics addressed in the committee sessions, 
such as federalism, disarmament, and demobilization, women’s role in conflict resolution and 
reconciliation and proposals for a women’s quota in parliament and regional government 
positions (IGAD 2005, 31). These presentations help them understand what was involved and 
expected of them as delegates. Women also learned about international policy documents on 
women’s rights and women and peace that they used to frame their demands for inclusion and 
also for a gender sensitive agenda.  
In conclusion, women mobilized support for their demands through use of interpersonal 
networks at the national, subregional, and regional level and the external brokerage of 
international allies. The interpersonal networks and external brokerage allowed them direct 
interaction with mediating agents, conflicting parties and international actors. The external 
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brokerage also made it possible for women to produce a common agenda despite the difficulties 
of overcoming political and other differences. They also relied on local and international media 
to diffuse their demands for participation, for the inclusion of their concerns in the negotiation 
and to express dissatisfaction with their exclusion by mediating agents, their position on the war 
and recommendations. The attention this drew put pressure on the mediating agent to include 
them in the process as in Liberia or in the post-implementation process like in the Sudan.  
7.2 Religious Leaders’ Participation in the Negotiations  
In the previous chapter I showed how the Contact Group (Mozambique), Inter-Faith 
Mediation Committee (Liberia), Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, and the New Sudan 
Council of Churches established contact with fighting groups to persuade them to negotiate an 
end to war and later initiated face-to-face talks. These initiatives opened the way for formal 
negotiations between the parties in Mozambique, Liberia, and South Sudan, and the resumption 
of talks that had failed like in Sierra Leone. Campaign accounts and reports show the religious 
leaders’ participation in formal negotiations came by way of the credibility they had gained 
brokering communication between disputing parties. The Contact Group’s brokering of 
FRELIMO government and RENAMO agreement to talk led to Archbishop Gonçalves’ 
participation in the mediation team at the Rome talks. The ECOWAS Standing Committee on 
Mediation called on the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee of Liberia to participate in formal 
negotiations it convened for the Liberian armed groups. The ECOWAS and UN also requested 
the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone to participate in the Lome talks. Conflicting parties 
developed trust in religious leaders and saw them as nonpartisan. Also, international actors 
convening the mediations, like the ECOWAS, invited them to participate in the formal 
negotiations because of their brokerage skills.  
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Participating in formal negotiations allowed religious leaders to be credible agents of 
peace within the official process by engaging directly with the armed groups and persuading 
them to commit to the process. Religious leaders’ participation at the talks did not vary much. 
Except for Archbishop Gonçalves who participated as a mediator in the Mozambican talks, the 
religious leaders continued with their brokerage role within the negotiations to end war in 
Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In the north-south Sudan talks, the religious leaders had 
an observer status with no voting rights. Mediating agents relied on them to break deadlocks by 
pressuring parties to return to the table and continue with the talks. For example, when the 
RENAMO leader Alphonse Dhlakama refused to continue negotiations with the FRELIMO 
government, the Churches’ Contact Group travelled to Nairobi (March 1992) to persuade him to 
return to the talks. During the meeting with him, they pointed out the need to show mercy to the 
Mozambican people who were suffering from the drought and famine affecting country at the 
time (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998, 28–33). They also rallied the support of influential heads 
of state in the region, to pressure parties to continue with negotiations they had abandoned. Also, 
the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone brokered communication between the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), Charles Taylor (who supported the RUF), and the President of Guinea 
Conakry (PR Newsire [New York], 15 April 1999) with the aim of persuading the leaders of the 
two countries to resolve their differences and move the Sierra Leone peace process forward. At 
the end of a meeting with Charles Taylor, where RUF representatives were present, he expressed 
to the religious leaders his commitment to helping find a solution to the war in Sierra Leone 
(Sierra Leone News, 16 and 17 April 1999).  
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Participation in formal negotiations did not prevent the religious leaders from making 
public calls for peace. They continued issuing statements, appeals for peace and pastoral letters 
commenting on the progress of the negotiations. Although religious leaders were careful to 
remain nonpartisan and avoid making statements that would jeopardize the negotiations, some 
like the late Archbishop Michael Francis expressed their criticism publicly. Woods observes that 
during the Cotonou negotiations, the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) disagreed sharply 
with the direction of the negotiations (August-September 1994). The Roman Catholic 
Archbishop Michael Francis, in particular, argued that the Cotonou agreement was an 
“appeasement” because it “rewarded crime, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle of violence, and 
rendering genuine national reconciliation difficult, if not impossible.” The Bishop opposed it on 
“legal, moral and religious grounds” (Woods 1996, 29–30). This did not endear him to the armed 
groups and he was a target of their intimidation. Nevertheless, the religious leaders’ overall 
concern was for a process that included all parties to the conflict and an agenda and agreement 
that reflected the needs of the suffering population, especially the respect for their human rights.  
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on a particular phase of the women and religious leaders’ 
campaigns to end war—their direct engagement with formal talks as participants. I sought to 
account for why and how religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized to participate in the 
negotiations. However, my account focuses on the women’s campaigns to participate in the 
negotiations. Unlike the women, religious leaders’ participated in formal negotiations largely by 
invitation and because of the credibility gained as communication brokers. Women, on the other 
hand, were uninvited and had to mobilize collectively to gain entry. Thus my account of the 
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campaign to engage directly with formal negotiations focuses on the women’s campaigns and 
briefly mentions religious leaders’ path to engaging directly with the formal negotiations.  
In answer to why women mobilized to directly engage with the formal negotiations, I 
initially argued that: a) they wanted an inclusive peace agreement, b) they wanted to ensure 
conflicting parties committed to ending the war, and c) in some instances, women seem to 
promote the agenda of conflicting parties they affiliated with. Similar to what I did in my 
account of the campaign to end war in Chapters 5 and 6, I proposed a sketch of the process 
leading to the choice to engage directly with formal negotiations, beginning with the key 
moments that compel women to consider their participation in formal negotiations. As for how 
the women collectively acted to engage directly with the formal negotiations, I argued that they 
did so by scaling their coordination of action to the regional and international arenas where the 
formal negotiations occurred. Also, they down-scaled action at the regional and international 
levels to the national level through report-back activities aimed at women and the public.  
According to the evidence, frustration with the conflicting parties’ refusal to compromise 
and to commit to implementing peace accords, and continued violence and insensitivity to the 
suffering endured by the population compelled the religious leaders and women groups to 
engage directly with the negotiations. However, three main factors led to the women’s 
reconsideration of the nature of their engagement with formal negotiations. First, the conflicting 
parties lack of credible commitment to negotiating an end to war and to implementing the 
accords ensured continued threats to their physical integrity, such as sexual abuse, and to their 
economic and welfare activities. Second, women saw in the conflicting parties’ and mediating 
agents’ apparent lack of concern for their issues, especially their abuse by combatants and their 
economic deprivation, the need to present their own concerns instead of depending on male 
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delegates to do so. Third, women saw in the increasing international discourse on women’s 
empowerment in political decision-making processes a justification for their full participation in 
formal negotiations. Thus, women saw participation as crucial to ensuring their concerns 
received the serious attention they deserved from conflicting parties and the mediating agents. 
They also saw in participation an opportunity to be gain official recognition as peacemakers and 
so participate in political decision-making on equal terms with male delegates. The women 
framed their participation role in terms of women’s right to participate in political decision 
making processes. To break through cultural constraints excluding their participation on gender 
identity, they appealed to failure of male leaders to fulfill cultural obligations of protecting 
women, children, and elderly. In pursuing official recognition, women sought to change thinking 
and behavior of conflicting parties and the public on who participates in decisions regarding the 
termination of war and on what issues inform the final settlement. Like in the campaign to end 
war, the women saw their participation as an opportunity to gain recognition as key political 
actors in the democratization process.  
Evidence shows that women mobilized to gain entry into the negotiations by diffusing 
their alternative theory of inclusive participation in formal negotiations to elicit support of other 
women, conflicting parties, mediating agents, and regional actors with a stake in the conflict. In 
reconstructing the diffusion of this story I showed that across the women’s campaigns this 
occurred mainly through encounters and conversations, the media, brokerage of external actors, 
and upscaling of coordination as the main mechanisms. The construction of the women’s 
alternative theory of participation—the gender agenda—built on their alternative theory of war 
and its resolution and extended it to include the need for women’s representation and equal 
participation, incorporation of women’s concerns in the negotiation agenda and their rights in 
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future political institutions including a new constitution. Even though campaign activists built on 
the support base comprising women’s organizations operating at the grassroots level, the nature 
of encounters and conversations seemed to limit participation to elite women given that they took 
place in capital cities, international venues not accessible to nonelite women, and involved 
deliberations with participants such as international experts that nonelite women would find easy 
to participate in. This contrasts with the campaigns to end war where processes of forging an 
alternative theory seemed open to the participation of ordinary women as demonstrated in the 
WIPNET–Liberia mass campaign for peace and the Somali women’s peace movement.  
Also in contrast to the compaign to end war, external brokers played a prominent role in 
composing the gender agenda. Accounts of meetings to develop the gender agenda are few. 
However those describing the processes in Burundi, South Somalia, and Sudan peace campaigns 
show that ethnic divisions, political party interests and fear of breaching cultural requirements 
informed the competition over the formulation of the gender agenda thus making it difficult to 
build on women’s shared experience of the war. In these particular campaigns, external brokers 
also took on the role of facilitating the composition of the alternative theory of inclusive 
participation by shifting the basis of the gender agenda from subjective experience of war to the 
objective norms of international women’s rights that applied to all regardless of race, class, and 
identity.  
Although encounters and conversations women had with their support base, conflicting 
parties, mediating agents and influential regional actors are main diffusion mechanisms, the 
brokerage of external allies and advocates was crucial to securing adoption of some of the 
women’s concerns in the final accords, some form of participation in the negotiations and in 
future political institutions created by the accords. External brokers achieved this through 
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strategic scheduling of meetings to influence deliberations on the protocols of the accord and 
also through lobbying mediating agents to allow for participation of women. This indicates the 
encounters and conversations initiated by women campaign initiators were not sufficient on their 
own. It was necessary for external brokerage to elicit support for the women’s alternative theory 
of participation from mediating agents and conflicting parties.  
Women’s diffusion of the shared story at regional and international venues of the formal 
negotiations scaled coordination of their campaign for peace from the national level up to the 
transnational level. Their report back activities down-scaled action at the regional to level to the 
national one. Upscaling the coordination of activities to the regional and international level 
remained a challenge for women who had few if any resources to do so. Again the brokerage of 
international allies like the Femmes Africa Solidarité and UNIFEM was crucial in mobilizing the 
required resources for travel to the international venues of formal negotiations. The use of media 
to diffuse the shared story varies across campaigns. The women made greater use of print and 
electronic media (radio and television) to publish demands for their inclusive participation and 
communicate the women’s gender agenda. However, the evidence shows an ad hoc instead of 
strategic use of the media to diffuse their story to the general public. In only one case, the South 
Somali women’s participation in the Mbagathi (Kenya) negotiations (2003), did women make 
use of internet service to communicate progress on developments at the talks to the public in 
Somalia. The Burundi women relied on encounters and conversations with women in the 
countryside to report back developments at the talks.  
Similar to the campaign to end war, the evidence I used to make my arguments varies in 
detailed descriptions of the processes leading to women’s mobilization to participate in the 
formal negotiations. However, the women’s campaigns show that civic groups will mobilize to 
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participate in formal negotiations when these fail to create the conditions the people require for 
survival, i.e., recover their livelihoods and lead a normal life. Specifically when conflicting 
parties refuse to compromise and to demonstrate credible commitment to implementing 
negotiated settlements by ending violence and restoring order, and instead pursue their own 
power interests to the exclusion of socioeconomic concerns of the population, civic groups will 
collectively act for a change in thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and mediating agents, 
and in the conduct of the negotiations. In answer to how civic groups mobilize to engage directly 
with the formal negotiations, the women’s campaigns show that they will do so by proposing an 
alternative understanding that expands on who participates in the negotiations and on the terms 
of the negotiation by demanding an inclusive agenda and participation. They will depend on 
imposition, lobbying, the media, and the strategic use of encounters and conversations in which 
the external brokerage of influential international allies plays a key role. Unlike the campaign to 
end war, creative appropriation and improvisation of cultural identity is prominent in one case—
the Somali women’s campaigns.  
The religious leaders’ path shows that in some instances, civic group engagement may 
come by way of credibility gained through previous communication brokerage roles and success 
in getting conflicting parties to the negotiating table. Thus, collective mobilization to participate 
in formal negotiations is not the only way that civic groups may engage with negotiations 
directly. Similar to the campaigns for peace, the women’s campaign to participate in formal 
negotiations did not alter the thinking and behavior of conflicting parties. The conflicting parties 
resisted women’s direct engagement as autonomous actors with the right to make decisions. 
Negotiating parties sought to exclude women or at best limit their participation to affiliation with 
political parties, civil society organizations, or within cultural constraints. Nevertheless, through 
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the influence of external allies, conflicting parties agreed to include gender formulations in some 
of the peace accords. 
The women’s mobilization to participate in formal negotiations and the religious leaders 
involvement in formal negotiations shows that civic groups were not frustrated with the formal 
negotiations per se but with the failure of conflicting parties to compromise, commit to ending 
war and work together to implement negotiated settlements. This frustration indicates civic 
groups’ lack of trust in the capacity of conflicting parties to represent them as leaders, to go 
beyond their own interests and address those of the suffering population. It also indicates their 
concern with offering an alternative way of negotiating and implementing accords to the highly 
polarized, uncompromising, and intransigent one conflicting parties pursued. The women used 
the social power I described in Chapter 5, to access formal negotiations that are largely exclusive 
and male dominated, especially since they had neither the political and economic power to 
fundamentally change the rules of the game. At this level, they faced strong resistance from 
conflicting parties who were suspicious of protecting their chances of gaining power.  
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Chapter 8. CONCLUSION 
This study examined an aspect of peace activism by noncombatant groups: social actors’ 
engagement with formal negotiations. The study focused on religious leader- and women-led 
networks. A number of these groups collectively acted to end war in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Some went further and pursued their peace 
objectives in formal negotiations despite politically adverse conditions. They faced the 
possibility of being seen as political threats to incumbent governments and armed groups 
determined to pursue a military option. Compared to conflicting parties, they did not have the 
military or political leverage to alter the situation for peace. The study sought to find out what 
about the context and conditions made it possible for them to pursue their peace objectives at 
negotiations. What specific conditions in the broader political context and among the civic 
groups accounts for this? How did the civic groups go about engaging with the formal 
negotiations? 
In answer to these questions, two arguments were made. First, certain opportunities 
existed within the risky political conditions of war and in the formal negotiation processes that 
civic groups used to directly engage with the formal negotiations. These had to do with 
conditions related to social actors, such as humanitarian resources, that allowed them to play an 
important role locally and among affected populations. Other conditions are external to social 
actors, such as the international community’s frustration with spoiler strategies conflicting 
parties used to delay, derail, or abandon talks. These made it possible for social actors to act in 
support of advancing the negotiation process. Second, social actors’ understandings of the 
violent internal conflict as “suffering” and “not the voice of the people” motivated their demand 
for an end to war and its peaceful resolution. More importantly, the frustration ordinary people 
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felt at conflicting parties’ failure to end war—“people’s suffering”—led civic groups to pursue 
their objectives for peace by directly engaging with the formal negotiations. This argument 
focused attention on conditions in the broader political environment, conditions specific to the 
formal negotiation process and conditions specific to social actors’ experiences and 
understandings of war—that is, cognitive factors.  
Peace movement studies do not fully address the question of social actors’ engagement 
with formal negotiations. However, they do suggest answers to what makes peace movements 
possible. These studies emphasized factors in the external environment that are favorable to 
peace action, such as liberal political systems, the free market economy, and Protestant 
Christianity, or factors that constrained peace movement actors, such as restrictive political 
conditions. Scholars also suggested factors to do with social actors, such as the unjust nature of 
wars. Similar to this study’s initial argument, the literature emphasized features of the domestic 
and international political environment and of social actors. They are close to the arguments that 
appear in political process theories regarding what makes peace action possible—political 
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and cultural frames. 
Insights from the peace movement literature and the political process were useful for 
answering the “what” part of my question. However, they did not provide an adequate answer to 
the “how” part of the question. This focused attention on a process leading to social actors’ 
engagement in formal negotiations. In other words, my argument focused on identifying what 
factors made engagement possible and suggests this engagement as a result of a process. This 
required conceptual tools that would allow for a reconstruction of the sequence of events linking 
the conditions to social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. The dynamics of contention 
(DOC) framework, a political process model, provided the conceptual tools that helped achieve 
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this task. The overall interest in understanding social actors’ peace actions from their perspective 
and the study’s focus on what happened and how led to the use of a particularizing strategy of 
specific history. This allows for a reconstruction of events that account for what happened and 
also for how it happened using this specific inquiry’s intrinsic and extrinsic narrative analysis. 
With regard to what happened to make social actors engage with formal negotiations, the 
findings can be summarized in the following argument: conflicting parties’ war strategies 
destabilized economic and social life, creating complex humanitarian crises. The population’s 
inability to cope with these conditions, and humanitarian actors’ inability to mitigate the 
humanitarian crises, leads them to reconsider their role. This results in a process of attribution, 
where civic groups “theorize” an alternative understanding of war as suffering and their role as 
peace agents. Social actors appropriate social resources—social bases, networks of kin, family 
and other personal relations, humanitarian resources, cultural and religious resources, 
international networks of influential contacts, international discourse favoring inclusion of 
women, and civil society actors in peace and other political processes— and use them to 
disseminate their alternative understandings of war to the public, conflicting parties, and 
international actors.  
Social actors also create new vehicles to coordinate peace action in public sites and 
among conflicting parties. They engage in contentious interaction—communication brokerage, 
strategic use of meetings, lobbying, petitions, shaming strategies, emotional displays, prayers, 
and pastoral letters—targeting conflicting parties, members of the public, and international 
actors. The failure of conflicting parties to negotiate an end to war and restore order leads to their 
engagement with formal negotiations. The particular paths to engagement, however, differ across 
some cases. Religious leaders are invited to negotiations. Some are excluded. Some actors lobby 
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and demand to be included. Others pursue contentious interaction at negotiation venues aimed at 
shaming conflicting parties into negotiating an agreement. In other instances, mediating agents 
provide for the participation of civic groups. In conclusion, a combination of conditions having 
to do with structure and agency accounts for social actors’ engagement with negotiations. Their 
engagement points to an opening—the lack of moderate political leaders and a politically 
moderate space—that peace activists fill. However, their ability to act effectively depends on 
social resources they have and political agility in using these resources to engage in formal 
negotiations. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This study’s findings are particular to the specific actors and time period in which they 
operated. Nevertheless the findings highlight the following contributions to theory.  
The study tests the DOC framework on a set of non-Western cases of peace activism.  
The study contributes to an understanding of formal negotiations from the perspective of 
social actors.  
The study raises two themes for further consideration. First, peacemaking needs to 
reconsider the question of legitimacy and not just focus on power and political representation 
concerns of conflicting parties. The problem is not just one of power or wealth sharing (political 
and economic power); it is also one of legitimacy (people’s consent to be ruled by conflicting 
parties). The legitimacy question turns on the degree of commitment conflicting parties or 
political leaders have in society. Second, it raises the question of creating and expanding a 
politically moderate space. The findings show that peace activists acted as political moderates in 
contexts where politics were dominated by political elites with extreme positions. Studies of 
peacemaking seem to neglect the challenge of expanding politically moderate spaces to counter 
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the dominance of an extremist political elite, yet moderates are crucial to altering the situation 
for peace. Local peacebuilding interventions are creating moderate spaces below. Creation of 
moderate spaces above needs to happen alongside these.  
Studies of peacemaking in postcolonial Africa focus on the contributions made by 
external mediating agents. They ignore the difficult groundbreaking work by domestic actors that 
facilitates formal negotiations. This involves breaking the culture of silence and fear, mobilizing 
public opinion for an alternative peaceful end to war, developing constituencies for peace, and all 
this without a critical mass of politically moderate elites willing to do the same at the political 
level. This groundbreaking activity needs to be accounted for in mediation analyses.  
Policy and Practice Contributions 
The findings of this study show that: 
Mediation interventions should be informed by social reality and not just the political and 
economic state of affairs. Concerns regarding political power and wealth sharing are important. 
Addressing them well leads to greater political stability and an environment conducive for long-
term economic development. However, these should be balanced with social concerns resulting 
from war’s destructive consequences on people’s lives and livelihoods. 
Mediation agents, their sponsors, or guarantors of the peace process should consider, 
seriously, the value domestic actors bring to the negotiation process instead of being preoccupied 
with the integrity of a process designed originally for interstate and not intrastate wars. Analysts 
of mediation and negotiations have recommended the need to redesign the process so that what it 
addresses and how it is consistent with social, political, and economic reality and closer to 
people’s aspirations for peace. A redesigned mediation process may need to include social actors 
as direct participants in some way. Unless negotiation agreements secure a lasting peace, social 
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actors are likely to make demands for inclusion. Mediators may have to draw on their knowledge 
and expertise.  
Domestic peace activists and practitioners need to be prepared for the level of political 
sophistication required to engage directly with peace negotiations. This allows them to gain 
credibility and sustain action. Problems mediators face, for instance, stalling and delaying tactics 
and intransigence would best be addressed by politically astute domestic actors at this level.  
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Appendix 1. PEACE CAMPAIGNS AND KEY ACTORS IN AFRICA: 1990-2005 
Peace Campaigns Key Actor(s) and Members 
The campaign for peace and reconciliation in 
Mozambique  
Mozambican Churches Task Force/Contact Group (Commission on Peace and 
Reconciliation of the Mozambican Council of Churches, Catholic Episcopal Conference)  
The campaign for peace in Liberia I  Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (Roman Catholic Church, Liberian Council of 
Churches, National Moslem Council of Liberia)  
 Liberia Women’s Peace Initiative (Various women’s organizations and individuals) 
The campaign for peace in Northern Somalia 
(Somaliland)  
Women’s organizations and individuals in Somaliland 
The campaign for peace in Sierra Leone I Women’s Movement for Peace; Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
 Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (Protestant, Evangelical, Catholic and Muslim 
councils of churches). 
The campaign for peace in Burundi The Collectif des Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) and Group of Six 
Women leaders 
The campaign for peace in Sierra Leone II Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone 
The movement for peace in Angola  Conferençia Episcopal de Angola e Sao Tomé–Movimento Pro Pace (Conference of 
Angolan Catholic Bishops Movement for Peace); Council of Churches of Angola; 
Alliance of Evangelicals of Angola  
Comité Inter Ecclésial para Paz em Angola–Rede de Paz (the Inter-Ecclesiastical 
Committee for Peace in Angola Peace Network) – (CEAST, AEA and CICA, Civic 
organizations, Traditional authority figures);  
The campaign for peace in South Sudan New Sudan Council of Churches (Southern Sudanese Protestant and Evangelical 
Churches, Roman Catholic church); Sudan Ecumenical Forum (Sudan churches and their 
International Partners e.g., WCC, AACC, Caritas Network).  
 Sudan Women’s Peace Initiative; Southern Women Group (Sudan Women Voice for 
Peace, Sudanese Women Association). 
The campaign for peace in Liberia II Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET); Women in Peace building 
Network–Liberia 
The campaign for peace in South Somalia Save Somali Women and Children – Sixth Clan; IIDA; COGWO; Family Economy and 
Rehabilitation Organization (FERO); 
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Appendix 2. FORMAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TARGETED BY THE NONCOMBATANT PEACE 
CAMPAIGNS 
Formal Peace Negotiation Duration Conflicting Parties Mediator (s) Engagement 
Type 
Engagement  
Mozambican Peace 
Negotiations  
1989–1992 FRELIMO Govt and 
RENAMO 
Sant’ Egidio, 
Mugabe–Zimbabwe, 
Moi-Kenya 
Support and 
Participation 
Pre-negotiations and 
Rome talks 
Liberian Peace 
Negotiations  
1990–2003 Doe Govt, TNG and 
NPFL; TNG and armed 
factions; Taylor 
Government and LURD  
ECOWAS/ECOMOG Support and 
Participation 
(mediator) 
Pre-negotiations and 
Freetown talks, 
1990; All Liberia 
National 
Conference, 1991; 
Accra,1994 ; 
Abuja,1995-96; 
Accra, 2003. 
Somaliland National 
Reconciliation Conferences 
1992–1993 Regional Government of 
Somaliland and Clan 
militia 
Somali Clan Elders Support Talks in 1992; 
Boroma Grand 
Conference 1993;  
Sierra Leone Peace 
Negotiations 
1994–2000 Sierra Leone 
Government and RUF 
OAU, 
Commonwealth, U.K, 
USA, 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG 
Support and 
Participation 
Unclear??? 
Burundi Peace 
Negotiations 
1998–2000 Buyoya government and 
13 political parties 
(including armed wings) 
Regional Heads of 
Government–Nyerere 
(MNF) and Mandela 
(MNF) as mediators 
Support and 
Participation 
Regional Heads of 
Government 
initiative. 
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Formal Peace Negotiation Duration Conflicting Parties Mediator (s) Engagement 
Type 
Engagement  
Angola Peace Negotiations  1993–2002 MPLA government and 
UNITA 
UN/UNAVEM Support Lusaka accords 
implementation 
Sudan Peace Negotiations 
– Machakos and Naivasha 
talks 
2002–2005 Government of Sudan 
and SPLM/A 
Kenya-IGAD  Support/No 
participation  
Machakos and 
Naivasha talks 
South Somali Peace 
Negotiations 
2000–2005 Transitional National 
Government, SRRC, 
armed groups, clan 
leaders, civil society 
groups, representatives 
of Somali diaspora 
Djibouti and IGAD 
(technical committee: 
Djibouti, Ethiopia and 
Kenya, later 
facilitation committee 
with members of all 
IGAD states 
represented) – 
Kiplagat. 
Support and 
Participation 
Arta, Djibouti and 
the Kenya (Eldoret, 
Nairobi) talks (14th 
round of talks, and 
15th  
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Appendix 3. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
AEA Associação de evangélicos de Angola (Angolan Evangelical 
Alliance) 
AFELL Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL) 
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia 
ALSAA Associação Lenoardo Sikufundo – Shalom – Angola association 
that advocates for peasants’ land rights.  
AJPD Associação Justiça, Paz e Democracia Association for Justice, 
Peace and Democracy. 
AU Africa Union 
CAFOB Collectif des Assocations Féminines et ONG du Burundi 
CCM Christian Council of Mozambique 
CEAST Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé (Episcopal 
Conference of Angola and São Tomé)  
CICA Conselho de Igrejas Cristãs em Angola—Council of Christian 
Churches in Angola 
CNDD National Council for the Defence of Democracy 
COGWO Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization 
COIEPA Comité Inter Ecclésial para Paz em Angola (The Inter-Church 
Committee for Peace in Angola) 
CWI Christian Women’s Initiative 
ECGLC Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ECOMOG Economic Community Monitoring Group 
FAA Forças Armadas de Angolanas Armed Forces of Angola 
FAAT Forum das autoridades tradicionais Forum for traditional 
authorities 
FAS Femmes Africa Solidarité  
FDD Forces for the Defence of Democracy 
FLN National Liberation Front 
FONGA Forum das ONGs de Angola  
FRODEBU Front for Democracy in Burundi 
FROLINA Front for National Liberiation  
FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
GARP Grupo Angolano de reflexão para a paz—Angolan Group for the 
Reflection of Peace 
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
IGNU Interim Government of National Unity 
IIDA IIDA Women’s Development Organization 
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
LWI Liberia Women’s Initiative 
MARWOPNET Mano River Women’s Peace Network 
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MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola) 
MRU Mano River Union 
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council 
OAU Organization of African Unity 
PALIPEHUTU Party for the Liberation of Hutu People 
PHRN Peace and Human Rights Network 
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National 
Resistance) 
RRA Rahawein Resistance Army 
RUF/SL Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone 
SDA Somali Democratic Alliance (Gadabursi) 
SDM - Mayo Somali Democratic Movement (Digil/Rahanweyn) 
SDM-Aliyou Somali Democratic Movement (Aliyou) 
SPLM/A Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army 
SPM - Noor Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni) 
SPM - Jess Somali Patriotic Movement (Jess) 
SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front (Merjertein clan) 
SSWC Save Somali Women and Children 
SNF Somali National Front (Siad Barre - Marehan) 
SNM Somali National Movement (Issaq) 
SNU Somali National Union 
SWDA Somaliland Women’s Development Association 
SWO Somaliland Women’s Organization 
ULIMO United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola) 
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
UPRONA Union Pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress) 
USC - Aideed United Somali Congress – Aideed faction (Hawiye/Habar Gidir) 
USC - Mahdi United Somali Congress – Mahdi faction (Hawiye/Abgal) 
USF United Somali Front 
USP United Somali Party 
WIPNET–Liberia Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia 
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